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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the knowledge of the behavioural processes for in-
equality in education and incentives or other solutions to mitigate such effects.
It does so with three empirical essays in the economics of education, each apply-
ing conceptual and methodological insights from behavioural and experimental
economics. The first study in this dissertation seeks to identify the underlying
psychological factors for the persistent relative age effect in education. It tests
for relative age differences in economic preferences that are relevant for decision
making in education, in a large scale laboratory-like experiment in the class-
room. Overall, there is no evidence supporting such conjecture. The second
and third studies in this thesis investigate the effect of incentives to encourage
effort of disadvantaged groups. Specifically, the second study examines the ef-
fect of affirmative action on effort in real effort and cognitively demanding tasks,
in a cross-country laboratory experiment conducted simultaneously in Australia
and in China. The main finding is that, in a context with a real stereotype and
differences in abilities between participants, affirmative action does not influence
effort of the disadvantaged group. Finally, the third study evaluates the effect
of a program which offers strong encouragement for educational achievement of
indigenous high school students. The main conclusion is that such incentives are
mostly effective for females and do not influence the behaviour of adolescents
belonging to the most disadvantaged family backgrounds.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In most developed societies, universal access to primary, secondary and also, to
varying extents, higher education, is a basic principle. Nevertheless, we observe
important disparities with respect to educational attainment across the popu-
lation, due to individual heterogeneity in ability and taste for education, and
inequality of opportunity in education. Inequality of opportunity in education is
depicted early in life and, to a large extent, influenced by circumstances which
restrict individuals’ capability set in the sphere of education. During childhood
and adolescence in particular, individuals need to make important decisions
with respect to educational achievement and career plans. The environment in
which they make these decisions, in particular the family, school, institutional
and cultural context, influences individuals’ choices and outcomes from the ear-
liest stages. Importantly, these contextual factors are powerful predictors of
educational choices via their influence on cognitive skills and also through their
effect on individuals’ internal factors or non-cognitive skills, namely personality
traits and economic preferences, which are important for decision making in
education.1 Examples of these are motivation, self-confidence, self-control, the
1Chowdry et al. (2011) show that the gap in educational outcomes between adolescents
from different socio-economic backgrounds is partly explained by differences in non-cognitive
skills and attitudes, such as self-esteem, positive views toward education, professional aspi-
rations and risk-taking behaviour. Likewise, Castillo et al. (2011) find that children from
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds are more impatient.
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capacity to establish goals and act toward their achievement and risk attitudes.2
In this thesis, I present three empirical essays on the economics of education,
applying conceptual and methodological insights from behavioural and experi-
mental economics. Together, the three studies contribute to the knowledge of
the underlying behavioural mechanisms for the influence of specific contextual
factors on individuals’ decisions in education, and of the effect of incentives or
other solutions designed to attenuate persistent patterns of inequality in educa-
tion. In what follows in this introductory section, I will describe the contribution
and relevance of such efforts to the economics literature, introduce each of the
next three chapters and emphasise the elements that join the three studies in
this thesis.
The investigation of how to mitigate inequality in education is a very rel-
evant topic in itself and, a fortiori, since disparity in educational attainment
can create or intensify inequalities in a plurality of other relevant spheres (e.g.
health, wealth, well-being and social influence). From an economics perspective,
there are two main reasons for public intervention in order to reduce inequality
in education. First, mitigating the disadvantage in educational attainment of
children from less resourceful families is likely to be less costly than late inter-
ventions trying to correct for unsuccessful outcomes, such as training for high
school dropouts, unemployment subsidies and increases in health care costs. The
second main justification are market failures, namely liquidity constraints, infor-
mation asymmetries with respect to the benefits of education between families
from different socio-economic backgrounds and positive externalities of educa-
tion (or social returns) (Currie, 2001).
Besides the economic arguments, mitigating inequality of opportunity in ed-
ucation is important from a social justice perspective. As Amartya Sen (1992)
asserts, “equal consideration for all, may demand very unequal treatment in
favour of the disadvantaged” (p.1). In modern societies, we observe a proclivity
2See, for example, Borghans et al. (2008b), Castillo et al. (2011) and Heckman and Rubin-
stein (2001).
3to vote for redistributive policies, in order to achieve a fair and equitable dis-
tribution of resources. Thus, it is economically and socially desirable to design
public policies oriented toward the provision of support to young individuals
who are disadvantaged in their initial endowments.
In order to make a judgement on the type of policies which are the most ef-
fective in alleviating inequality of opportunity in education, we need to further
the understanding of the psychological mechanisms through which environmen-
tal factors impair educational achievement. We also need to investigate how
individuals’ behaviour is shaped by incentives or other pedagogical solutions
aiming to enhance their liberty of choice in education for predicting the long-
run effects of such interventions. An emerging and expanding research trend in
the economics of education has recently started to explore how specific environ-
mental factors or interventions are associated with regularities in behaviour or
non-cognitive skills, which are important for educational outcomes, by applying
theoretical and methodological insights from behavioural and experimental eco-
nomics.3 Behavioural economics investigates how individuals make decisions,
building on principles from standard economic theory (stability of preferences,
utility maximisation), and integrating insights from other human behavioural
sciences, such as psychology,4 sociology and neuroscience, specifying a more
realistic description of human behaviour (Koch et al., 2014). Unlike psychol-
ogy, behavioural economics assumes that individuals have stable preferences,
but relaxes the assumption that their choices uniquely reflect those preferences.
Instead, behavioural economics integrates the evidence that decisions of eco-
nomic agents are influenced by behavioural biases. These behavioural biases,
such as inconsistent time preferences, self-control problems, preference reversal,
framing effects, social comparisons, status quo bias and over-confidence, are
3See Koch et al. (2014) and Lavecchia et al. (2014) for recent surveys of the literature on
the behavioural economics of education.
4The compelling psychological evidence of discrepancies between individuals’ behaviour
and the predictions of the standard economic theory, in particular by showing that people
dislike losses more than they like gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), laid the foundations
of behavioural economics.
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well-documented in the literature.5 They arise due to the environment in which
the choices are made and individual-specific factors, such as emotions, beliefs
and previous experiences.
These concepts have been recently integrated in the economics of educa-
tion, in order to refine the understanding of the persistence of patterns with
respect to educational trajectories across different groups. In order to do so,
the behavioural economics of education investigates how the interplay between
environmental (e.g. family, school and institutional context) and psychological
factors (e.g. motivation, aspirations, self-confidence, risk attitudes and self-
control) shape individuals’ choices in education.
Thus far, the evidence is very narrow; such analyses have mainly described
the association between socio-economic indicators and non-cognitive skills, espe-
cially, time-discounting behaviour and self-control, and its effect on educational
outcomes.6 In particular, there is little evidence on the psychological mecha-
nisms through which peers may influence educational outcomes. In Chapter 2
in this thesis, I enrich the knowledge of the so-called relative age effect (RAE),
by investigating whether relative age differences among peers influence non-
cognitive skills. The RAE literature consistently shows that arbitrary school
entry rules create a penalty for the youngest children in the cohort on academic
(Bedard and Dhuey, 2006) and sport performance (Musch and Grondin, 2001).
Beyond a positive bias in cognitive skills, there is also evidence suggesting that
children who are relatively young are disadvantaged in their non-cognitive skills
(such as self-esteem (Thompson et al., 2004), leadership (Dhuey and Lipscomb,
2008) and probability of suffering from a psycho-pathology (Goodman et al.,
2003)). Two main transmission channels for the RAE have been discussed:
maturity or absolute age and peer comparisons.7 Children’s relative position
in the age distribution in the classroom may adversely affect younger children’s
self-valuation of their abilities, biasing the development of preferences which are
important for success at school and also later in life. From a policy perspective,
5See Rabin (1998) for a survey.
6See, for example, Castillo et al. (2011).
7See, for example, Musch and Grondin (2001).
5it is important to understand whether psychological factors driven by children’s
relative age in their peer group influence the relative age gap in performance, in
order to discern the type of solutions which are adequate to attenuate this effect.
For instance, if peer comparisons play an important role, it may be beneficial
to design solutions that lessen competition in the school system (e.g. avoid the
use of rankings).
I experimentally elicit preferences for competitive environments, risk atti-
tudes and professional aspirations of 661 high school students, aged 13 to 14
years old, who were born within a two-month window of the cut-off date de-
fined to enter school. The selection of students in this age range was primarily
motivated by the stability of preferences during adolescence (Sutter et al., 2013;
Harbaugh et al., 2002; Borghans et al., 2008a). Overall, I find little evidence
for relative age differences in economic preferences. This study distinguishes
itself from the existing evidence on the RAE as, to the best of my knowledge,
it is the first investigation of the RAE on economic preferences of adolescents.
Moreover, it is the first study that uses the experimental method to measure
relative age differences in adolescents’ non-cognitive skills.
Further behavioural economics research has investigated the relation be-
tween gender differences in taste for competition (that is, the fact that women
tend to shy away from competition when performing against men) and choices
in education,8 and the impact of affirmative action rules designed to attenuate
the potential discouraging effect of gender stereotypes.9 Broadly, affirmative
action (AA) implies positive discrimination and aims to compensate for lower
competitive capacities of social groups who may have been exposed to envi-
ronments which adversely impact educational achievement (e.g. school quality,
peer characteristics and stereotypes), and concurrently increase their incentives
to invest in education. Understanding whether AA encourages effort and influ-
ences beliefs of disadvantaged individuals is fundamental to predict its long-run
8See Ors et al. (2013) and Kleinjans (2009).
9See Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) for a survey.
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effects.
In Chapter 3, I conduct a cross-country laboratory experimental study (in
Australia and in China) to investigate the incentive effects of an AA rule, in
terms of participants’ effort decisions when performing a real effort task in a
tournament setting, in the presence of a real stereotype and asymmetry in abil-
ity. The asymmetry in ability between participants is achieved by the compo-
sition of the participant pool, undergraduate students from an Australian and
a Chinese university, and the nature of the task, a mathematical exercise. The
main finding in this study is that AA does not impact participants’ effort in the
tournament. I also provide evidence for the perception of the stereotype, which
is a central condition for the validity of the experimental design. The main con-
tribution of this study is that, as far as I am aware, it is the first investigation
of the incentive effects of AA combining both a real stereotype (existing prior
to the experiment) and differences in abilities between participants. This is an
important specificity in the design for external validity, given that in real life
situations where such rules are in place, we commonly observe that the tar-
geted minority groups are affected by negative stereotypes and often have lower
qualifications than the majority group (for example in the case of AA rules for
university admission in the US). Another novel aspect in this study is that is
the first cross-country experimental study on AA.
Contrasting with the little evidence on the underlying behavioural processes
for inequality in education, considerable behavioural economics research has
tested the effectiveness of soft incentives designed to encourage successful aca-
demic outcomes, and improve attitudes toward education of economically dis-
advantaged children and adolescents.10 In Chapter 4, I add to the extant
literature, by investigating the impact of symbolic incentives and strong en-
couragement with a new target population, indigenous adolescent students in
Australia. I evaluate the impact of a small scale program targeting academic
10See, for example, Gneezy et al. (2011) and Lavecchia et al. (2014) for a comprehensive
survey.
7outcomes and attitudes toward education of indigenous Australian adolescent
students. They typically have poor academic performance, also lower family
support and encouragement for educational achievement than students from
other family backgrounds. The program evaluated in this study is delivered by
a charity organisation and offers in-kind incentives, learning support and strong
encouragement to all indigenous students enrolled in 21 high schools. Using a
differences-in-differences design, I find that the program improved educational
outcomes for indigenous students, in particular school attendance and teachers’
assessment of performance and behaviour for female students, and standardised
test scores for male students. I also find that the program is only effective for
students from intact families. The novelty in this study is that I believe that it
is the first evaluation of an incentive program in education targeting indigenous
Australian students. This is a very relevant aspect given the policy priority of
increasing educational attainment of the Australian indigenous population and
considerable allocation of public resources toward this end.
There are several elements that closely link the three studies in this thesis.
First, each study contributes to the existing knowledge of inequality in edu-
cation. A plurality of environmental factors promote inequality in education.
The studies in this thesis focus on three of these determinants: peer compar-
isons, stereotypes, family and cultural background. An important aspect is that,
although each chapter places the emphasis on one of these determinants, the
extent to which they generate disparities in educational achievement is influ-
enced by at least one of the other factors. How the interaction between these
environmental factors influences cognitive and non-cognitive skills will be de-
tailed in Section 1.1.2. Another relevant common element of the three studies
presented in this thesis is that they seek to inform public policy on how to cor-
rect behavioural mechanisms, influenced by these environmental factors, that
may lead to inequality in education. Importantly, the findings in each study are
complementary for the formulation of policy recommendations.
The three studies are also related from a methodological perspective. In
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each study, I investigate how individuals respond to incentives in an experimen-
tal or quasi-experimental design. The experimental method in economics allows
studying the causal impact of a particular treatment or stimulus in a highly
controlled environment (the laboratory), or by means of field experiments with
random assignment of the treatment within a sufficiently large participant pool.
In field experiments, there is less control over the environment but the results
may in some cases be more informative given their superior external validity,
in particular, when assessing the impact of policies or interventions targeting
specific groups. Harrison and List (2004) write “An ideal field experiment not
only increases validity, but does so in a manner in which little internal validity
is foregone” (p.1033). However, political and ethical implications often prevent
the use of field experiments. Therefore, evidence from laboratory experiments,
with a participant pool with similar characteristics to those of potential partici-
pants in a field experiment, may constitute the closest predictors of behavioural
adaptations to specific interventions.
In the first study (Chapter 2), I conduct a laboratory-like experiment in the
classroom. I elicit economic preferences of students with standard computer-
based tasks applied in experimental economics research associated with mon-
etary incentives. In the second study (Chapter 3), I conduct a laboratory ex-
periment with a standard participant pool (i.e. university students) who share
relevant characteristics with the participants of a hypothetical field experiment.
In this sense, I try to be as close as possible to a field experiment, by bringing
natural conditions into the laboratory. In the third study (Chapter 4), I explore
the causal impact of incentives in education in a quasi-experimental setting. In
doing so, I create ex post conditions which resemble closely a field experiment
with random assignment of the intervention.
This thesis unfolds as follows. In the remainder of this introductory chap-
ter, I will provide a contextual literature review that motivates the relevance
of research in the (behavioural) economics of education and ties together the
three studies in this thesis. It also complements the more detailed and confined
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literature review contained in Chapters 2 to 4. In Chapter 2, I will present the
first study in this thesis entitled “Relative age effect on adolescents’ economic
preferences: Evidence from a controlled classroom experiment”. I will devote
Chapter 3 to the second study in this thesis, entitled “The impact of affirma-
tive action on effort: Evidence from a cross-country laboratory experiment”. In
Chapter 4, I will present the third study in this thesis, entitled “An evaluation
of an incentive program in education for indigenous students”. I will provide
the concluding elements of this thesis in Chapter 5.
1.1 Contextual background
1.1.1 Importance of education
Education is commonly identified as one of the main elements of human capital
(Becker, 1962). Much attention from (labour) economists has been focused on
the identification of the causal impact of education on labour market outcomes,
in particular earnings (see Card, 2001, for a survey). By receiving formal educa-
tion, individuals acquire skills which increase their productivity and make them
capable of undertaking specific tasks, often associated with higher earnings.
Moreover, a higher level of education signals unobserved abilities (e.g. reliabil-
ity, efficiency) which enhance employability (Weiss, 1995). However, restricting
the analysis to labour market indicators largely underestimates the benefits of
education, as these encompass many other relevant domains of individuals’ lives.
Recently, there has been a growing investigation of the causal impact of educa-
tion on non-pecuniary outcomes.11 I provide below a brief and non-exhaustive
summary of the effects that have been identified in the economics literature (see
Table 1.1.1 for an illustrative summary of the empirical evidence).
11See Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) and Grossman (2006) for a survey of the literature.
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Labour market
With respect to labour market outcomes, education not only increases individ-
uals’ earnings potential, but also reduces the probability of being unemployed
(Riddell and Song, 2011) and improves the quality of the jobs for which individ-
uals are qualified (Duncan, 1976). This is a very important positive aspect of
education, as individuals spend a considerable share of their time in their work
environment. For instance, individuals with higher levels of education are likely
to benefit from better working conditions (e.g. paid holidays, health insurance,
job stability, flexibility of working hours). In addition, they are more likely
to work in challenging and stimulating environments that offer opportunities
for career promotion and may also enhance social relations (Oreopoulos and
Salvanes, 2011).
Health
An individual’s health status is a key predictor of well-being (Viscusi and Evans,
1990) and it is well-established that education has a positive causal effect on
health outcomes. This result is valid across a large range of health indicators,
including mortality rates, self-reported and objective measures of health (see
Grossman, 2006, for a survey). The primary explanation is that more educated
individuals are able to make better health decisions, for instance with respect to
dietary choices, physical exercise, regular health checks and smoking behaviour
(Conti and Heckman, 2010).
Non-cognitive skills
Education is associated with individuals’ non-cognitive skills or personality
traits, but the direction of the causality is unclear. In particular, education may
influence specific preferences, such as patience, risk attitudes, self-confidence
and goal setting skills (Becker and Mulligan, 1997), and these are in turn also
relevant for educational achievement (Borghans et al., 2008b; Chowdry et al.,
2011). Individuals with higher levels of education are arguably better at map-
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ping present choices and consequent future outcomes, and more able to delay
present rewards in favour of more desirable future outcomes. Additionally, time
spent in school promotes the development of social skills that facilitate inter-
action and communication with others, as well as the propensity to trust other
people (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Education also has a positive impact
on parenting skills, in particular for women (Hoff et al., 2002; Kalil et al., 2012)
and child health (Currie and Stabile, 2003). Furthermore, women with higher
levels of education are better able to plan fertility (Lam and Duryea, 1999;
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011).
Consumption value
Education has consumption value, in particular through social interactions ex-
perienced at school, the personal satisfaction from learning and the expectation
of qualifying for occupations associated with high prestige. Furthermore, edu-
cation enhances individuals’ prospects in the marriage market, as couples tend
to sort, among other traits, according to education (Lafortune, 2013). Using
Rawls’ (1971) terminology, education is a primary good, defined as things that
a rational person wants and which include basic liberties, freedom of movement
and choice of occupation, income and wealth and the social bases of self-respect.
Social returns, externalities
Besides the private benefits of education described above, there are also impor-
tant associated social returns. In fact, education can also be seen as a common
good. For instance, there is evidence that high school graduation reduces the
probability of participating in criminal activity (Lochner and Moretti, 2004).
Two different mechanisms are compatible with this effect. First, individuals
who complete high school have better labour market prospects and therefore
will be less likely to engage in criminal activity. In addition, higher levels of
education may increase the psychological cost of committing a crime, and as
aforementioned, it may influence individuals’ preferences, thereby reducing the
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
probability of engaging in criminal activities. Other studies find that education
encourages voter turnout (Dee, 2004a). A potential channel may be the fact that
education develops critical thinking and facilitates processing complex political
information, thereby decreasing the cost of voting. Additionally, it increases
the benefit of voting, by giving informed citizens utility from expressing their
political opinion and reinforces the notion that voting is a civic duty. Likewise,
Glaeser et al. (2007) find that education promotes democracy, through an in-
crease in civic participation. Furthermore, the aggregate level of human capital
of a country is a major factor of economic growth and innovation (Romer, 1990).
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1.1.2 Determinants of educational attainment
The determinants of educational attainment have received considerable atten-
tion in the economics and behavioural biology literature. It is common to clas-
sify these determinants into two categories: nature and nurture. Nature refers
to children’s innate characteristics which are inherited from their parents, via
the genotype. In particular, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities of a child
will be at least partly determined by his or her parents’ abilities. The sec-
ond category, nurture, refers to the influence of the child’s environment and
personal experiences, such as parenting practices, financial wealth, peers, expe-
riences at school and the institutional framework. While it is not feasible to
shape inherited abilities of a child, it is possible to attenuate the influence of
environmental conditions which are significant predictors of children’s cognitive
skills and personality traits that affect educational choices. The investigation of
how to mitigate the adverse influence of environmental factors on educational
attainment is relevant for public policy and constitutes the core of this thesis.
In what follows in this section, I will describe a simple sketch of a model,
based on the seminal work by Becker and Tomes (1986).12 I will refer to this
model in the discussion of the potential mechanisms through which the con-
textual factors that I chose to analyse in this thesis may influence educational
attainment, and how the three studies in this thesis are conceptually linked.
In the model, educational attainment (H) is influenced by individuals’ in-
nate abilities (Et) and environmental factors. These are mainly defined by
experiences within the family environment, via parenting practices (Pt) and fi-
nancial resources (Xt). Other contextual factors, the school environment (St),
through the curriculum, class size, teachers’ and peers’ characteristics, and the
institutional framework (It) also influence children’s educational achievement.
12The Becker and Tomes (1986) model describes the intergenerational transmission of hu-
man capital placing a central role on parental investments in children’s skills.
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Ht+1 = f(Et, Pt, Xt, St, It)
Children’s abilities (Et) are at least partly determined by nature, a cohort
effect and luck in the transmission process. The innate ability endowment of a
child can be represented as follows:
Et = αt + hEt−1 + vt (1.1)
where Et−1 denotes parents’ unobserved cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
The parameter h represents the degree of inheritability. If individuals’ cognitive
and non-cognitive skills are fully determined genetically, h will be very close to
unity. The parameter αt represents cohort effects or public expenditure which
impact educational achievement of a given cohort and vt represents luck, or an
unsystematic effect which impacts children’s innate abilities.
The debate on the relative importance of nature versus nurture on educa-
tional achievement has been the centre of attention of many scholars in the
areas of human behavioural genetics and also more recently in behavioural eco-
nomics. Twin studies suggest that both nature (pre-natal factors) and nurture
(post-natal factors) impact children’s trajectories. Moreover, the interaction be-
tween nature and environmental factors, or the phenotype, is also an important
contributing factor for the persistence of inequality in education.13 Accordingly,
in the Becker and Tomes (1986) model, a child’s inherited ability influence the
marginal productivity of contextual variables.
δ2H
δJδEt
> 0, J = P,X, S
If a child’s inherited ability is higher or parents’ cognitive abilities are higher,
any investment in children’s human capital will be more productive. This prop-
erty implies that environmental factors reinforce inequality in education between
children with different levels of innate ability. Moreover, parents’ investment
13See Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes (2011) for a survey.
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decisions in the education of their children will be influenced by their own ed-
ucational endowments. Parents with higher levels of education may be more
aware of the value of investment in education and may be better at discerning
the quality of different schools. Likewise, parents with higher cognitive skills
may be less financially constrained when deciding on the allocation of resources
in their children’s education.
Although the framework proposed by Becker and Tomes (1986) is useful in
order to schematise the determinants of educational attainment investigated in
this thesis, it is to some extent restricted in the description of the mechanisms
for educational choices. For instance, the model simplifies the life cycle of an
individual by considering only two periods, childhood and adulthood, and does
not take into consideration the fact that during childhood the early environment
is very important for depicting educational trajectories. In addition, the model
does not take into account the psychological factors that impact decision making
in education.
1.1.2.1 Environmental factors
In this section, I will discuss how contextual factors (family characteristics,
school environment and institutions) and their interplay, influence cognitive
and non-cognitive skills that are relevant predictors of educational achievement.
Family characteristics
Whether an individual is born in an affluent family, or alternatively in a poor
family, is independent of his or her will but it conditions choices and outcomes.
Recent studies have confirmed the early observation by Coleman (1968), identi-
fying parenting quality as the main predictor of disparities in children’s cogni-
tive and non-cognitive skills.14 Besides the genetic argument, there are several
mechanisms for the intergenerational correlation of abilities and attitudes. First,
14See, for example Heckman (2006).
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families with low educational background may be less able to stimulate the de-
velopment of cognitive skills of their children. Moreover, parents with low levels
of education might also be less able to discern the benefits of education and
therefore, to support and encourage their children to realise their full potential.
Furthermore, children tend to imitate the behaviour of their parents (Capaldi
and Clark, 1998). In particular, parents’ behaviour is likely to play a major
role in the development of non-cognitive skills, in particular those which are
mainly the product of social learning, such as social preferences, risk attitudes
(Dohmen et al., 2012), self-control (Kosse and Pfeiffer, 2012) and health choices
(Wickrama et al., 1999).
Financial wealth also conditions children’s educational attainment, via ac-
cess to better childcare institutions and schools. More affluent families are also
better able to pay for extra learning support if their children experience learn-
ing difficulties. Also, financial resources may condition adolescents’ perspectives
with respect to the possibility of pursuing post-secondary education, and con-
sequently influence their goals for academic performance.
Of the critical factors for the systematic lower academic performance of
indigenous Australian students compared to their non-indigenous counterparts
(which motivates the study in Chapter 4), the most important is the fact that
they are over-represented among families with poor educational background
and other socio-economic indicators (e.g. participation in the labour market,
income, health).
School environment and peer influence
The most obvious explanation for the fact that children’s experiences at school
impact the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, is the quality of
the school, via the quality of the instruction and class size. Another impor-
tant reason is the so-called peer effects. Peer effects define any externalities
on children’s behaviour or outcomes driven by the background, behaviour or
outcomes of their peers (Sacerdote, 2011). There is evidence of peer influence
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on students’ academic outcomes, with low and average ability students bene-
fiting from high achieving peers (Zimmer, 2003). Furthermore, there is strong
evidence of peer effects in social behaviour, such as the propensity to use drugs,
alcohol consumption and dropping out of school (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001).
Although observational studies strongly suggest that peers influence a wide
range of outcomes, our understanding of the underlying psychological processes
is very limited. In both the psychology and economics literature, it has been
proposed that peer comparisons may influence individuals’ academic outcomes
and behaviour, by exerting a bias on individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura,
1993; Manski, 2000). In particular, goal setting may be influenced by individu-
als’ self-valuation of their ability relative to their peers (Bandura, 1993). Those
who are more confident in their relative ability are more optimistic and therefore
will set higher goals for their own achievement as opposed to individuals with
a lower perceived self-efficacy.
More recently, there has been a debate on whether peer comparisons in the
classroom based on relative age differences could at least partly explain the
persistent disparity in educational achievement between the youngest and the
oldest students in a cohort.15 The hypothesis is that relative age differences
in the classroom may influence the development of non-cognitive skills, with a
systematic penalty for the youngest children. In Chapter 2, I do not find ev-
idence supporting such conjecture. Although it does not exhaust the question
on relative age differences in non-cognitive skills, these findings bring additional
support to the recently privileged explanation that small maturity differences
may be the main driving factor for the relative age effect in educational out-
comes (Crawford et al., 2014).
Beyond experience and teaching skills, teachers’ characteristics also have a
large influence on students’ academic achievement. For instance, Dee (2004b)
show a positive bias in grades for both majority and minority students when as-
signed to a teacher belonging to the same ethnic group. This effect will mainly
15See, for example, Thompson et al. (2004) and Musch and Grondin (2001).
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penalise children from minority groups, as most teachers will belong to the
majority group. Moreover, teachers’ expectations with respect to students’ ed-
ucational achievement and behaviour are influenced by students’ race, ethnicity
and gender, in particular for students belonging to low socio-economic back-
grounds (e.g., Dee, 2005). These expectations may affect children’s perception
of their own abilities and consequently, their achievement (Pygmalion effects,
Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), a fortiori if they are correlated with children’s
beliefs. In particular, teachers’ beliefs or stereotypes with respect to learning
abilities of indigenous children in the Australian context, and younger children
in the classroom, may possibly influence children’s self-valuation of their abil-
ities and motivation, and consequently, reinforce their potential disadvantage
in cognitive skills.16 Furthermore, teachers’ race, ethnicity or gender may also
influence the extent to which students identify them as role models (Solomon,
1997).
The school environment is not dissociated from the family environment,
as more affluent families tend to live in wealthier neighbourhoods, with bet-
ter public resources including childcare facilities and schools. The selection of
children from more resourceful families into better educational institutions is
exacerbated in anglo-saxon countries as characterised by a dual educational
system, with public and private institutions, with differing school fees, curricu-
lums and resources. Moreover, parents with higher educational background may
influence their children’s relative age, by planning their date of birth or delay-
ing their school entry. Likewise, parenting quality may influence the extent to
which relatively young children are disadvantaged in their learning abilities and
psychological factors. Hence, the association between the family and school en-
vironment may intensify the gap in cognitive and non-cognitive skills between
16Interestingly, Rubie-Davies et al. (2006) find that despite no differences in reading skills
between indigenous and other ethnic groups primary school children in New Zealand at the
start of the academic year, teachers expected indigenous children (Maori) to have inferior
reading abilities. The authors also find that indigenous children had made the least progress
in reading by the end of the year, which may in part be driven by teachers’ beliefs.
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children belonging to different social groups.
Institutions
The institutional framework, that is the regulatory system, social and cultural
conventions, may also contribute to the inequality in education between differ-
ent social groups defined by biological traits, such as gender or ethnicity (e.g.
indigenous and non-indigenous Australians). Individuals belonging to social
groups who historically had lower levels of education will have larger incentives
to invest in human capital in a society that strongly promotes equality of oppor-
tunity in education and offers supporting structures for individuals who belong
to disadvantaged social groups.
The persistence of racial and gender differences in achievement has been the
focus of interest of many social scientists. For instance, a suggestive contribut-
ing factor for the persistent gap in educational achievement between indigenous
and non-indigenous populations is that the former may be discouraged to invest
in human capital if indigenous applicants tend to be perceived as less produc-
tive by employers. Similarly, there is evidence that women tend to shy away
from competition, in particular in domains characterised by a strong male bias
(see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010, for a survey.). A major reason for enacting
affirmative action rules is to counteract the negative incentive effect of stereo-
types on incentives to invest in education of individuals subject to statistical
discrimination. In Chapter 3, I investigate the incentive effects of such rules for
disadvantaged individuals on performance and effort.
1.1.3 Behavioural economics and education policy
The expanding field of behavioural and experimental economics constitutes
a major reference for public policy design. In the domain of education, be-
havioural economics enriches the standard approach by identifying the psycho-
logical factors through which specific environmental conditions shape individu-
als’ choices in education. In this direction, the first study in the thesis is designed
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to explore the psychological mechanisms that could explain the persistence of
the relative age effect throughout the educational trajectory.
Another relevant aspect of the behavioural economics of education is that it
is informative on which solutions may be the most effective in influencing the be-
haviour of disadvantaged individuals toward better educational outcomes. This
is particularly important because, although there is a strong association be-
tween the contextual factors discussed in the previous sections and educational
achievement, it may not be effective or even desirable to directly act on these
factors. For example, enacting affirmative action rules, the focus of the second
study in this thesis, may not be effective in reducing inequality in education
between different social groups, if it does not enhance their intrinsic motivation,
beliefs and attitudes toward education. However, it is possible to try to influ-
ence individuals’ non-cognitive skills that are relevant for educational outcomes.
It has been shown that cognitive skills, such as IQ, are stable by the age of 10
(Heckman, 2006), but that non-cognitive skills are to some extent malleable
until late adolescence (Avvisati et al., 2014).17 A major element of behavioural
economics research in education is that it seeks to identify how to influence non-
cognitive skills of young individuals which are powerful predictors of educational
achievement (e.g. self-control, intrinsic motivation, self-confidence and reliance
on role models).18 The objective is to enhance the capability of children and
adolescents to make decisions in education, by means of soft incentives or other
solutions that encourage a certain type of behaviour, without imposing restric-
tions.19 There is convincing evidence that such incentives can be effective in
improving educational outcomes (see Levitt et al., 2012; Lavecchia et al., 2014,
for recent surveys).
The experimental method in economics allows us to test the effect of differ-
ent types of incentives or pedagogical solutions, in particular among children
who are disadvantaged in their family, school or institutional environment. This
17Adolescence is an important evolving phase for a large range of behavioural traits, such
as self-control and emotional stability (Dahl, 2004).
18See Lavecchia et al. (2014).
19Thaler and Sunstein (2008) define this type of incentives as nudges.
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is line with the studies in Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis. The main limitation
of several of these studies (including those in this thesis), is that they are often
context-dependent and/or combine more than a single adjustment in individu-
als’ environment. As a consequence, the findings of each study are often only
partially informative about the mechanisms which drive the observed outcomes,
and not individually well-suited to predict the impact of similar interventions
in different contexts or long-run effects.20 The investigation of the mechanisms
through which the solutions at test influence choices in education and the repli-
cation of studies in different contexts, is of major importance for the general-
isability of the findings and for predicting the long-run effects of prospective
interventions seeking to mitigate inequality in education.
20See Deaton (2010) for a detailed discussion on the external validity issues of impact
evaluation studies that do not identify the channels for the observed outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Relative age effect on
adolescents’ economic
preferences: Evidence from
a controlled classroom
experiment
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Abstract1
Extant research consistently shows a small but long-lasting penalty in scholas-
tic performance and choice of professional career for the youngest individuals
in a cohort. There is also convincing evidence for a tendency for the youngest
children in the classroom to be disadvantaged in non-cognitive skills, suggesting
that the relative age position of young children in their peer group may influence
the formation of preferences that are relevant for decision making in education.
In this study, we conduct an experiment with 661 high school students, born
within a two-month window of the school entry cut-off date in two Australian
states, and investigate whether we observe relative age differences in economic
preferences. We elicit preferences for competitive environments, self-confidence,
risk, ambiguity attitudes and professional aspirations. Our main result is that
relative age does not seem to influence those preferences. Consistent with well-
established findings in the literature, we find large gender differences in risk and
competitive preferences.
1This is joint work with Lionel Page and Dipanwita Sarkar.
28 CHAPTER 2. RAE ON ECONOMIC PREFERENCES
2.1 Introduction
In most educational systems children are eligible to start school in the year they
reach a certain age, on or before a defined cut-off date.2 Consequently, children
born just before the cut-off date, are expected to end up at the lower end of
the age distribution in the classroom, whereas those born just after the cut-off
date, will end up at the upper end of the age distribution. A large body of
literature on the relative age effect (henceforth RAE) points to an advantage
in cognitive skills for the oldest compared to the youngest children in a cohort
(Smith, 2009; Datar, 2006; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). A disadvantage for the
youngest children is also observed in non-cognitive skills (Thompson et al., 2004;
Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008). Furthermore, children who are the oldest in their
cohort perform better in sport than those who are relatively young (see Musch
and Grondin, 2001, for a survey). The RAE is not confined to performance in the
initial stages of the educational trajectory, as there is evidence of a long-lasting
effect, for instance, on the choice of professional careers and labour market
outcomes (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Fredriksson and O¨ckert, 2006; Crawford
et al., 2010; Bedard and Dhuey, 2007).
There is no clear consensus in the literature on which mechanisms drive the
observed RAE. The debate is centred on whether the RAE is mainly explained
by a maturity advantage of being older in a cohort, or whether the advan-
tage stems from the relative position in the age distribution of the peer group
(Thompson et al., 2004). The maturity bias results from relatively old children
having better learning abilities given that a child’s span of attention varies with
age and that the school curriculum is tailored to the learning abilities of the
median student. Particularly in sport, older children have a clear advantage
relative to their younger counterparts, due to their more advanced physiological
development.
2In Australia, children need to turn 5 or 6 years old (depending on the state), by the defined
state-level cut-off date in order to start school. Similarly, in the US and in most European
countries, children have to turn 6 years old by a certain date, in order to be eligible to start
school in that years’ intake.
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Beyond a positive bias in cognitive skills, there is evidence that relatively
old children are advantaged in their non-cognitive skills. They tend to be more
confident, to have higher self-esteem (Thompson et al., 2004; Fenzel, 1992), are
more likely to be involved in leadership activities (Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008)
and less likely to suffer from school victimisation (Mu¨hlenweg, 2010). Moreover,
there is higher incidence of teenage pregnancy (Black et al., 2011) and psycho-
pathologies (Goodman et al., 2003) among relatively young students. These
findings suggest that psychological mechanisms influenced by peer comparisons
may also constitute an important factor in explaining the RAE. It is plausible
that children’s relative position in the age distribution in the classroom may
bias the development of preferences which are important for decision making in
education and also later in life. The opposite is likely to occur for children who
are the oldest in the classroom. As Manski (2000) observes, agents look at the
actions chosen by others and their experienced outcomes, in order to form their
own expectations about what they can achieve (“observational learning”). Ac-
cordingly, children’s relative position in the age distribution in the classroom, is
likely to influence their expectations regarding their own abilities by observing
and comparing themselves with their peers. The behaviour of teachers, parents
and peers may amplify this effect if it co-varies with children’s initial percep-
tion of their own abilities (Musch and Grondin, 2001; Bandura, 1993). The
hypothesis that peer comparisons in the classroom influenced by relative age
may contribute to shape individuals’ preferences early in life is also compatible
with the persistence of the RAE on long-run outcomes.
Thus far, there has been no investigation of the RAE on economic preferences
of adolescents. In this study, we experimentally elicit preferences for competitive
environments, risk attitudes and professional aspirations of 661 high school stu-
dents, enrolled in year levels 8 and 9 (aged 13 to 14 years old), and born within
a two-month window of the cut-off date defined to enter school. The students
born within one month prior to the cut-off date are expected to be the youngest
in the classroom, whereas those born within one month after the cut-off date
are expected to be the oldest. We choose adolescent students because recent
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literature suggests that preferences of individuals in this age range are stable
(Sutter et al., 2013; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Borghans et al., 2008a). Overall
we find that relative age differences in the behavioural traits under analysis in
this study are unlikely to explain the persistent relative age gap in educational
achievement. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses
experimental data in order to investigate potential behavioural mechanisms for
the RAE observed early in life, and its persistence over long-run outcomes. In
a broader perspective, this study also contributes to the expanding literature
in the economics of education on peer influence on educational outcomes and
non-cognitive skills (Koch et al., 2014).
Understanding the mechanisms that drive the RAE has important implica-
tions for public policy. In particular, it will allow us to identify which solutions
are effective in attenuating disparities in education caused by relative age dif-
ferences. For instance, if differences in outcomes are mostly due to the fact that
the youngest children are not ready to start school, creating a long lasting gap
in achievement, then it might be beneficial to increase the school starting age.
However, if psychological factors driven by the relative position of a child in
the age distribution in the classroom also play an important role in explaining
the disparity in outcomes, ensuring that children start school at a later devel-
opmental stage or offering extra learning support to the youngest children may
not be effective in reducing the relative age bias. Within a cohort some children
will always be relatively young and others relatively old. In that case, other
pedagogical solutions should be considered, such as avoiding the use of compet-
itive grading schemes or adjusting the assessment methods to children’s level of
maturity in the early years of schooling.
In this study, we focus on preferences for competitive environments, self-
confidence, risk attitudes and occupational aspirations because these are likely
to be important predictors of educational achievement, performance in sport,
leadership and choice of professional career, which are the domains where we
observe a RAE. For instance, there is evidence that taste for competition posi-
tively affects academic performance and occupational choices (Ors et al., 2013;
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Kleinjans, 2009). Moreover, it is likely to be a key factor for success in sport.
Therefore, we expect individuals who are relatively old in their cohort to have a
stronger taste for competitive environments than those relatively young. With
respect to risk attitudes, it has been shown that higher cognitive skills are pos-
itively associated with risk aversion (Borghans et al., 2008b). Moreover, risk
attitudes are correlated with outcomes which are important to determine suc-
cess later in life. For instance, Sutter et al. (2013) find that individuals who
are more risk averse are also more patient, which is an important predictor of
educational achievement (Castillo et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008b). Based
on these findings, we test the hypothesis that the oldest students are more risk
averse than the youngest students. Finally, we expect relatively old students to
have higher professional aspirations, as there is arguably a causal link between
occupational aspirations and educational choices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews
the empirical literature on the relative age effect. Section 2.3 presents the iden-
tification strategy. Section 2.4 describes the participant pool and experimental
setup. Section 4.5 presents the results and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Literature
2.2.1 Methodological considerations
There are several empirical difficulties when estimating the RAE during com-
pulsory schooling. The main issue is the linear dependence between absolute
age, relative age and time spent in school. In the classroom, children who are
relatively old are also older in absolute terms, and might perform better by the
simple fact that they are more mature. Also, children with very similar absolute
age, but who end up in different positions in the age distribution in their class-
room (those born in the vicinity but on different sides of the cut-off date), will
end up in different school years. Hence, it is not trivial to separately identify the
causal impact of each of these variables. Although this is a fair concern when
32 CHAPTER 2. RAE ON ECONOMIC PREFERENCES
focusing on the RAE on scholastic performance, it is substantially attenuated
when considering non-cognitive skills. This is a reasonable assumption, since
it has been shown that economic preferences and personality traits evolve over
the life cycle,3 but that these are stable during adolescence (Sutter et al., 2013;
Harbaugh et al., 2002; Borghans et al., 2008a). For instance, Sutter et al. (2013)
find that economic preferences of children and adolescents are stable in the age
group of 10 to 18 years old. If economic preferences are fairly stable during
adolescence, it is plausible to consider that a one-year gap in age and formal
education during this period do not have a significant influence on preferences.
Consequently, any relative age differences in non-cognitive skills within school
cohorts during adolescence are expected to be driven by psychological factors
associated with the relative age.
The second main issue is the potential sample selection bias, as we do not
observe perfect compliance with the cut-off date (in particular for children born
just before the cut-off date), and grade retention. Parents whose children are
born just before the cut-off date, can decide to delay their school entry by one
year (“red-shirting”), in order to avoid them being disadvantaged in the age
distribution in the classroom. Similarly, parents whose children are born just
after the cut-off date can decide to enrol their children in school one year before
they are eligible to start school, as long as they are not too young. If accelerated
school entry is very uncommon, delayed entry is frequently observed. Failing to
account for the imperfect compliance with the cut-off date when estimating the
RAE may lead to an endogeneity issue. Whether a child’s school entry is delayed
or not will arguably depend on parents’ socio-economic conditions and on the
child’s maturity level, which will be correlated with scholastic performance and
non-cognitive skills. Another source of bias which may attenuate the RAE
is failing to account for grade retention (Grenet, 2009). Children who repeat
school grades are among the oldest in the classroom and are likely to have lower
abilities than the average child.
3See, for example Harbaugh et al. (2002) for risk preferences and Borghans et al. (2008a)
for a survey of the literature on the stability of personality traits and time preferences over
the life cycle.
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In order to address the potential endogeneity issue, the approach commonly
followed in the literature is to instrument the school starting age (endogenous
variable) with the expected school starting age, defined by the child’s date of
birth and the cut-off to start schooling (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). The in-
strumental variable method yields the unbiased local average treatment effect
(LATE) of the relative age on the population of compliers, that is, those whose
relative age is affected by the school entry rules. The validity of the instrument
requires the fulfillment of three conditions. First, the assignment variable (cut-
off date) has to be exogenously determined, i.e. uncorrelated with the outcome
variables. This is a plausible assumption given that the cut-off date is admin-
istratively defined. Secondly, there has to be a strong correlation between the
expected school starting age and the actual school starting age. This condition
can be easily verified empirically, with the first stage of the instrumental vari-
able procedure. Finally, the birth date has to be random around the cut-off.
Although there is evidence for an over representation of women from disadvan-
taged socio-economic backgrounds among those giving birth in winter (Buckles
and Hungerman, 2012), this selection issue is strongly attenuated when consid-
ering only the two months adjacent to the cut-off date. Moreover, abundant
evidence shows that parents do not plan the birth date of their children in order
to avoid them being relatively young in their cohort (e.g., Dickert-Conlin and
Elder, 2010; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Black et al., 2011; Datar, 2006; Elder
and Lubotsky, 2009). In the case of Australia, although there is evidence that
parents manipulate their child’s birth date in response to financial incentives,
there is no evidence for differences in birth rates around the school entry cut-off
date (Gans and Leigh, 2009).
2.2.2 Empirical evidence
Many studies have investigated relative age differences in cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes. Table 2.2.1 provides a non-exhaustive summary of these
studies that will also be described in more detail below.
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Cognitive outcomes
Considerable attention from economists has been directed toward the RAE on
academic outcomes. For instance, using data from a longitudinal survey con-
ducted in the Netherlands, Plug (2001) finds that individuals who were born
after the cut-off date are more likely to hold a university degree than those who
were born just before the cut-off date. A major drawback of this study is that
it fails to account for the fact that grade retention and delayed school entry are
more prevalent among children born just before the cut-off date (Grenet, 2009).
Hence, the estimates cannot be interpreted as the impact of relative age. In con-
trast, in early research, Cahan and Davis (1987) and Cahan and Cohen (1989),
do not find any evidence for relative age differences in test scores within school
cohorts, using a sample of 3,191 and 11,000 primary school Israeli students, re-
spectively. The authors exclude from the analysis students who are under and
over-aged in their grade. However, doing so does not solve the selection bias
given that students belonging to the lower tail of the age distribution are more
likely to repeat grades or to have their school entry delayed.
In England, grade retention and redshirting are very seldom, which offers a
good setting to analyse the effect of the relative age, as it can be assumed that
school starting age is exogenous in the vicinity of the cut-off date. For example,
Crawford et al. (2010) exploit the fact that in England school admission policies
are determined by local rather than central education authorities, which gives
considerable variation in the age at which children born on a particular day of
the year start school, and breaks the perfect linear dependence between school
starting age and age at the test. Using data on national achievement tests of
all students attending public schools, they find a significant and long-lasting
positive bias in test scores and in the decision to pursue higher education for
the oldest children in the cohort.
In order to circumvent the potential endogeneity problem driven by sample
selection (red-shirting and grade retention), the common practice is to use the
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instrumental variable (IV) strategy, instrumenting the school starting age with
the expected school starting age (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006). For instance, us-
ing data on educational outcomes of 13,818 children from the ECLS-K survey,
Datar (2006) finds that children who are the oldest in their kindergarten cohort
score about 0.8 and 0.6 of a standard deviation higher in math and reading re-
spectively, compared to their youngest counterparts. The gap persists after two
years in school. The results also indicate that children from disadvantaged socio-
economic backgrounds benefit more from late kindergarten entry. A potential
explanation for this effect is that parents with higher educational background
may provide more support to their children if they are relatively young in their
classroom, compensating for their initial disadvantage in learning abilities. The
author also finds that children from low socio-economic backgrounds are more
likely to enter kindergarten at a younger age. Likewise, using data from the
ECLS-K and the NELS:88, Elder and Lubotsky (2009) find that children who
are relatively old in kindergarten have an advantage in test scores of 0.53 stan-
dard deviations from the mean. Although the magnitude of the effect declines
over time, it persists until grade 8. Moreover, children who are relatively old
have a lower probability of repeating grades (between [-0.155, -0.131] percent-
age points). In contrast with the findings of the previous study, the positive
effect of relative age is stronger for children from advantaged socio-economic
backgrounds.
Using French data on a large representative sample of students, Grenet
(2009) finds that being born just before, rather than just after the cut-off date,
increases the probability of being held back in school by 16 percentage points.
Using the IV methodology, the author shows that there is a significant penalty
in test scores (by 0.7 standard deviations from the mean) for students who are
the youngest in their school cohort in the first year of school, which persists
throughout primary and secondary education. The results also show persistent
effects of the relative age for men, who incur a small penalty in the labour
market (lower wages and higher unemployment rates). Moreover, individuals
who were relatively young in their schooling cohort have a lower probability of
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holding an academic degree.
Other studies use data from different countries or states with different school
entry cut-off dates, precluding the RAE to be confounded with season of birth
effects. For example, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) use data on test scores of 225,772
children from OECD countries enrolled in grades 4 and 8.4 Using the IV strat-
egy, the authors find that the youngest students score substantially lower than
the oldest students (between [4, 12] percentiles in grade 4, and [2, 9] percentiles
in grade 8). In addition, the authors find that individuals born just before the
cut-off date are under-represented in pre-university streams and in accredited
four-year college/university enrollments.
The studies described so far have looked at the RAE within school cohorts.
An alternative method is to compare outcomes for children who were born just
before and just after the cut-off date across school cohorts, applying a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design (RDD). For instance, Smith (2009) uses data on
all students enrolled in grades 4, 7 and 10 in British Columbia for four adja-
cent birth cohorts and shows that relatively old children in grade 4 have an
advantage in test scores in the range of [0.26, 0.39] standard deviations from
the mean. The magnitude of the effect decreases over time, but remains positive
and statistically significant. A student who is predicted to be relatively old in
his cohort is expected to have an advantage in test scores between [0.23, 0.27]
standard deviations from the mean in grade 7, and in the range of [0.10, 0.24]
in grade 10. Further evidence using the RDD is provided by Fredriksson and
O¨ckert (2006) with survey data covering the entire Swedish population born be-
tween 1935 and 1984. The authors find that children who start schooling when
they are older have an advantage in average GPA of 0.25 standard deviations
from the mean in grade 9. As in Datar (2006), the effect is larger for children
from disadvantaged families. The youngest children with lower socio-economic
backgrounds also have a higher starting age penalty in the probability of attend-
4The data is extracted from the Trend in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) and from the ECLS for the US data.
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ing advanced classes. In order to obtain a measure of relative age which is not
perfectly correlated with absolute age, Fredriksson and O¨ckert (2006) exploit
the within school variation in the age composition across cohorts. The results
suggest that absolute age is much more important than the relative age, with
the latter accounting for 20 percent of the variation in outcomes. However, a
very strong correlation between absolute and relative age remains suggesting
that the estimates might not point identify the effect of relative age. When
looking at long-run outcomes, the data shows that individuals who are older
in their cohort complete more years of education (between [0.03, 0.06] stan-
dard deviations from the mean), compared to those who are relatively young.
Furthermore, they are more likely to choose academic careers than vocational
tracks.
In contrast with the previous results, a few studies show that students might
benefit from exposure to more mature peers. Moreover, in line with the peer
effects literature, which provides mixed results on the distributional impact on
educational outcomes of having high-achieving peers (e.g. Zimmer, 2003; Zim-
merman, 2003; Duflo et al., 2011; Ding and Lehrer, 2007), there is evidence of
sub-group heterogeneous effects of exposure to older peers. For instance, Elder
and Lubotsky (2009) suggest that having older peers, measured by the average
entrance age of all children in the school, increases test scores of the youngest
children. On the other hand, having older peers has a large detrimental effect
on the probability of grade retention for the relatively young children. In order
to investigate the impact of having older peers on children’s educational out-
comes, Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) use data from the project STAR, which
comprises achievement scores of kindergarten children enrolled in 79 schools in
Tennessee in 1985. Most of project STAR participants were randomly assigned
to classrooms, implying that the age distribution of a child’s peers is uncorre-
lated with unobservable characteristics, such as the child’s academic potential,
which affect the outcome variable of interest. Using the IV method, the re-
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sults show significant sub-group effects.5 The relative age seems to have greater
benefits for boys and children belonging to an advantaged socio-economic back-
ground, whereas females and children from poor socio-economic background
benefit from having older peers. A suggestive explanation for this result is that
children with low educational background can benefit from starting school early,
as they may learn more at school than they would learn in their home environ-
ment.
A common criticism addressed to the empirical studies on the RAE, is that if
they control for the potential sample selection bias, they still cannot disentangle
the psychological factors of the relative age from the maturity effect on scholastic
performance, given the perfect linear dependence between both variables. In a
very recent study, Crawford et al. (2014) estimate the importance of absolute
age relative to other factors (relative age and schooling) for cognitive skills. In
order to do so, they compare the performance of children born in the vicinity
of the cut-off date at two different tests. One of the tests is performed on the
same date for all children of a given cohort, while the other test is performed
once children reach 8 years of age. The authors find that in the former test,
children who are the oldest in the cohort score on average 0.8 standard deviations
higher than those who are the youngest. In contrast, they do not find relative
age differences in performance in the second test, suggesting that absolute age
differences explain the persistent disadvantage for the youngest children.
Other studies try to identify the RAE by focusing on outcomes measurable
over the long-run, as after completion of compulsory schooling the exact lin-
ear dependence between absolute and relative age disappears (Fredriksson and
O¨ckert, 2006). For instance, Black et al. (2011) exploit the fact that in Nor-
way there is a relationship between the month of birth and the year in which a
person takes the IQ test, in order to measure the RAE on IQ at age 18, educa-
tional attainment, teenage pregnancy and earnings. The data covers the entire
5The authors considered three alternative definitions for the relative age: the rank of a
children in his or her classroom, a dummy for being in the bottom 25 percent, and a dummy
for being three months younger than the average in the classroom.
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Norwegian population up to 2006. Using the IV approach, the results suggest a
small positive effect of starting school younger on IQ test scores. However, as in
Crawford et al. (2014), there is a large positive effect of age at the test. Starting
school early also has a significant positive effect on teenage pregnancy. In line
with previous studies, the findings suggest that the effects of school starting age
are stronger for subjects from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds.
Finally, Bedard and Dhuey (2007) exploit a shift in school entry rules in
several US states as a natural experimental setting, and estimate the RAE on
academic and labour market outcomes. Using data from the 2000 US Census and
the 2001-2007 American Community Survey, the authors do not find evidence
that school starting dates affect high school graduation and college attendance,
but there is a significant and large positive effect on earnings (a one-month
increase in the minimum school starting age increases average hourly wages in
the range of [0.72, 0.81] percent). However, these results are not informative
with respect to potential heterogeneous effects across the age distribution of the
cohort.
Non-cognitive outcomes
Along with the observation of a RAE on academic outcomes, there is convincing
evidence that the relative age influences non-cognitive skills that are relevant
for education and labour market outcomes. For instance, using data from a
nationally representative survey of high school students in the US and using
the IV approach, Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008) find that relatively old students
are 4 to 11 percent more likely to be leaders. They also provide evidence that
the RAE observed in leadership activity cannot be explained by differences in
physical maturation (measured by the body mass index) between the oldest and
the youngest students. Following a similar empirical approach and using data
on 833,000 primary school children across 17 countries, Mu¨hlenweg (2010) finds
that relatively young children are 8 percent more likely to be victim of violence
at school (being bullied, injured or getting stolen).
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Studies in developmental psychology also provide evidence of a RAE on non-
cognitive skills. For instance, using Norwegian data on 1,689 children, Alsaker
and Olweus (1993) find that the youngest children in a cohort have consistently
lower levels of self-esteem and more unstable perceptions of self. With a sample
of 1,129 children in Canada and the US, Thompson et al. (2004) also find that
those who are relatively old have higher self-esteem compared to those relatively
young. Thompson et al. (1999) also show that, in the population of individuals
under the age of 20, those expected to be the youngest in their school cohort
are more likely to commit suicide than individuals expected to be relatively old.
However, these studies do not account for the endogeneity issue of the relative
age.
As previously pointed out, the potential selection problem is virtually non-
existent when using data on school children from England, where we nearly
observe perfect compliance with the school entry rules. Crawford et al. (2014)
find a large (by 0.6 standard deviations from the mean) relative age difference
on children’s beliefs for their scholastic competence, controlling for their actual
achievement. Using data on 10,438 British children aged between 5 and 15 years
old, Goodman et al. (2003) find that relatively young children have a higher risk
of suffering from a psychopathology.6 Likewise, Morrow et al. (2012) find that
children expected to be the youngest in their cohort have a higher probability
(30 percent for boys and 70 percent for girls) of being diagnosed with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Using the IV methodology, Elder and Lubotsky
(2009) also find that relatively old children are 2.5 percentage points less likely
to be diagnosed with a learning disability, relative to the youngest children in
the cohort.
In summary, extant research convincingly suggests that there is a positive
bias in academic performance and in the probability of pursuing post-secondary
education in favour of children who are relatively old in their cohort. However,
6The incidence of a psychopathology was based on parents’, teachers’ and self report, and
the presence of at least one psychiatric diagnosis.
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much less is known about the mechanisms for this effect. On the one hand,
recent studies that have tried to disentangle the psychological factors from the
absolute age effect on cognitive outcomes, suggest that the RAE is mainly driven
by maturity differences (Crawford et al., 2014; Black et al., 2011). On the other
hand, there is compelling evidence that maturity differences in the classroom in-
fluence non-cognitive skills, in particular self-confidence. In a related and recent
study using data from England, Murphy and Weinhardt (2013) suggest that the
ordinal rank in primary school influences scholastic performance in high school
(controlling for performance at the end of primary school), in particular for male
students. Importantly, the influence of rank in the classroom on self-confidence
seems to be an important channel for this effect. This evidence supports the con-
jecture that psychological mechanisms induced by peer comparisons can plau-
sibly reinforce and perpetuate existing gaps in educational achievement which
arise due to small maturity differences. Our study contributes to the literature
on the RAE by investigating, in an experimental setting, whether the relative
age position in the classroom influences economic preferences.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
The main empirical problem in the identification of the effect of the relative
age on performance indicators during compulsory schooling is the identity (age)
= (relative age or school entry age) + (schooling). In Angrist and Pischke’s
(2008) terms it is a “fundamentally unidentified question”, since children who
are relatively old in the classroom are also older in absolute terms than those
who are relatively young. Hence, attributing differences in performance between
the oldest and the youngest children in the classroom uniquely to the relative
age would imply that maturity has no effect. Likewise, assigning differences
in outcomes between children enrolled in adjacent year levels and born in the
vicinity of the cut-off date to the relative age, would imply that time at school
has no impact on performance. In our study, the identification problem of the
relative age is at least significantly attenuated. Unlike previous studies that
look at performance indicators, we focus on economic preferences and previous
research has shown that these are stable during adolescence (Sutter et al., 2013;
Harbaugh et al., 2002; Borghans et al., 2008a).
Our identification strategy builds on the regression over discontinuity method-
ology from Lee and Lemieux (2010). We investigate whether we observe relative
age differences in economic preferences, with a sample of high school students
from two adjacent school cohorts (grades 8 and 9) and born on each side of the
school entry cut-off dates.
Let’s consider the general model:
yij = β0 + β1rai + β2gradei + β3statei + Xiβ4 + Sijβ5 + ij , (2.1)
where y represents the outcome variable, ra is a binary variable equal to 1 if
the participant is among the oldest students in the cohort and 0 if he or she is
among the youngest, grade corresponds to school year level (grade 8 or 9), and
state is an indicator variable for the state where the student is attending school
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(Queensland or New South Wales). The variables X and S represent vectors
of individual and school level control variables respectively. Individual level
control variables include gender and academic scores. School level covariates
control for whether the school is public or private, and located in a regional or
metropolitan area.
Our main outcome of interest are economic preferences. In this specific case,
it is plausible to assume that β2 = 0, that is, a one-year difference in absolute
age and schooling do not impact preferences. As we will discuss later in our
results, this assumption is supported by the non-significance of the coefficient
for grade (which combines both the grade and age effects) in all our regressions
with behavioural variables as the outcome of interest.7
Our model is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.3.1, with the school entry
cut-off dates applied in Queensland for children enrolled in grades 8 and 9
at the time of our study. In Figure 2.3.1a we describe the general case, i.e.
without restricting the outcome variables to economic preferences. Point A in
Figure 2.3.1a corresponds to children born in January 1999, who turned 6 years
old just after the cut-off date (31st of December) and are predicted to be the
oldest in their cohort. Point B corresponds to students born in December 1999,
who turned 6 just before the cut-off date and are expected to be the youngest in
their cohort. Similarly, point C corresponds to students born in January 2000
who are expected to be relatively old, and point D corresponds to students born
in December 2000, who are predicted to be the youngest in the cohort. When
focusing on economic preferences as the outcome of interest (i.e. when β2 = 0),
Figure 2.3.1b illustrates graphically the case where β1 > 0, and Figure 2.3.1c
represents the case where β1 = 0.
7We discuss in Appendix A.1 the general case, that is, when the impact of absolute age
and grade cannot be assumed equal to zero. This is the case in particular when estimating
the RAE on performance indicators during compulsory schooling.
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birthdate
y
Jan 1999 Jan 2000 Jan 2001
ByB
DyD
AyA
CyC
Year 9 Year 8
(a) β1 > 0, β2 > 0
y
yB = yD
yA = yC
(b) β1 > 0, β2 = 0
y
yA = yB =
yC = yD
(c) β1 = β2 = 0
Figure 2.3.1: Identification strategy for the relative age effect β1 on preferences.
In our sample, we do not observe perfect compliance with the school entry
rules. One of the implications is that we only observe the subset of compliant
students who were born in December 2000 in Queensland or born in July 2001
in New South Wales. Delaying school entry of relatively young children is quite
common in Australia and also likely to be correlated with socio-demographic
characteristics which may impact preferences. For instance, if more educated
parents are more likely to delay the school entry of their children than less edu-
cated parents, ignoring this selection effect could upward bias the estimates for
the RAE. In contrast, if children who are at an earliest developmental stage,
among those born just before the cut-off date, are more likely to be redshirted,
this could arguably yield downward biased estimates for the RAE. The same
applies to children who repeat grades and end up among the oldest children in
the classroom. In order to correct for the potential selection bias, as in Bedard
and Dhuey (2006) we instrument the observed relative age with the predicted
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relative age.8
We therefore estimate the parameters of equation (2.1) using the two-stage
least squares procedure. Denoting rap as the predicted relative age given the
child birthdate and state cut-off date, the first-stage equation is defined as fol-
lows:
raij = θ0 + θ1ra
p
i + θ2gradei + θ3statei + Xiθ4 + Sijθ5 + ηij (2.2)
The standard errors are clustered at the school level, in order to account for
the fact that the error term is not likely to be independent across observations
within schools, e.g. students from the same school are exposed to the same
environment which may influence the outcome variable (Angrist and Pischke,
2008), and also in order to account for experimental session effects.9
2.4 Experimental design
2.4.1 Participant pool
The study was conducted in two Australian states, Queensland and New South
Wales, with different school entry cut-off dates.10 In Queensland, the experi-
ment took place between March and November 2013, with a total of 547 high
school students enrolled in grades 8 and 9, and born within a one-month window
on each side of the cut-off date defined by the Queensland Department of Ed-
ucation. Until 2007, children in Queensland had to be 6 years old on or before
the 31st of December in order to be able to start school (grade 1) in that year’s
8A child is predicted to be relatively old if born within one month after the cut-off date,
and relatively young if born within one month before the cut-off date.
9Only one experimental session was conducted in each school (with the exception of two
schools, where we divided the sample of participants and conducted two sessions).
10In order to conduct our study, we needed the approval from QUT human research ethics
committee, the departments of education of Queensland and New South Wales, subsequent
approval from the principals of the schools involved in the study and parental signed consent.
All schools were invited to take part in the experiment via phone call.
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intake, starting usually at the end of January or beginning of February.11 In
New South Wales, we conducted the experiment between April and May 2014,
with a total of 114 students enrolled in grades 8 and 9, and born either in July
or August. Children in New South Wales are eligible to enter kindergarten (first
year of formal education in the state) if they turn 5 years old on or before the
31st of July.
Our choice of adolescent students as our participant pool, in particular in-
stead of younger children, is motivated by the fact that students in this age
range had a longer experience of their relative (physical and cognitive) maturity
in the classroom environment. A related reason for choosing this specific age
range is the stability of preferences during adolescence.12 Furthermore, practical
considerations also influenced our choice, as these are the first two years of high
school in Queensland (unlike in New South Wales where high school starts with
grade 7). We also expected these students to be mature enough to understand
the experimental tasks and be able to stay focused during a 90-minute session.
A total of 38 schools (32 in Queensland and 6 in New South Wales) accepted
to take part in the experiment. Our sample in Queensland includes 19 schools
in the Brisbane metropolitan area (capital of the state), 4 regional schools in
other metropolitan areas, and 9 regional schools in remote or rural areas. Out
of the 32 participating schools, 23 are public and 9 are private schools.13 The
sample in New South Wales includes public schools only, 5 located in the Sydney
metropolitan area and 1 regional school. Three of these are characterised by
very low levels of socio-economic indicators and large numbers of students from
refugee or recent immigrant families with non-English speaking background.
An invitation to participate in the experiment was sent to all students en-
rolled in year levels 8 and 9 and born in the months of December or January
in Queensland, and July or August in New South Wales. In order to partic-
11Since 2008, children in Queensland need to turn 6 by the 30th of June in order to start
school in the following school year.
12See Borghans et al. (2008a), Sutter et al. (2013) and Harbaugh et al. (2002).
13All public schools are co-educational while 6 private schools are single-sex and 3 co-
educational.
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ipate in the experiment, eligible students had to return an information letter
briefly describing what their participation would involve, with their consent for
participation and also of their parents or caregivers.14 Across the participating
schools, an average of 47 percent of grade 8 and 42 percent of grade 9 students
born in the months of interest took part in the experiment.15 We do not ob-
serve significant differences in the participation rates between students born in
December and January for Queensland, and July and August for New South
Wales.
Our sample counts with 328 students born in January or August and 333
students born in December or July (see Table 2.4.1). Fifty-four percent of the
students in our sample are enrolled in grade 8, and 46 percent are enrolled in
grade 9. Our sample is balanced in terms of gender. Seventy-nine percent of the
students are enrolled in public schools, and 21 percent in private schools. We
also have information on students’ academic achievement, given by their grades
in math and English, for 35 out of the 38 schools.16 The academic grades were
obtained by self-report and via the principal teacher of the school. However,
as many students declared that they did not remember their grades and given
that we do not have information on the grades from the principal teacher of all
schools, we do not have data on academic grades for all participants.
14The consent forms were distributed to the students between one month and two weeks
prior to our visit, in order to allow enough time for the students to return the forms.
15The difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.17).
16We did not ask for the grades of the students in the first three schools where we conducted
the experiment.
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Table 2.4.1: Descriptive statistics
Month of birth
December/July January/August Total
No. % No. % No. %
Grade 8 182 55 177 54 359 54
Grade 9 151 45 151 46 302 46
Total 333 100 328 100 661 100
Female 155 47 166 51 321 49
Male 178 53 162 49 340 51
Total 333 100 328 100 661 100
Private school 71 21 65 20 136 21
Public school 262 79 263 80 525 79
Total 333 100 328 100 661 100
English grade
A 38 13 45 16 83 14
B 135 46 107 38 242 42
C 96 32 99 35 195 34
D 22 7 28 10 50 9
E 5 2 3 1 8 1
Total 296 100 282 100 578 100
Math grade
A 64 22 57 20 121 21
B 86 29 90 32 176 31
C 98 33 94 33 192 33
D 39 13 37 13 76 13
E 6 2 4 1 10 2
Total 293 100 282 100 575 100
Speak English at home
Yes 296 90 298 91 594 91
No 32 10 28 9 60 9
Total 328 100 326 100 654 100
Mother’s education
No schooling 1 0 3 1 4 1
Primary school 21 6 15 5 36 5
High school 66 20 90 27 156 24
University degree 92 28 93 28 185 28
Doesn’t know 153 46 127 39 280 42
Total 333 100 328 100 661 100
Father’s education
No schooling 3 1 4 1 7 1
Primary school 28 8 30 9 58 9
High school 64 19 85 26 149 23
University degree 90 27 73 22 163 25
Doesn’t know 148 44 136 41 284 43
Total 333 100 328 100 661 100
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We do not observe any significant differences in the academic results of stu-
dents’ born before and after the cut-off date for both math and English (p-values
of 0.93 and 0.72, respectively). We also present in Appendix A.3 the IV regres-
sion results for the effect of relative age on academic scores, which allows us to
correct for the potential bias arising from grade retention and delayed school
entry. Controlling for the year level, the results indicate that there are no differ-
ences in academic outcomes between the oldest and the youngest students.We
also have self-reported information on parents’ level of education. However,
these indicators of socio-economic background are not very informative, as close
to half of the students in the sample declared that they did not know the level
of education of their parents.
In Table 2.4.2, we look at the distribution of participants between compliers
with the school entry cut-off date, and non-compliers, i.e. those who were red-
shirted or skipped grades, by month of birth. We also consider as non-compliers
students who repeated grades or were previously enrolled in other states or
countries with different school entry rules.17 We observe that 19 percent of the
students in our sample had their school entry delayed. This is almost exclusively
observed for students born in December or July (37 percent of the students who
were born in December or July had their school entry delayed). Also, 8 percent
of the students in the sample repeated at least one grade, and this is mainly ob-
served for students who were the youngest in the classroom (14 percent among
those born in December or July versus 3 percent among those born in January
or August).
17Note that we can have overlap between different categories of students considered as
non-compliers: redshirted, repeaters, grade advanced and enrolled in other states/countries.
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Table 2.4.2: Distribution of participants between compliers and
non-compliers, by month of birth
Month of birth
July/Dec August/Jan Total
No. % No. % No. %
Compliers 136 41 267 81 403 61
Non-compliers
Redshirted 122 37 3 1 125 19
Repeaters 46 14 9 3 55 8
Grade advanced 0 0 5 2 5 1
enrolled in other states or countries 67 20 55 17 122 18
1 The category compliers identifies the students who are enrolled in the
expected grade according to their date of birth and the school entry rule,
did not skip or repeat any grade, and who have not been enrolled in other
states or countries with different cut-off dates.
2 The category redshirted refers to the students who were born just before
the cut-off date and whose school entry was delayed by one year.
3 This category refers to the students who have been enrolled in other states
or countries with different cut-off dates.
Although we use the IV methodology in our regression analysis, which cor-
rects for the potential sample selection bias, the fact that such a large proportion
of the participants in our sample had their school entry delayed may lead to an
underestimation of the RAE. For instance, this could be the case if these stu-
dents are those who were less mature and consequently would potentially be
more negatively affected by peer comparisons based on relative age differences
in the classroom. Other studies on the RAE using observational data from other
countries, observe a negligible (Crawford et al., 2014) or relatively small (Be-
dard and Dhuey, 2006; Grenet, 2009) fraction of students who had their school
entry delayed compared to our sample.
We excluded from our main regression analysis participants who have been
previously enrolled in other Australian states or countries with different school
entry rules (accounting for 18 percent of the sample).18 The reason for exclud-
ing these students is that we expect that any existing relative age differences
18We will compare these results with those obtained when including this sub-sample of
students in our robustness analysis.
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in behaviour emerge from peer comparisons and repeated exposure to an en-
vironment in which they perceive their disadvantaged or advantaged position.
Therefore, including students who have been in a school system with different
cut-off dates could potentially bias our estimates for the RAE.
2.4.2 Experimental tasks
We elicit preferences for competitive environments and self-confidence as in
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), risk and ambiguity preferences as in Sutter et al.
(2013) and Lejuez et al. (2002), and professional aspirations based on the work
developed by Siegel (1957). We also collect socio-demographic variables with
a post-experimental questionnaire. The experimental tasks were chosen taking
into account their feasibility, with particular attention to our young participant
pool, and following the existing literature, to facilitate the comparison of our
results with previous findings.
All experimental sessions were conducted with the same experimenter (au-
thor in this study) plus either another author in the study or a research as-
sistant. A teacher was always present during the session, so that the students
would perceive the experiment as a formal activity. All sessions were conducted
in the morning (with one exception) during school hours and lasted between 70
and 90 minutes, depending on the number of participants. The instructions for
all tasks were given out loud at the beginning of the session, following a writ-
ten script. Examples were used to illustrate each of the tasks and participants
were encouraged to ask questions in order to ensure a good understanding of
the tasks and the associated payoff structure. Subsequently, the students per-
formed the experimental tasks individually, on a website specifically designed
for our experiment. Once the experiment started, all questions were answered
privately. The experimental webpage displayed screens with a brief summary of
the instructions before the participants started to perform each of the tasks.
The experiment was incentivised with real monetary payments. Each stu-
dent received a participation fee of 7 Australian dollars and could earn up to
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14 Australian dollars, depending on his or her choices and performance at the
tasks. The upper bound for the gains was defined taking into account the age
of our participants, such that their earnings would correspond approximately to
the average weekly pocket money available to young students. Only one out of
the three incentivised tasks was selected randomly at the end of the session to
determine the participant’s final gains. These were distributed privately to the
participants at the end of the session.
1) Preferences for competitive environments
We elicit preferences for competition as introduced by Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007).19 The task consists of adding sets of five one-digit or two-digit numbers
under two different payment schemes and comprises five stages (in fixed order).
In each of the first three stages, participants are asked to successively add up
sets of five numbers (as illustrated in Figure A.2.1 in Appendix A.2) during
three minutes. Once they submit an answer, a different set of five numbers is
displayed on the screen. Participants are not given any feedback on whether
the previous answer was right or wrong.
In the first stage, participants face a piece-rate compensation scheme and
receive 20 cents for each correct answer. In the second stage, they face a tourna-
ment compensation scheme. A participant receives 60 cents per correct answer
if he or she is ranked in the top third in terms of number of correct answers
in stage 2. Those ranked below the top third do not get anything. These two
stages provide participants with experience in both compensation schemes.
In the third stage, participants have to choose which compensation scheme
will be applied to their future performance. They are then given another three
minutes to solve the calculations. The performance of a participant choosing
the competitive compensation scheme is evaluated relative to the performance of
all participants observed in the previous stage (stage 2). Therefore, the perfor-
19The main difference with our experiment is that, in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
participants are matched in groups of four and the participant with the highest number of
correct answers in each group wins the tournament. In our setting, there is no matching of
the participants and the top third of participants in the classroom win the tournament.
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mance of a participant who enters a tournament is compared to the performance
of other participants who also performed under a tournament compensation
scheme.
In the fourth stage of the task, participants do not have to perform any
calculations, but choose the compensation scheme for their past piece-rate per-
formance (in stage 1). They are first informed about their number of correct
answers in stage 1 (but not about their rank), and have to choose between
the piece-rate and the tournament compensation scheme.20 This stage allows
us to test whether the heterogeneity between different groups in preferences
for competition (assessed in stage 3), can be explained solely by differences in
taste for performing under a competitive environment, or whether it can also
be explained by other factors, such as over-confidence and risk aversion, as the
competition makes the payoff more uncertain (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010).
In the final stage of the task, participants are asked to guess their relative
performance in stages 1 and 2. The elicitation of beliefs for relative performance
is not incentivised, in order to ensure that participants have no interest in
behaving strategically in the first stages, for instance by performing very poorly.
Risk and ambiguity attitudes
2) Ordered choices lists
We use ordered choices lists as in Sutter et al. (2013) in order to elicit risk
and ambiguity attitudes. In each list, participants have to choose twenty times
between drawing a ball from a bag (filled with white and orange balls) and an
increasing sure amount of money, as shown in Appendix A.2. If participants
choose to draw a ball from the bag, they earn 7 dollars if the drawn ball is
white, and 0 is the drawn ball is orange. At the end of the session, only one out
of the twenty decision rows is randomly selected by the experimental software
to determine participants’ earnings. If participants chose to draw a ball from
20As previously, if a participant chooses to submit his or her piece-rate performance to a
tournament, his or her score will be compared to the score in stage 2 of the other participants
in the session.
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the bag in the selected row, they draw a ball from the bag themselves and are
rewarded according to the colour of the ball drawn. If they chose the sure option,
the amount of money offered in the selected row is paid to the participant.
Participants are presented with two different bags, named A and B. Bag A,
represents the risky prospect and is filled with six white and six orange balls
in front of the participants. Bag B, represents the ambiguity prospect and is
filled before the experimental session. The participants are told that the bag
contains twelve balls, but they are not informed about the proportion of each
colour. Based on participants’ choices between the sure amount of money and
the random draw, we calculate the parameters for risk and ambiguity attitudes
as in Sutter et al. (2013) (a detailed description is provided in Appendix A.2).
In order to ensure a good understanding of the task, participants were given
different examples of completed choice lists (corresponding to different risk at-
titudes) and explanations on what would be their payoff if a given row was
randomly chosen out of the twenty rows of a filled list. The different examples
were presented in random order, without mentioning whether a given choice list
represented the preferences of a more or less risk seeking individual. We also ex-
plicitly guided participants to make consistent choices, by explaining that once
they preferred the sure amount of money offered over drawing a ball from the
bag, they should also prefer the sure amount of money in all the subsequent
rows. Accordingly, as in Andersen et al. (2006), our experimental software lim-
ited the possibility to make inconsistent choices (i.e. participants could not have
more than one switching point between the risky and the sure option).
3) Balloon analogue risk task (BART)
We use the BART task (Lejuez et al., 2002) (commonly used in psychology
studies) as a second measure of risk attitudes. In this task, a simulated balloon
with a balloon pump is displayed on the computer screen (see Appendix A.2).
Each click on the pump inflates the balloon and increases participant’s earnings
by 5 cents. The balloon will explode at a random pump, leading to a payoff of
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zero. At any time before its explosion, participants can decide to stop pumping
the balloon and collect the accumulated earnings. Participants are not given
information regarding the probability of the explosion of the balloon, but they
are told that the balloon can explode at any point, between the first click all
the way up to the maximum of 140 clicks, at which point the balloon will fill
the entire computer screen. After each balloon explosion or money collection,
participants are presented with a new balloon, until a total of five balloons are
completed. Our measure of risk attitude is given by the total number of clicks.
The BART can be considered as a way to elicit risk attitude in a situation
where probabilities are subjective. It is a task which is easy to understand for
young participants and, as the ordered choices lists, it provides a measure of risk
aversion correlated with real life risk behaviour (Dohmen et al., 2011; Lejuez
et al., 2002, 2007).
4) Professional aspirations
Our methodology to elicit professional aspirations is closely related to Siegel
(1957). We measure participants’ aspirations by their ranking of professional
careers on a preference scale (see Appendix A.2). In this task, participants are
presented with three different occupations which have contrasting skill require-
ments and social standings. Two of the three occupations are used as reference
points on an ordered preference scale. The occupation associated with the low-
est social status is assigned to the bottom of the scale, and the one associated
with the highest social status is assigned to the top of the scale. The task con-
sists of ranking the third occupation, associated with an intermediate rank in
the classification of occupation and social status, on this preference scale.
Our measure of aspirations is given by the distance between the lowest ranked
profession (fixed on the scale) and the third occupation, ranked by the partic-
ipants. If the intermediate profession provides a satisfaction very close to the
least attractive profession, this will be interpreted as high aspirations, that
is, only the high ranked profession appears satisfactory to the participant. In
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contrast, if the intermediate occupation provides a satisfaction close to the oc-
cupation associated with the highest rank and social status, this reveals low
aspirations. We use occupations from different professional areas (scientific,
artistic, educational) to capture aspirations over a diverse range of professional
careers.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main results
We present the results for the pooled sample and also separately by gender,
because the factors which might be relevant predictors of economic preferences,
in particular the relative age, might differ between male and female students
or vary in their magnitude. This is line with the common observation in the
experimental economics literature of significant gender differences in risk, social
preferences and competitive behaviour (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
We present two different specifications of our model: a basic specification,
only with the relative age and state as regressors, and a fully specified one,
adding individual and school level control variables. We focus on the estimates
obtained with the IV method, net of the potential selection bias, for interpreta-
tion of the results and report the estimates obtained with the OLS procedure for
comparative purposes in Appendix A.5. The estimates from the first stage of
the IV regression, in Appendix A.4, show that the predicted relative age (rap),
given by whether a child was born before or after the cut-off date, is a strong
predictor for the observed relative age.
There are slight variations in sample sizes between the different regression
specifications. One of the reasons is that, as mentioned in section 2.4, we do not
have data on students’ academic grades for all participants. A second reason
is that as the tasks were performed online, we sporadically lost information on
participants’ choices due to internet connection issues. This is highly unlikely
to bias the results as the incidents were randomly distributed across partici-
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pants. Finally, in the ordered choices list task, we excluded participants who
made inconsistent choices,21 as this might be an indication that they did not
understand the task.
Result 1: There is no evidence of a relative age effect on preferences for
competitive environments.
Result 1.1: There is no evidence of relative age differences in performance.
Under the piece-rate, the average number of correct answers is 5.24 with a
standard deviation of 3.37. The average number of correct answers under the
tournament compensation scheme is higher, 5.96, with a standard deviation of
3.48.22 The positive progression in performance between the two stages is likely
to be explained by a learning effect, as the order of the stages was constant
across sessions. In Table 2.5.1 we show the estimation results with the number
of correct answers in the piece-rate, in the tournament and the progression in
performance between the two stages as dependent variables. The results point
to an absence of relative age differences in performance under both the piece-
rate and the tournament. As we are measuring performance, the coefficient
estimate for the relative age combines the relative and absolute age effects. By
comparing the estimates obtained with IV and OLS regressions (see Table A.5.1
in Appendix A.5), we observe a downward bias in the estimate for the relative
age obtained with OLS (although the coefficient estimates tend to not be sta-
tistically different from zero). This is potentially due to a negative selection of
students whose school entry was delayed, for instance if those who have weaker
cognitive skills are more likely to have been redshirted. In addition, children
who repeated grades are among the oldest in the class, but are expected to have
low cognitive skills.
In specifications (1b) and (2b) with additional control variables, we find
that students in year 9 perform better than students in year 8. They obtain on
average 0.69 more correct answers in the piece-rate (1b) and 0.86 more correct
21We excluded participants who never switched from the risky option to the safe option.
22The difference in average performance between the two stages is significant at 1 percent
level.
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answers in the tournament compensation scheme (2b). These estimates combine
the effect of a one-year difference in formal education and in absolute age. As in
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Sutter and Ru¨tzler (2010), we do not find
any gender differences in performance.23
We also find that students with better math scores perform better. An
increase of one standard deviation from the mean in math scores increases the
number of correct answers by 1.1 in the piece-rate and by 1.25 in the tournament
payment scheme. Moreover, the results provide mild evidence that students from
Queensland perform worse than participants from New South Wales and that
students from metropolitan areas perform better than students from regional
areas under the tournament (both effects are significant at 10 percent level).
23Other studies find that competition increases the gender gap in performance. Gneezy
et al. (2003) conduct an experiment with Israeli engineering students, who had to solve mazes
under different incentive schemes. They find that competition increases the gender gap in
performance by factor three, compared to the non-competitive setting. They also find that
the gender gap in performance is not due to the fact that women do not perform well under
competitive environments generally, but that they do not perform well when competing in
mixed-gender groups.
2.5. RESULTS 61
Table 2.5.1: IV regressions on performance
Piece-rate Tournament Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 0.686 0.401 0.135 -0.134 0.521 0.494
(0.587) (0.588) (0.664) (0.691) (0.463) (0.507)
QLD -0.876 -0.575 -1.164 -0.944∗ 0.305∗ 0.377
(0.665) (0.511) (0.715) (0.490) (0.183) (0.263)
Year 9 0.691∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ -0.200
(0.297) (0.290) (0.213)
Male 0.281 0.102 0.163
(0.284) (0.343) (0.236)
Math score 1.099∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ -0.133
(0.154) (0.189) (0.141)
English score 0.245 0.259 -0.048
(0.187) (0.202) (0.113)
Public -0.987∗ -1.034 0.057
(0.580) (0.652) (0.318)
Regional -0.563 -0.719∗ 0.104
(0.504) (0.425) (0.305)
Constant 6.057∗∗∗ 0.776 7.698∗∗∗ 1.291 -1.633∗∗∗ -0.248
(1.304) (3.038) (1.459) (3.136) (0.518) (1.899)
N 534 463 532 461 529 458
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Result 1.2: There is no evidence of a relative age effect on confidence with
respect to performance.
At the end of the first task, participants were asked to report their guesses
for their relative performance, for both the piece-rate and the tournament.24
The results presented in Tables 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 show that there is no evidence
of a RAE on participants’ expectations for their rank. We find that students in
year 9 expect to be ranked higher than students in year 8, in both compensation
schemes (specification (1b)). This is consistent with the observation that they
also perform better (see Table 2.5.1). The results obtained when considering
24The variable expected rank is expressed in percentile rank. It is calculated by dividing
the guessed rank of the participant by the total number of participants in the session and then
multiplying this fraction by 100.
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separately the samples of male and female participants indicate that relatively
old male participants have higher expectations for their rank in the piece-rate
(specification (2a) in Table 2.5.2). However, this result does not hold when
controlling for additional factors, including performance (2b).
We also find evidence of a large gender gap in beliefs for relative performance,
even when controlling for math scores and performance. Male participants ex-
pect to be ranked 7.03 and 7.89 percentiles higher than females, under the
piece-rate and the tournament respectively. As expected, participants who have
better math scores and perform better in the task expect to be ranked higher.25
25We also include as an explanatory variable the number of participants in the session, as
this might influence participants’ expectation for their rank, although it does not impact their
performance (results not reported here). As shown in Tables 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, we do not find
evidence for this effect.
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Result 1.3: There is no evidence of relative age differences in the choice of
performing in a competitive environment.
When asked to choose the payment method, piece-rate or tournament, that
will be applied to their future performance, 35.11 percent of the participants in
our sample opt into the tournament. The results from the IV probit regressions
in Table 2.5.4, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the participant
chooses the tournament, and 0 if he or she chooses the piece-rate, indicate that
there is no RAE on preferences to perform under a competitive setting, for the
pooled sample and separately by gender.
As in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we find a large gender effect in taste
for competition. Male students are more likely to choose the tournament com-
pared to female students, even in the absence of differences in performance (as
shown in Table 2.5.1). Specification (1b) in Table 2.5.4 shows that female stu-
dents have on average a 17.1 percentage point lower probability of choosing the
tournament (significant at 1 percent level), compared to male students. This
is in line with the results in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), showing that fe-
males are 38 percentage points less likely to enter the tournament than males.
In accordance with the findings in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Sutter
and Ru¨tzler (2010), although we do not observe differences in performance be-
tween male and female students, male participants have higher confidence than
females, which contributes to the gender gap in tournament entry decisions.
Controlling for participants’ beliefs for their rank under the tournament (stage
2) in specification (1c), male students are 11.4 percentage points more likely to
enter the tournament than female students (significant at 1 percent level).
The results also indicate that participants with better math scores are more
likely to enter the tournament. An increase of one standard deviation from the
mean in math scores, increases the probability of entering the tournament by
4.5 percentage points (significant at 1 percent level). Moreover, the probability
of entering the tournament decreases with the number of participants in the
session, although the tournament rule was rank dependent (participants had to
be ranked in the top third in order to win the tournament).
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Result 1.4: There is no evidence of relative age differences in the choice of
submitting the piece-rate performance to a tournament.
When participants are informed about their performance in the piece-rate,
subsequently having to decide whether to submit their score to a tournament,
32.28 percent of the participants in our sample choose to do so (a similar pro-
portion to the one observed for opting into performing under a tournament in
the previous stage). In Table 2.5.5, we present the IV probit regression results,
where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the participant chooses to submit
his or her piece-rate performance to a tournament, and 0 otherwise, showing
the absence of relative age differences in the decision to submit the piece-rate
performance to a tournament (for the pooled sample and separately by gender).
The results also indicate that the year level does not influence the probability
of submitting the piece-rate performance to the tournament.
We also find that male participants are 17.8 percentage points more likely to
submit their piece-rate performance to the tournament than females (specifica-
tion (1b)). In line with our previous observation, when controlling for partici-
pants’ beliefs for their rank in the piece-rate (1c), the gender gap is attenuated,
but remains large and significant. Controlling for participants’ beliefs, females
are 14 percentage points less likely to submit their piece-rate performance to a
tournament than males.
We also find that participants with higher performance in the piece-rate are
more likely to submit their score to the tournament. As for the decision to enter
the tournament in stage 3, the number of participants in the session significantly
decreases participants’ propensity to submit the piece-rate performance to a
tournament.
The results obtained when considering separately the samples of male and
female students, show that males from public schools are 20.5 percentage points
more likely to submit their score to the tournament, compared to male students
from private schools (specification (2c)). When considering the sample of fe-
male participants, we observe that their math scores and expectations for their
rank increase their probability to submit their piece-rate performance to the
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tournament (3c).
In sum, we do not find evidence of a RAE on participants’ preferences for
competition. Our results show that the grade (combining the effect of absolute
age and schooling) impacts performance, but does not influence taste for com-
petition, which is in line with previous findings on the stability of preferences
during adolescence (Sutter et al., 2013). Moreover, in accordance with the ex-
isting literature on the gender gap in preferences for competitive environments
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004), our results indi-
cate that males have stronger preferences for competition than females. This
effect is not only driven by males’ preference to perform under a competitive
setting, but also by other attributes, in particular self-confidence.
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Result 2: There is no evidence of relative age differences in attitudes toward
risk and ambiguity.
In Table 2.5.6 we present the regression results for risk preferences, using the
ordered choices list task.26 Our measure of risk aversion takes a continuum of
values between 0 and 1. A participant with a risk aversion value of 1 is classified
as extremely risk averse, whereas a participant with a risk aversion value of 0 is
considered risk loving. We show that the relative age does not seem to impact
risk attitudes. Likewise, grade does not influence risk preferences.
We also find that males are more risk seeking than females. Being male
decreases the risk aversion parameter by 0.07. This result is consistent with
Sutter et al. (2013), who find that males are less risk averse (by 0.07) than
female students. Moreover, an increase of one standard deviation from the
mean in math scores decreases the risk aversion parameter by 0.05. This result
is in line with the finding in Burks et al. (2009) that individuals with higher IQ
are less risk averse in standard economic measures of risk attitudes (i.e. binary
choices between lotteries).
In Table 2.5.7, we show the regression results for risk preferences using the
BART. We measure risk aversion by the total number of pumps in the five
balloons.27 The results for the pooled sample confirm our previous finding,
that is, relative age does not influence risk attitudes. When restricting the
sample to male participants, we find mild evidence that relatively old students
are more risk averse than the youngest students. The former are expected to
have a smaller average number of pumps by 47, relative to male participants
who are the youngest (specification (2a)). However, this result does not hold
when including additional control variables (specification (2b)). We note that
the coefficient estimate for year 9 is not statistically different from zero. With
26We excluded from the regression analysis participants who never switch from the risk or
ambiguous prospect to the sure option (approximately 5 percent of the sample), as this might
be an indication that they did not understand the task.
27We excluded from the sample 8 percent of the participants for whom we do not have
information on each of the five balloons, due to internet connection issues during the task.
It is very unlikely to change the results as these events were randomly distributed across
participants.
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respect to female students, we also do not find evidence of a RAE on risk
aversion. Furthermore, when measuring risk aversion with the BART, we do
not observe the common finding that females are more risk averse than males. A
suggestive explanation is that the BART may be a closer predictor of ambiguity
than risk preferences and, as in Sutter et al. (2013), we show that there is no
gender effect in ambiguity attitudes.
Table 2.5.6: IV regressions on risk aversion
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 0.001 0.022 -0.021 0.020 0.013 0.016
(0.039) (0.045) (0.084) (0.092) (0.045) (0.060)
QLD 0.019 0.014 0.000 -0.011 0.036 0.035
(0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.040) (0.035) (0.044)
Year 9 -0.035 -0.038 -0.037
(0.032) (0.031) (0.046)
Male -0.074∗∗∗
(0.024)
Math score -0.026 -0.046∗ -0.009
(0.017) (0.027) (0.019)
English score -0.003 -0.007 0.002
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
Public 0.013 -0.003 0.041
(0.028) (0.041) (0.034)
Regional -0.036 -0.066 -0.010
(0.042) (0.061) (0.059)
Constant 0.531∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.800∗
(0.050) (0.277) (0.083) (0.293) (0.077) (0.410)
N 505 438 255 232 250 206
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5.7: IV regressions on the BART
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age -17.042 -18.185 -46.996∗ -44.548 1.962 -2.317
(16.944) (17.846) (27.982) (28.642) (19.229) (18.787)
QLD -2.076 -8.599 13.233 5.427 -13.511 -21.527
(15.022) (18.808) (13.255) (19.193) (22.435) (24.346)
Year 9 0.044 1.376 2.346
(7.145) (9.789) (10.026)
Male 11.204
(9.720)
Math score 3.652 1.517 6.745
(3.839) (4.667) (5.792)
English score -2.352 0.195 -5.496
(5.753) (8.481) (5.907)
Public -24.018 -27.644 -13.434
(14.983) (17.737) (23.548)
Regional -0.898 -12.246 11.882
(14.530) (24.612) (13.492)
Constant 187.233∗∗∗ 212.589∗∗∗ 192.349∗∗∗ 214.141∗∗ 185.854∗∗∗ 193.850∗∗
(34.940) (69.666) (31.158) (96.662) (50.657) (90.604)
N 488 450 251 240 237 210
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In Table 2.5.8 we present the regression results on ambiguity aversion. The
ambiguity aversion parameter takes values between -1 and 1, with higher values
indicating higher ambiguity aversion. As for risk attitudes, we do not find
evidence that the relative age impacts ambiguity preferences. As mentioned
above, we also do not find gender differences. Contrasting with the previous
results on risk attitudes, when considering the results separately by gender, we
find weak evidence that female participants with higher math scores are more
ambiguity averse (specification (3b)). An increase of one standard deviation
from the mean in math scores increases the ambiguity aversion parameter by
0.03 for female participants.
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Table 2.5.8: IV regressions on ambiguity aversion
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age -0.012 -0.012 0.064 0.072 -0.065 -0.080
(0.035) (0.038) (0.058) (0.060) (0.065) (0.067)
QLD -0.004 -0.001 -0.023 -0.015 0.004 -0.005
(0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.050) (0.042) (0.042)
Year 9 -0.009 -0.020 -0.011
(0.018) (0.031) (0.027)
Male -0.018
(0.027)
Math score 0.004 -0.022 0.029∗
(0.015) (0.026) (0.017)
English score 0.001 -0.007 0.006
(0.017) (0.024) (0.027)
Public -0.038 -0.014 -0.061∗
(0.042) (0.057) (0.032)
Regional -0.016 -0.052 0.009
(0.035) (0.055) (0.043)
Constant 0.116 0.233 0.079 0.263 0.148 0.323
(0.075) (0.197) (0.086) (0.337) (0.093) (0.273)
N 486 424 247 225 239 199
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
Result 3: There is no evidence of a relative age effect on professional aspi-
rations.
We measure participants’ professional aspirations by their ranking decisions
of different occupations on a preference scale, ranging from 0 to 100. Partic-
ipants were invited to rank the following occupations: shop keeper, teacher,
cameraman and project manager. We report in Table 2.5.9 the regression re-
sults on the average rank across these four occupations, suggesting that relative
age is not an important predictor of professional aspirations. We find that
students from public schools have lower aspirations than students from private
schools (specification (1b)). This could be partly explained by the selection of
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students who are enrolled in private schools, as they tend to belong to more
advantaged socio-economic backgrounds. We also find that female participants
with higher grades in English have lower aspirations (specification (3b)). How-
ever, the magnitude of the effect is small and is partly driven by the fact that
female students with higher English scores were more likely to attribute a higher
rank to a teaching career.
Table 2.5.9: IV regressions on professional aspirations
Average rank for the 4 occupations
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 0.060 -1.415 1.547 -0.169 -0.911 -2.543
(1.858) (2.030) (4.401) (4.391) (2.687) (3.010)
QLD -2.841∗∗ -2.243∗ -3.251∗∗ -2.775∗ -2.691 -1.951
(1.375) (1.328) (1.326) (1.443) (3.012) (2.756)
Year 9 2.394∗ 2.777 2.023
(1.431) (2.399) (1.914)
Male -0.044
(1.294)
Math score 0.316 0.233 0.603
(0.700) (0.947) (1.034)
English score 1.283 0.004 2.554∗∗
(0.988) (1.404) (1.159)
Public 3.184∗ 1.530 6.108∗∗
(1.697) (1.851) (2.776)
Regional 0.756 0.377 0.800
(1.575) (1.802) (2.877)
Constant 60.657∗∗∗ 37.819∗∗∗ 59.636∗∗∗ 35.548∗ 61.627∗∗∗ 38.563∗∗
(2.633) (12.243) (3.582) (20.445) (5.676) (16.597)
N 524 461 262 243 262 218
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2.5.2 Robustness analysis
In the previous sections we assumed that relative age differences in preferences
should not differ between two adjacent school cohorts, and focused on the in-
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terpretation of the estimates for the relative age, averaged across grades 8 and
9. In this section, we investigate whether we obtain different results when es-
timating equation 2.1 (in section 2.3), separately for grades 8 and 9. Next, we
analyse whether our previous results hold when considering the whole sample of
participants, i.e. including those who were enrolled in other Australian states
or countries with different school entry rules.
We start by discussing the results obtained when relaxing the assumption
that the RAE is constant across cohorts. The results suggest that considering
the pooled sample of students in grades 8 and 9 masks differences in prefer-
ences between the oldest and the youngest students in grade 8. We find that
the oldest students in grade 8 have a 17.9 percentage points higher probability
to enter a tournament (in stage 3), and a 21.8 percentage points higher prob-
ability to submit the piece-rate performance to a tournament (in stage 4) (see
Table A.6.1 in Appendix A.6). Furthermore, the results indicate that this effect
is stronger for male than female participants. We also find that relatively old
male students in grade 8 are more ambiguity averse in the ordered choices list
task (see Table A.6.2 in Appendix A.6). In contrast, as with the pooled sample
we do not find any effect for risk aversion.
A suggestive explanation for the heterogeneous RAE between grades 8 and
9, is the fact that grade 8 is the first year of high school for most students
in our sample. The transition from primary to high school is accompanied
with important changes with respect to the learning environment, academic
requirements and peers. Moreover, some studies have shown that the transition
to high school has negative emotional consequences, e.g. lower self-valuation,
anxiety, in particular for adolescents with low coping skills (Qualter et al., 2007),
which could explain the transitory bias in preferences of the youngest students
in year 8.
In all our previous estimations, we excluded participants who have been
previously enrolled in other Australian states or countries with different school
entry rules (18 percent of the total sample). When including this subset of par-
ticipants, we would expect the estimates for the relative age to be even smaller
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in magnitude and to have lower statistical significance. This expectation rests
on the assumption that the RAE arises from a continued process of peer com-
parisons in the classroom environment, with relatively young children perceiving
themselves as disadvantaged already in their first years of formal education due
to their earlier developmental stage. When including students who have been
enrolled in other states or countries with different school entry rules, none of the
results for ambiguity aversion and preferences for competition for the sample
of grade 8 students described above remain statistically significant. However,
we find that relatively old male students in grade 9 are more risk averse than
their youngest counterparts in the ordered choice list task. The risk aversion
parameter increases by 0.22 for relatively old male students (significant at 10
percent). All the other results described in the previous section remain stable.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we investigated whether the persistent relative age gap in aca-
demic outcomes can be partly explained by relative age differences in economic
preferences relevant for decision making in education. The rationale for this in-
vestigation is that peer comparisons in the classroom based on maturity differ-
ences could bias the development of preferences early in life, with a systematic
penalty for the youngest children. Such effect would be compatible with the
persistence of a relative age effect throughout the educational trajectory. We
conducted the experiment in 38 high schools, with a sample of 661 adolescent
students aged between 13 and 14 years old. We selected this age range because
we expected their preferences to be stable. All our participants were born within
a two-month window of the cut-off date defined to start school.
The main finding in this study is that relative age differences do not influence
the preferences we chose to elicit: taste for competition, risk attitudes and
professional aspirations. We also find that the combined effect of absolute age
and schooling does not impact students’ preferences, which is in line with the
observation that preferences of children and adolescents are fairly stable by the
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age of 10 (Sutter et al., 2013). Moreover, our results confirm the well-established
finding that females are more risk averse than males using the ordered choices list
task (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Furthermore, as in Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) we find that male students have a stronger preference for competitive
environments than females and are more self-confident. The main contribution
of this study is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first investigation of
the RAE on economic preferences. It also distinguishes itself from the existing
evidence by doing so in an experimental setting.
Understanding what drives the relative age gap in performance is of major
importance for the design of adequate policies to counteract this effect. Our
results give support to the recent finding by Crawford et al. (2014) that small
maturity differences may explain the persistent RAE in academic outcomes,
suggesting that delaying the school starting age could constitute an adequate
solution. Bedard and Dhuey (2007) find that increasing the school starting age
by six months in 26 US states had a positive effect on educational attainment
and wages. However, they do not investigate the distributional effects of such
policy shift according to relative age or socio-economic background. In par-
ticular, pushing back the school entry cut-off date might widen disparities in
education between children from different socio-economic backgrounds. For in-
stance, while children belonging to advantaged socio-economic backgrounds will
attend high quality pre-school institutions, those belonging to poor backgrounds
might spend additional time in environments which adversely impact the devel-
opment of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. It could also be suggested
to assign students to different classrooms according to their level of maturity,
which may benefit more mature children and the youngest children with low
learning abilities. However, it could penalise children in the middle of the age
distribution assigned to classrooms with the youngest children (Zimmerman,
2003). Moreover, a child’s relative maturity is not fully stable, but susceptible
to evolve over time. Finally, a sensible solution may be providing extra support
to the youngest children, in particular during the first years of school, when the
maturity gap is substantial.
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We acknowledge several weaknesses in this study. One limitation is not test-
ing for relative age differences in time preferences, although the ability to delay
rewards and stick to commitments is an important predictor of educational out-
comes (e.g., Castillo et al., 2011). We chose not to test for time preferences for
practical reasons. First, it would extend the experimental session and imply for
our participants missing more than one class. In addition, we would need to
request extra collaborative effort from the schools in organising the deferred pay-
ments for the participants. A second caveat of this study is that not all eligible
students took part in the experiment, but only those who (and whose parents)
opted in. This could raise concerns in terms of the representativity of our sam-
ple, if the participants in the experiment differ in their relevant characteristics
from the students who were eligible but did not participate. In particular, we
may have a selection bias among students who are born on a particular side of
the cut-off date. While this is a valid concern, we do not observe differences in
participation rates according to the side of the cut-off date in which students
were born. A more important potential limitation in this study is that a very
large fraction of our participants who were born just before the cut-off date had
their school entry delayed (37 percent). This may be an issue when relating our
findings to other studies on the RAE in the context of other educational sys-
tems with larger compliant populations (e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Grenet,
2009; Smith, 2009; Crawford et al., 2014). In particular, this is a concern if
students who had their school entry delayed were those who were less mature
when eligible to enter school and more susceptible to peer influence based on
relative age.
Finally, the fact that we do not find evidence of a RAE on the preferences
we chose to elicit in our study does not exhaust the possibility of a RAE on the
formation of other non-cognitive skills which are relevant predictors of choices
in education. In particular, for future research, it would be interesting to test
whether we observe an influence of relative age on self-control and time pref-
erences with school children. For instance, Bettinger and Slonim (2007) find
that more mature children are more patient. Hence, testing whether relatively
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young children are less patient than their older counterparts may provide im-
portant insights on the type of pedagogical solutions which could be effective in
attenuating the relative age effect in educational trajectories.
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Chapter 3
The impact of affirmative
action on effort: Evidence
from a cross-country
laboratory experiment
81
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Abstract1
Affirmative action policies use positive discrimination and one main prior-
ity consists in increasing investment in education of potentially disadvantaged
groups. A debate persists on whether such policies succeed in attenuating in-
equality in skills and stereotypes, or instead reinforce them by discouraging
effort in education of the disadvantaged group. We conduct a cross-country
laboratory experimental study (in Australia and in China) to investigate the
incentive effects of an affirmative action rule in a tournament setting, in the
presence of a real stereotype and differences in competitive capacities between
participants. Our experimental design rests on the negative stereotype with
respect to the mathematical skills of Australians, compared to Chinese partic-
ipants. Our results confirm our central assumption, that is, the perception of
a stereotype with respect to the mathematical skills of Australian participants
and the unequal mathematical skills between the two groups. The main finding
of this study is that neither the stereotype nor AA affects individuals’ effort in
a tournament setting implying that the policy does not discourage effort from
the disadvantaged group.
1This is joint work with Uwe Dulleck, Yumei He and Michael Kidd.
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3.1 Introduction
Inequality of opportunity between different social groups defined by race, gen-
der, religion or ethnicity remain pervasive in society and are repeatedly stressed
in the political debate. The observed gap in representation in top labour mar-
ket segments or higher education institutions is, to a large extent, explained
by actual differences in skills (Heckman, 1998). These differences emerge due
to contrasting pre-labour market conditions, such as the quality of education
received, family environment, peer characteristics and stereotypes. The reputa-
tion or stereotypes associated with different social groups is likely to affect hiring
decisions of employers and university admission committees, in particular when
there is asymmetry of information. The consequent statistical discrimination
(Aigner and Cain, 1977) may undermine the incentives of individuals affected
by a negative stereotype to invest in education, creating a vicious circle of sus-
tained inequalities (Coate and Loury, 1993; Loury, 2009). Accordingly, there is
evidence to suggest that stereotypes influence individuals’ performance.2
In several countries, affirmative action (henceforth AA) programs have been
enforced by law in order to increase the representation of disadvantaged social
groups in university admissions and top labour market segments. For instance,
in the US there is a long history of AA programs to promote women and mi-
norities in the labour market and higher education institutions. In Norway, a
legislative quota was enacted in 2003, requiring that women must constitute
at least 40 percent of company board members. Similarly, many Australian
public and private institutions aim to achieve employment participation of the
indigenous, at least to the level of their representation in the Australian popu-
lation. The rationale for enacting AA programs is twofold. First, it is expected
that increasing the probability for individuals to reach a position from which
2In an experimental study, Shih et al. (1999) show that female Asian American students
perform better in a mathematical task when the positive stereotype is activated (Asian), while
the reverse occurs with the activation of the negative stereotype (female). Another example
is provided by Steele and Aronson (1995) who find that the gap in performance in ability
diagnostic tests between white and black American students is stronger when the test asks
participants to identify their race.
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they were at least partially excluded in the absence of a positive discrimina-
tory policy, raises incentives to invest in education. Secondly, exposure to the
stake-holders, namely universities, employers and the electorate, may eliminate
the negative stereotype. The ultimate objective of AA policies is to reduce
the penalty in education for individuals who have been historically affected by
negative stereotypes.3
There is no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on the in-
centive effects of AA policies for disadvantaged groups. The debate is centred
on whether preferential policies increase their incentives to invest in education
and break down negative views about disadvantaged social groups, or whether
these policies mechanically induce lower standards, and thus, reinforce the gap
in educational attainment and stereotypes (Coate and Loury, 1993). Labora-
tory experiments are a very valuable tool to study the incentive effects of AA
policies. A major reason is that such policies are often adopted endogenously,
challenging the interpretation of its causal effects by means of observational
data. Moreover, ethical and political considerations prevent conducting field
experiments on such policies, with a valid counterfactual. In contrast, labo-
ratory experiments allow exogenous policy changes, and consequently, a clean
identification of its incentive effects (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Extant experi-
mental studies examine the impact of AA in a pure experimental context (e.g.,
Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Kidd et al., 2008). In order to achieve superior
external validity of the results, other studies add realism to the experimental
setting with real effort tasks, and by building the experimental design on gender
stereotypes (e.g., Niederle et al., 2013) or creating disparities in experience in
the experimental task between participants (Calsamiglia et al., 2013).
In this study, we provide further evidence on the incentive effects of AA
3Other social policies have been implemented in an attempt to mitigate the impact of
negative stereotypes, and prospective effects of potential policies are still under evaluation.
For instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) suggest that anonymous resumes could reduce
inequality of opportunities in the labour market between white and black workers. The authors
test whether job applicants whose resumes have a white-sounding name were more likely to
be interviewed than those with black-sounding names. They show that the former have a 50
percent higher probability to be called back than candidates with African-sounding names.
86 CHAPTER 3. CROSS-COUNTRY LAB EXPERIMENT ON AA
with a cross-country laboratory experiment, conducted simultaneously in Aus-
tralia and in China. In this setting, we introduce a real (existing prior to the
experiment) stereotype and differences in ability between participants, by de-
signing our experiment around the asymmetry in mathematical skills between
Australian and Chinese students. The systematic difference in abilities in math-
ematics between Chinese and Australians (or more generally Western students)
is well-documented in the literature (see, for example, Flynn, 1991; Dandy and
Nettelbeck, 2002).4 Several factors may account for this gap. For instance,
the Chinese school curriculum is more demanding in mathematics compared to
the Australian curriculum. Moreover, the important role of education for social
mobility, beliefs in the value of education and the importance of achievement
through working hard in Chinese society may also be important contributing
factors for the gap in mathematical skills between Chinese and Australian uni-
versity students (Dandy and Nettelbeck, 2002).
In our experiment, Australian and Chinese participants compete in groups
of six participants in order to be allocated to two relatively high-skill real ef-
fort tasks, associated with high payoffs. In one of the tasks, which consists of
adding fractions in a limited time, Australian participants have a real disad-
vantage, due to their inferior average mathematical skills. Participants’ relative
performance in their group at a qualifying round (tournament) of each task
determines whether they are allocated to a high-skill and high-payoff task, or
alternatively, to a low-skill and low-payoff task in the second round. We imple-
ment three different treatments. In the baseline treatment, participants compete
in groups of six participants from the same ethnic background. In the stereo-
type treatment, participants compete in perfectly balanced mixed groups (with
three Chinese and three Australian participants). In the AA treatment, the
composition of the groups is identical to the previous treatment, but there is
an AA rule establishing that at least one Australian participant must appear
among the two winners of the tournament. The composition of the groups is
4For example, Dandy and Nettelbeck (2002) show that, controlling for IQ, Australian stu-
dents with a Chinese background perform better in mathematics than anglo-celtic Australian
students.
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made clear to the participants in the instructions and with a video transmission
between the two experimental laboratories. In this context, we test whether
Australian participants’ effort choices are affected by the introduction of the
AA rule.
Our results confirm the central assumption of our experimental design, that
is, the perception of a stereotype with respect to the mathematical skills of
Australian participants and their inferior performance in the mathematical task
relative to the Chinese participants. The main finding of this study is that
neither the stereotype nor AA affect individuals’ effort in the tournament, sug-
gesting that AA does not discourage effort from the disadvantaged group. In
sum, our results do not provide supportive evidence for AA as a powerful in-
strument in reducing disparities in achievement between different social groups
in a context with a real stereotype and difference in abilities.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the
theoretical and empirical literature on the incentive effects of AA. Section 3.3
describes the experimental design and participant pool. Section 3.4 presents the
results and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Theoretical background
Most of the theoretical work on AA models the introduction of preferential
rules in a context of statistical discrimination, which arises due to informa-
tion asymmetries with respect to the productivity of individuals who belong to
groups with different average productivity (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Lundberg
and Startz, 1983; Lundberg, 1991; Coate and Loury, 1993; Altonji and Blank,
1999; Neumark and Holzer, 2000). In the statistical discrimination framework,
employers have imperfect knowledge about the ability of job applicants and
infer their productivity level from all available information that they consider
relevant. They typically consider the applicant’s education, previous employ-
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ment experience and references. They might also consider other characteristics
such as gender, age and ethnicity. Hence, the employer’s choice on whether
to hire a given applicant or the type of job to offer, depends not only on the
applicant’s observable characteristics but also on group average characteristics
(Lundberg, 1991; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972). In this context, discrimination
can take the form of different wages for workers belonging to different groups
considered to have different average productivity levels (Arrow, 1973), alloca-
tion of workers from different groups to jobs with different skills requirements
(Coate and Loury, 1993) and unemployment. In modern societies, the former
type of discrimination is formally prohibited. Thus, models with alternative
jobs associated with different skills requirements or unemployment are better
suited to describe the role of discrimination and the efficiency effects of AA
(Niederle et al., 2013). Another class of theoretical models describes the effects
of AA in a rank-order tournament setting, with asymmetry in cost of effort or
ability (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992). The predictions
for the incentive effects of AA in both types of models are mixed.
The seminal paper by Coate and Loury (1993) proposes a formal description
of the mechanisms through which AA can lead to two alternative equilibria:
a benign equilibrium, with elimination of the stereotype, and a patronising
equilibrium, with a reinforcement of the stereotype. The authors analyse the
consequences of the introduction of AA on the equilibrium assignment patterns
of minority (b) and majority (w) workers to two vertically differentiated jobs.
Employers observe the group to which each worker belongs and a noisy signal,
informative about the skill level of the worker (e.g. test scores). Workers are
qualified for the best job if they have previously made an investment at cost
c. The function G(c) gives the fraction of workers with an investment cost no
greater than c. Employers fix a given standard that workers need to reach in
order to be assigned to the best job. The former will depend on employers’
beliefs with respect to the average ability of the worker’s group. Workers decide
to invest if the cost of doing so does not exceed the benefits. The latter are
given by the product of the gross return from being assigned to the best job and
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the increased probability of assignment due to investment, β, which depends on
workers’ expectation of the standard fixed by employers, s. Thus, the propor-
tion of workers who become qualified is given by G(β(s)). Employers will set the
standard, decreasing in the probability that a worker is qualified, pi. This implies
that more optimistic beliefs (pi) regarding group i will result in lower standards.
An equilibrium is given by a pair of beliefs such that pii = G(β(s
∗(pii))). As in
Lundberg (1991) and Lundberg and Startz (1983), in the presence of negative
stereotypes, minority workers will rationally invest less and become less produc-
tive than the majority workers.
In the model, AA requires employers to define standards such that the same
proportion of workers from both groups is assigned to the best job. AA creates
a binding constraint if employers hold negative beliefs regarding the skills of the
minority group. Employers seek to maximise [(1 − λ)P (sb, pib) + λP (sw, piw)],
where λ gives the fraction of workers of type w in the population, and P (s, pi)
the employer’s expected payoff from assigning a worker to the best job; under
the constraint that ρ(sb, pib) = ρ(sw, piw), where ρ(s, pi) is the probability that
the employer assigns a randomly drawn worker from each group to the best job.
An equilibrium under AA is a pair of beliefs, (pib, piw), and standards, (sb, sw),
satisfying the two following conditions: (sb, sw) solves the optimisation prob-
lem, given (pib, piw); and pii = G(β(si)). Employers generally respond to the
AA constraint by reducing the assignment standard for b’s and raising it for
w’s; and these adjustments are larger for b’s and smaller for w’s the larger is
the proportion of majority workers. In this framework, AA leads to a patronis-
ing equilibrium if employers have correct beliefs about the inferior skills of the
minority workers, and therefore use a lower standard to ensure that they are
assigned to the best job at the same rate as the majority workers. Employers are
bound to treat minority workers more liberally, thereby the negative stereotype
may be reinforced due to a lower investment in human capital by the minority
workers, leading to a larger ex-post skill gap.5 Alternatively, AA might raise
5Schotter and Weigelt (1992) predict that, in an uneven tournament setting (i.e. with
asymmetry in cost of effort), AA decreases effort of both advantaged and disadvantaged
groups.
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employers’ estimate of the productivity of minority workers enough that upon
removal of the policy, beliefs about both groups converge to the same equilib-
rium. Whether the patronising or benign equilibrium is observed depends on
several things, such as minority workers’ perception of their chances of being
allocated to the high-skill job conditional on their ability signal, the trade-off
between the additional gain of being allocated to a high-skill job and the invest-
ment cost, and the change in the optimal level of investment as a result of the
change in the standard (Neumark and Holzer, 2000).
There is no clear-cut theoretical prediction for the efficiency impact of AA
rules, as two alternative stable and incompatible equilibria - patronising or
benign - can emerge. Empirical studies testing the assumptions and predictions
of the models can provide important insights on the incentive effects of AA.
Table 3.2.1 provides a non-exhaustive summary of 10 of these studies which will
also be described in the next section.
3.2.2 Empirical evidence
One strand of the empirical literature on the efficiency effects of AA focuses on
exploring policy changes and policy simulations. These studies mainly investi-
gate the impact of AA on labour market indicators and admissions to university.
In the labour market context, Leonard (1990) and Miller and Segal (2012) find
that AA does not increase the representation of black workers in top labour
market segments. Conversely, policy simulation studies show that AA has an
overall positive effect on admission to college of minority students (Arcidia-
cono, 2005; Howell, 2010). For instance, Howell (2010) finds that a ban of AA
would decrease the representation of black and hispanic students in college by
2 percent, and by 10.2 percent at the most selective institutions. Focusing on
applicants’ behaviour, the results indicate that 95 percent of candidates submit
as many applications and that 92 percent apply to colleges of the same level
of selectivity. Other studies explore policy shifts in the US. For instance, Card
and Krueger (2005) show that AA does not influence high qualified minority
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students’ applications to the most selective institutions. However, Long (2004)
suggests different effects. The author finds that the ban of AA in California
and Texas significantly changed students’ application decisions, with minority
students shifting their SAT scores reports toward lower quality colleges, while
it was the opposite for majority students.
A considerable weakness of drawing causal inferences with observational data
is that AA policies are rarely adopted or abrogated exogenously. One exception,
examined by Beaman et al. (2009), is found in West Bengal (India) where gender
quotas for leadership positions in villages are randomly assigned across villages.
The authors find that mandated exposure to female leaders reduces discrimi-
nation against women in leadership positions and improves voters’ evaluation
of female leaders. Although there are exceptions, policy shifts are generally
excluded from natural experiments. For this reason, controlled laboratory ex-
periments, with exogenous policy implementations constitute a very important
tool to investigate the incentive effects of AA. A second and related reason
is that, for ethical and political considerations, it is very unlikely that it will
be possible to conduct controlled field experiments with random assignment of
positive discrimination policies.
It is common in the experimental literature to study the incentive effects
of AA in an asymmetric tournament context, i.e. with heterogeneity in invest-
ment costs or abilities between participants. For instance, Schotter and Weigelt
(1992) test the impact of AA in a pure experimental tournament setting. In the
experiment, participants have to select a decision number corresponding to an
abstract level of effort. The output of each participant is obtained by adding
a random number, corresponding to a productivity shock, to their chosen deci-
sion number. In each pair of randomly matched participants, the one with the
highest output receives a high payoff, and the other a low payoff. AA is intro-
duced by giving a positive starting advantage to participants with higher cost of
effort. In this setting, AA increases participants’ incentives to provide effort, in
particular when the disadvantage is very large. In contrast, they find that AA
decreases effort if there is no asymmetry in cost of effort between participants.
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Kidd et al. (2008) and Feltovich et al. (2013) test the predictions of the Coate
and Loury (1993) model, focusing on workers’ investment decisions under the
stereotype and AA scenarios. Feltovich et al. (2013) extend Kidd et al. (2008)
by adding another stage in the experiment, in which the AA rule is dismantled.
Both studies find evidence corroborating the benign equilibrium prediction, but
they do not find strong support for the patronising or worsening equilibria.
These studies suggest that AA rules enhance outcomes of disadvantaged
individuals by influencing their effort choices. Nonetheless, findings from pure
laboratory experimental settings tend to be criticised regarding their external
validity (Harrison and List, 2004). Another main criticism is that people may
change their behaviour by the simple fact that they are observed (Hawthorne
effect, Adair, 1984). The external validity problem is attenuated in laboratory
experiments which combine the rigorous identification of laboratory observation
with the realism of field data (Falk and Fehr, 2003). The relevant characteristics
of field settings can be retrieved, for instance, with a participant pool very
similar to the one that would be part of a field experiment, and such that the
context or information in which the experiment relies is naturally perceived
by the participant pool, rather than created by the framing (e.g. Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007). An increasing number of laboratory experiments also try
to add realism by using real effort tasks (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007;
Calsamiglia et al., 2013).
For instance, Niederle et al. (2013) and Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) try
to assess whether AA rules decrease the gender gap in tournament entry in
the laboratory, by matching participants in mixed gender groups and having
them performing a real effort task in a competitive setting. This is a relevant
investigation since top ranked positions in the labour market typically involve a
highly competitive selection process (e.g. entrance in medical schools, leadership
positions in companies). If women are more reluctant to enter environments
where fierce competition is expected, they will be under-represented in upper
job market segments. The authors find that AA doubles tournament entry for
women.
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Closely related to our experimental design, Calsamiglia et al. (2013) investi-
gate the impact of AA in a tournament setting with children from two different
schools who differed in their level of experience in solving a real effort task
(sudoku). Children from one of the schools receive training at the task, while
students from the other school do not receive any training. Each experienced
participant is paired with a non-experienced participant, and the highest per-
former wins a $7 voucher. In the first treatment, participants are not aware
of the competitive advantage of one of the participants. In the second treat-
ment, participants are aware of the asymmetry in competitive capacities. Four
other treatments test the impact of different variants of AA rules (lump-sum
and proportional bonuses) to compensate for the competitive disadvantage of
non-experienced participants. The results point out that participants do not
perform differently when informed about the asymmetry in competitive abili-
ties. Moreover, there is a positive impact on the performance of participants
benefitted by the AA rules.
These controlled experiments that try to bring real conditions into the lab-
oratory, do not relax the Hawthorne effect and also raise fair concerns with re-
spect to the generalisability and replicability of the results, given the specificity
of the context of each experiment. These concerns can be strongly attenuated by
replicating laboratory experiments in different contexts, for instance, by testing
different variants of AA programs, with different samples and different inten-
sities of the stereotype or disadvantage. Our study adds to the literature by
providing further experimental evidence on the impact of AA in effort choices,
in a context with actual asymmetries in skills between participants, who perform
real effort and cognitively demanding tasks in a competitive setting.
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3.3 The experiment
3.3.1 Participant pool
We conducted the experiment with a sample of 137 students from Queensland
University of Technology (QUT) in Australia and 150 students from Southeast
University (SEU) in China. In terms of ethnic background, only Australian
students without an Asian background (from any Asian region) participated in
the sessions conducted at QUT, and only Chinese students participated in the
sessions conducted at SEU. This is important for the validity of our experimental
design, as it builds on the assumption that participants perceive the stereotype
or differences in abilities in solving mathematical tasks between participants
from their own university and those from the other university. We will refer to
QUT participants as Australians and to SEU participants as Chinese.
Table 3.3.1 shows general characteristics of the participant pool. The sample
of Chinese participants is strongly unbalanced in terms of gender, with 77 per-
cent of the participants female. This is due to the fact that the majority of the
students enrolled in the economics degree at SEU are female. In our regression
analysis, we control for gender in order to avoid biases that may occur due to
the gender imbalance. For Australian participants, we have additional infor-
mation on the complexity level of mathematics in their high school curriculum.
Australian high school students can choose between three alternative levels of
mathematics classes: basic (A), intermediate (B) and advanced (C). This vari-
able constitutes a good proxy for the mathematical skills of the Australian par-
ticipants. In our sample, 29 percent of the participants followed mathematics A
in high school, 39 percent mathematics B and 32 percent followed mathematics
C.
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Table 3.3.1: General characteristics of the participant pool
Sample: Australians (QUT) Chinese (SEU)
Characteristics Obs. Col % Obs. Col %
Gender
Female 63 46 116 77
Male 74 54 34 23
Age
≤ 20 80 58 53 35
[21,23] 29 21 81 54
[24,26] 12 9 16 11
≥ 27 16 12 0 0
Uni. enrolment year
1 62 45 30 20
2 40 29 74 49
3 17 12 8 5
4 18 13 38 25
Faculty
Business 62 45 131 87
Other 75 55 19 13
High-school math level
A 39 29
B 52 39
C 42 32
3.3.2 Experimental tasks
At the beginning of each session, participants are matched in groups of six, and
then perform two real effort tasks in a competitive setting. The experimental
tasks consist of a mathematical exercise, which captures the stereotype against
Australian participants, and the mastermind task, for which there is a priori
no stereotype, as a control task. In the mathematical task, participants are
given 6 minutes to solve 10 multiple choice questions in which they have to add
fractions (a pen and paper exercise). The mastermind task is a logic-based code-
breaking game. The objective is to find a code made of a sequence of colours,
within a maximum of 10 guesses. After each guess, the participant receives
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feedback on the number of colours which are correct and whether they are in
the correct order. The participants are given 10 minutes to guess as many codes
as possible. The control task allows us to test whether individuals respond to
AA differently when there is a stereotype and asymmetry in abilities relative to
a context where there is no stereotype. The order of the tasks is randomised
between sessions. A more detailed description of the tasks and instructions is
provided in Appendix B.1.
There are two rounds for each task. The first round is the tournament, with
participants being ranked according to their performance in their group. After
the first round for each task, participants receive feedback on their absolute and
relative performance in their group. All participants in a group have a different
rank and ties are broken randomly. The top two participants in each group
are allocated to a more difficult version of the same task in the second round
and the remaining four, to an easier version. The complex version of the task
is also associated with a significantly higher piece-rate payoff. We will refer to
the complex and high piece-rate payment variant of the task as the high task,
and to the easy and low piece-rate payment version of the task as the low task.
The payoff structure is defined such that even low-skill participants prefer to
be allocated to the high task. This minimises a potential strategic behaviour
consisting in performing purposely very poorly in the tournament, in order to
guarantee the allocation to the low task.
Before performing the first round of each task, the participants have the
option to buy hints (0, 1 or 2), which are designed to help in solving the tasks,
and thus increase the probability of winning the tournament and being allo-
cated to the high task in the second round.6 The hints are useful to solve the
tasks, conditional on participants’ also investing effort in reading the strategies
and explanations provided in the hints. Hence, the cost of the effort is twofold,
with the observed component (the monetary investment in hints) and the un-
observed component (the effort spent in reading the hints attentively and in
performing the tasks). Our setting allows for two measures of effort, the first
6See Appendix B.1 for a description of the hints.
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based on participants’ decisions on whether to buy hints, and the second on the
performance in the tournament round of each task.7 The price of each hint is
2 Australian dollars/Chinese renminbi, subtracted from final earnings. Partici-
pants who choose not to buy any hint are invited to listen to music while those
who buy hints are given 6 minutes to read the hints. Before the first round of
each task, we elicit participants’ beliefs about their rank in their group.
In the second round, participants perform either the high or low variant
of the task. In the high (low) task, participants receive a payoff of 3 (0.50)
Australian dollars/Chinese renminbi, per correct answer in the mathematical
task and per code solved in the mastermind game.
At the end of the experiment, participants perform the risk aversion Holt and
Laury (2002) task8 and complete a short socio-demographic survey. Addition-
ally, participants perform an implicit association test (Greenwald et al., 1998),
in order to measure the extent to which they perceived the negative stereotype
regarding Australians’ mathematical skills.
3.3.3 Treatments
We will apply the terminology used by Schotter and Weigelt (1992) in the de-
scription of our treatments. Unlike their study, in our experiment participants
perform real effort tasks in a one-shot tournament setting. Moreover, we in-
troduce asymmetry in effort costs and competitive capacities between partici-
pants by the actual difference in average level of skills in mathematics between
Australian and Chinese participants. We apply the following three different
treatments, in a between subject design, which differ by the composition of the
groups and/or the tournament rule.
7Although an individual’s performance is expected to increase with effort, it is an imperfect
measure of effort as individuals with different ability need to exert different levels of effort to
attain the same performance (Bardsley, 2010). Similarly, it may be argued that the investment
in hints might not be a good measure of effort if individuals differ in their ability. This is
not a concern for the validity of our results, as all participants were recruited from the same
participant pool and we do not observe differences across treatments in the distribution of the
high school math curriculum of the Australian participants.
8See Appendix B.1.
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I. Baseline
In the baseline treatment, participants are “identical” and equally treated.
Australian (or Chinese) participants compete exclusively with other Australian
(Chinese) participants for the allocation to the high task in the second round. In
each group of six participants, the two participants with the best performance in
the first round of the task are allocated to the high task and the four remaining
participants are allocated to the low task in the second round. This treatment
corresponds to a symmetric tournament in Schotter and Weigelt’s (1992) setting.
II. Stereotype
In the stereotype treatment, participants compete within mixed groups (three
Australians and three Chinese). The same qualifying rule applies as in the
baseline treatment. This treatment corresponds to the uneven tournament or
laissez-faire in Schotter and Weigelt (1992).
III. Affirmative action (AA)
In the AA treatment, participants compete within mixed groups, as in the
stereotype treatment, but the policy requires that at least one Australian par-
ticipant must be one of the two participants allocated to the high task in the
second round. Hence, the two winners of the tournament are the highest per-
forming Australian participant and the highest performer among the remaining
five participants. This treatment corresponds to the unfair and uneven, or AA
tournament in Schotter and Weigelt (1992).
Following Calsamiglia et al. (2013), we analyse participants’ response in
terms of effort choices to the stereotype and the AA rule by pairwise compar-
ison of treatments. We compare the baseline treatment with the stereotype
treatment, in order to identify the impact of the stereotype, as only the compo-
sition of the groups varies between these two treatments. Similarly, we compare
the stereotype and AA treatments in order to identify the impact of AA, as only
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the allocation rule to the high task varies between these two treatments. Given
that in each pairwise comparison only one parameter differs between the two
treatments, the results do not confound several effects.
3.3.4 Hypotheses
Our hypotheses for the behavioural adaptation in terms of effort choices of the
disadvantaged group to the different treatments,9 are defined in the light of the
predictions of the Coate and Loury (1993) model of statistical discrimination,
and of the predictions and evidence in rank-order tournaments with asymmetry
in cost of effort in Schotter and Weigelt (1992). In both theoretical settings, the
consequence of stereotypes and/or asymmetry in costs of effort, is a reduction
in effort of the members of the disadvantaged group. Thus, our first hypothesis
can be summarised as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Under the stereotype treatment, Australian participants re-
duce their effort, namely their performance in the tournament and investment
in hints, in a situation where they face a disadvantage, the mathematical task,
due to the real stereotype and asymmetry in skills. In contrast, they maintain
the same level of effort in the control task.
Unlike the prediction for the effect of stereotypes on effort, the inference
for the incentive effects of AA is unclear. In Coate and Loury (1993), AA can
either increase or decrease the effort of the members of the disadvantaged group,
depending on their beliefs for the marginal net benefit from exerting effort.
Specifically, two alternative equilibria can emerge: a patronising equilibrium,
with a reduction in effort of the members of the disadvantaged group, and
consequent reinforcement of asymmetries in skills and stereotypes; or a benign
equilibrium, with an increase in effort of the members of the disadvantaged
group. In the context of a rank-order tournament, in Schotter and Weigelt
(1992), the effect of AA depends on the extent of the asymmetry in the cost of
9As previously mentioned, our experimental design gives two indirect measures of effort:
participants’ performance in the tournament and their prior investment decisions in hints.
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effort. In particular, AA adversely affects effort when there is no asymmetry
in cost of effort, whereas it increases effort when it compensates for a large
disadvantage. In the light of these predictions, our second hypothesis can be
formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Under the AA treatment, Australian participants may reduce
their level of effort in both tasks. This would correspond to the patronising
outcome described in Coate and Loury (1993). Alternatively, Australian par-
ticipants increase their effort in the task in which, without AA, they have a
competitive disadvantage (the mathematical task). This would give support to
the benign equilibrium.
3.3.5 Experimental procedures
The experimental sessions for the stereotype and AA treatments were conducted
simultaneously at both universities, as participants were matched in groups in-
cluding three Chinese and three Australian participants. The composition of the
groups was made clear to the participants in the instructions. In addition, for
the stereotype and AA treatments we had a video transmission through skype
between the two experimental labs, so that it was possible for the participants
to clearly visualise their counterparts from the other university participating in
the same experiment. The treatments varied between sessions, but not within
sessions, in order to avoid confusion. Australian participants were invited to par-
ticipate in the experiment via the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner,
2004), whereas Chinese participants were recruited through announcements dur-
ing their classes and online through the university website. Although Chinese
participants were invited to participate in the experiment by their lecturers
when invited during classes, it was clearly stressed that their participation was
fully voluntary. Each participant took part in only one session.
Each participant received a fixed participation fee of 10 Australian dollars
or Chinese renminbi, plus a variable payment depending on the participant’s
choices and performance in the tasks. We applied an exchange rate of one
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Australian dollar to one Chinese renminbi, as this was the exchange rate con-
sidered adequate given the comparison of prices of a range of students’ daily
consumption items (such as meals on campus), and wages obtained in students’
jobs. Each experimental session lasted approximately 90 minutes. The experi-
ment was programmed with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions were
phrased neutrally (i.e. without the mention of AA, stereotype or any labour
market terminology) in order to avoid framing effects (Cookson, 2000), to limit
the possibility for the participants’ decisions to be driven by factors other than
the monetary incentives, the composition of the groups and the tournament
rules. The experimental instructions for the Chinese participants were trans-
lated into Chinese, in order to ensure as much as possible that the instructions
were perceived similarly by Australian and Chinese participants.10
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Is there evidence of a stereotype?
Participants’ perception of a negative stereotype with respect to the mathe-
matical skills of Australian students compared to Chinese is central for the
validity of our experimental design. We examine the extent to which partici-
pants perceived the stereotype, using an occupation-based implicit association
test (IAT),11 performed after the post-experimental survey. The IAT is a com-
puterised sorting task commonly used in psychology and recently adopted in
experimental economics (Beaman et al., 2009). The appeal of this task is that
it may reveal attitudes even for individuals who prefer not to express those at-
titudes (Greenwald et al., 1998). During the IAT task, participants visualise a
sequence of words and pictures on a computer screen. They have to categorise
the words or pictures by associating each of them either to the left-hand side or
to the right-hand side of the screen with the computer buttons.
10The instructions were translated into Chinese and back translated into English by Chinese
native speakers fluent in English.
11See Appendix B.2 for a detailed description of the IAT.
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The procedure starts with the introduction of the target-concept discrimina-
tion: pictures of Chinese and Australian individuals (Nosek et al., 2007). Par-
ticipants observe a series of pictures on a computer screen which they categorise,
by associating each picture either to the left-hand side, if Chinese, or right-hand
side, if Australian. The second stage introduces the occupation-based attribute
dimension. We use words for occupations requiring intensive training in math-
ematics and occupations that do not require strong mathematical skills. These
two stages familiarise participants with the task. The third stage corresponds
to the “non-stereotypical block”, in which the stimuli for target and attribute
discrimination appear on alternate trials. Here the participants see pictures and
words for occupations on alternate trials and they have to associate pictures of
Chinese individuals and words for occupations non-intensive in mathematics to
the left-hand side, and pictures of Australians and words for occupations inten-
sive in mathematics to the right-hand side. In the fourth stage, participants
learn a reverse response assignment for the target discrimination. They have to
associate pictures of Chinese individuals to the right-hand side, and pictures of
Australian individuals to the left-hand side. The fifth stage, the “stereotypical
block”, combines the attribute discrimination with this reversed target concept
discrimination. In this last stage, participants have to associate Australians
with occupations which are not intensive in mathematical skills, and Chinese
with occupations requiring intensive training in mathematics. The stereotype
measure is obtained by comparing stages 3 and 5. The assumption is that if
a participant considers one of these stages considerably easier than the other,
that reveals a stronger association between the two concepts. It will also trans-
late into shorter average response time (measured in milliseconds) in one of the
stages. Therefore, the gap in average response time between the two stages pro-
vides a measure of implicit attitudes. In each stage, the order of the stimuli is
random. We also randomise between sessions the order of stages 3 and 5, so that
the results are not driven by a potential learning effect. Figure 3.4.1 presents
the results of the IAT separately for Australians (panel A) and Chinese partic-
ipants (panel B), suggesting that participants perceived a negative stereotype
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with respect to the mathematical skills of Australians relative to Chinese. For
both sub-samples, the average response time in stage 3, the non-stereotypical
block, is greater than in stage 5, the stereotypical block (significant at 1 percent
level).
There is a possibility that the stereotype could mainly be an artefact of the
experiment given that Australian participants performed systematically worse
than Chinese participants in the mathematical task, and also because in the AA
treatment, the tournament rules benefit Australian participants. However, this
is not likely to be an important issue, as participants did not get any feedback
on the other participants’ performance, but only on their own performance.
Furthermore, the separate analysis of the IAT by treatment provides results
consistent with the conclusions obtained when aggregating the three treatments.
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3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
We start with a descriptive presentation of the data. In Table 3.4.1 we report
mean and standard deviation values for performance in the tournament and
payoffs, by treatment and sub-samples of Australian and Chinese participants.
As expected, there is systematic evidence for differences in tournament perfor-
mance between Australians and Chinese in the mathematical task (significant
at 1 percent level for all treatments). Australians answered on average between
5.57 and 6.20 (depending on the treatment) questions correctly, while Chinese
participants answered on average between 9.72 and 9.85 questions correctly.
We also observe that the standard deviation in performance is very large for
Australians, indicating heterogeneity in performance. This contrasts with the
sub-sample of Chinese participants, whose standard deviation in performance
is very low across all treatments. The gap in performance is also reflected in
the average earnings in the mathematical task. Australian participants have an
average payoff between 5.76 and 8.15 AUD, while Chinese participants’ average
payoff is between 10.54 and 17.23 RMB.
In the mastermind task, we also find evidence of heterogeneity in tournament
performance between Australian and Chinese participants. Australian partici-
pants solved on average between 1.11 and 1.83 codes, while Chinese participants
solved on average between 0.76 and 1.28 codes. The difference in performance
between the two sub-samples is only statistically significant for the stereotype
treatment (at 1 percent level). We also find systematic evidence for higher
earnings of Australian participants in the mastermind task, significant at 5 per-
cent level for the stereotype and AA treatments, and 10 percent level for the
baseline treatment. The fact that Australians tend to have higher performance
and payoffs in the mastermind task compared to Chinese participants does not
invalidate using the mastermind task as a control task, as long as participants
do not perceive any stereotype or differences in ability between the two groups.
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Figures 3.4.2a and 3.4.2b show the cumulative distribution functions of tour-
nament performance under the three different treatments for both tasks, for Aus-
tralians (panel A) and Chinese participants (panel B). The comparison of panel
A and panel B in Figure 3.4.2a shows very large differences in performance in
the mathematical task between Australian and Chinese participants, consistent
with our previous observation (see Table 3.4.1). Within each sub-sample, the
pairwise comparison of distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test
and the comparison of means using the robust rank-order12 (RRO) test do not
provide support for significant differences in performance between treatments.
Panel B, shows that the performance of Chinese participants in the mathemat-
ical task is concentrated at the highest level across all treatments. This shows
that if the level of difficulty of the task was well calibrated for Australians, it
was too low for Chinese participants. Therefore, comparisons of performance
in the mathematical task under the different treatments will not be informative
about Chinese participants’ response to the stereotype or AA rule.
In Figure 3.4.2b, panel A shows that the AA rule seems to have a negative
effect on performance of Australian participants in the mastermind task. Using
the K-S and the RRO tests, we find that the difference in performance between
the stereotype and AA treatments is significant at 5 percent level. This result
suggests that, in the absence of a real stereotype, participants respond to the
AA rule by decreasing their performance. Conversely, the incentive effect in
the mastermind task under the baseline and stereotype treatments should not
be different, as the stereotype is only relative to the competitive capacity of
Australian participants in the mathematical task, due to their real disadvan-
tage. Our results confirm that there is no significant difference in performance
for Australian participants between the baseline and stereotype treatments in
the mastermind task. Panel B shows the performance distribution of Chinese
participants across the three treatments. The difference in performance between
the baseline and stereotype treatments is marginally significant (at 10 percent
12The robust rank-order (RRO) test does not assume normality and corrects for different
variances between samples (Fligner and Policello, 1981).
110 CHAPTER 3. CROSS-COUNTRY LAB EXPERIMENT ON AA
level) using the RRO test (but not significant using the K-S test), whereas the
difference in performance between the stereotype and AA treatments is not
statistically different from zero.
Figure 3.4.2: CDFs of tournament performance
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(b) Mastermind task
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Tables 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 show the investment choices in hints of Australian
and Chinese participants respectively, by task and treatment. Overall, there
are large differences in investment decisions between Australian and Chinese
participants, with the Australians investing significantly less in hints. Moreover,
both sub-samples of participants tend to invest more in hints in the mastermind
than in the mathematical task. In the mathematical task, between 79.5 and
89.1 percent (depending on the treatment) of Australian participants did not
buy any hint, while this is the case for [40, 52.4] percent of Chinese participants.
Similarly, in the mastermind task between 63.6 and 71.7 percent of Australian
participants chose not to buy any hints, versus [35, 39.6] percent of Chinese
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participants. However, none of the differences in investment choices between
treatments and within sub-samples are statistically significant at conventional
levels.
Table 3.4.2: Choice of number of hints of Australian participants
Panel A: Math task
Treatment Baseline Stereotype AA
# hints Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
0 39 83.0 41 89.1 35 79.5
1 3 6.4 4 8.7 5 11.4
2 5 10.6 1 2.2 4 9.1
Panel B: Mastermind task
Treatment Baseline Stereotype AA
# hints Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
0 32 68.1 33 71.7 28 63.6
1 11 23.4 12 26.1 12 27.3
2 4 8.5 1 2.2 4 9.1
Table 3.4.3: Choice of number of hints of Chinese participants
Panel A: Math task
Treatment Baseline Stereotype AA
# hints Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
0 24 40.0 22 52.4 23 47.9
1 31 51.7 17 40.5 18 37.5
2 5 8.3 3 7.1 7 14.6
Panel B: Mastermind task
Treatment Baseline Stereotype AA
# hints Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
0 21 35.0 16 38.1 19 39.6
1 28 46.7 20 47.6 17 35.4
2 11 18.3 6 14.3 12 25.0
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3.4.3 Regression results
In this section we present the regression analysis, which allows us to control for
relevant variables - gender, age, risk attitudes, mathematical skills, faculty13
and the order of the tasks -, which may influence the outcomes due to the small
sample sizes, and that we cannot control for in a simple descriptive analysis.14
The effect of the stereotype on effort
We first analyse whether the negative stereotype impacts participants’ effort in
the mathematical task, measured by the performance in the tournament and
investment choices in hints,15 restricting our sample to the baseline and stereo-
type treatments. We present the regression results in Table 3.4.4, separately for
the sub-sample of Australian and Chinese participants. Our main variables of
interest are the dummy for the stereotype treatment and its interaction with
the mathematical task. The results suggest that the stereotype has no impact
on Australian participants’ choices of hints and performance (specifications (1a)
and (1b)). In contrast, there is evidence that Chinese participants’ have a lower
performance under the stereotype compared to the baseline treatment (by 0.28
standard deviations from the mean), and that such effect is only observed in
the mastermind task. As for the sample of Australian participants, we do not
find any effect on the choice of hints. The results also indicate that Australian
participants have a competitive disadvantage in the mathematical task, as their
performance relative to the whole sample of participants is lower in the math-
ematical task than in the mastermind task (by 1.02 standard deviations signif-
icant at 1 percent level). Conversely, Chinese participants have an advantage
in the mathematical task (their relative performance is larger by 0.69 standard
13We control for mathematical skills and faculty only in the regressions for the sub-sample
of Australian participants, given that the different levels of mathematics in the high school
curriculum is a specificity of the Australian school system and that almost all Chinese partic-
ipants were from the business faculty.
14We report the regression results obtained with the random effects model. The results
presented are very similar to the ones obtained by estimating the OLS regression model
clustering standard errors by participant (results not reported here).
15We consider three possible values for the dependent variable: 0, 1 and 2. Our conclusions
do not differ when using a random effects probit model, for the likelihood of investing in hints.
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deviations significant at 1 percent level).
The results presented in this section contrast with our first hypothesis that,
in the stereotype treatment, Australian participants would reduce their perfor-
mance and investment in hints in the mathematical task and keep the same level
of effort in the control task. Instead, our results show that there is no impact of
the stereotype on Australian participants’ performance and investment choices
in hints. In the next section, we investigate whether these variables are affected
by the introduction of an AA rule.
Table 3.4.4: Baseline vs stereotype
Australians Chinese
Hints Performance Hints Performance
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Stereotype -0.127 -0.072 -0.219 -0.284∗∗
(0.121) (0.226) (0.146) (0.140)
Math task -0.164 -1.023∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.190) (0.131) (0.119)
Stereotype x Math task -0.010 0.107 0.161 0.263∗
(0.158) (0.287) (0.176) (0.153)
Male 0.006 0.010 -0.296∗∗ 0.035
(0.094) (0.141) (0.125) (0.130)
Age 0.001 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.013 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.031) (0.022)
Tasks order 0.188∗∗ -0.090 0.303∗∗∗ -0.083
(0.078) (0.144) (0.094) (0.083)
Math A 0.010 -1.108∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.185)
Math B 0.201 -0.670∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.196)
Risk aversion 0.007 -0.020 -0.002 0.057∗∗
(0.017) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025)
Business 0.070 -0.027
(0.097) (0.156)
Hints -0.109 -0.054
(0.112) (0.077)
Constant 0.182 1.503∗∗∗ 1.140 -0.307
(0.193) (0.305) (0.710) (0.512)
Obs. 186 186 204 204
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Performance is standardised to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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The effect of affirmative action on effort
In this section, we analyse whether the introduction of an AA rule impacts
participants’ effort in the tournament. We consider the stereotype treatment as
our baseline to study the impact of AA. The AA rule requires that at least one
Australian participant has to appear among the two participants allocated to the
high task, i.e. the winners of the tournament. Table 3.4.5 presents the regression
results for the performance in the tournament and the investment choice in hints,
separately for Australian and Chinese participants, restricting now the sample
to the stereotype and AA treatments. There is mild evidence (significant at 10
percent) that Australian participants decrease their performance under the AA
treatment compared to the stereotype treatment in the control task. However,
the AA rule does not seem to affect Australian participants’ performance in the
mathematical task. For Chinese participants, we do not find any effect of the
AA rule on performance or choices of hints.
Thus, our results suggest that the AA rule does not impact participants’
effort in the presence of a stereotype and asymmetries in competitive capaci-
ties. As previously, the evidence does not confirm our second hypothesis, that
Australian participants would respond to the AA rule, by either increasing or
decreasing their level of effort when they experience a disadvantage in compet-
itive capacities.
We also observe that Australian participants with lower mathematical skills
(math A and B) have a lower performance, which is driven by their performance
in the mathematical task (results not reported here). The order of the tasks
has a systematic effect on the decision to buy hints for both sub-samples of
participants, indicating that participants buy more hints in the first task. Fur-
thermore, the results indicate that male Chinese students tend to buy less hints
than female students.
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Table 3.4.5: Stereotype vs AA
Australians Chinese
Hints Performance Hints Performance
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
AA 0.132 -0.432∗ 0.153 0.150
(0.139) (0.238) (0.156) (0.146)
Math task -0.174∗ -0.950∗∗∗ -0.165 0.978∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.216) (0.111) (0.100)
AA x Math task 0.041 0.480 -0.022 -0.133
(0.178) (0.311) (0.185) (0.166)
Male 0.123 -0.061 -0.239∗ 0.140∗
(0.091) (0.149) (0.131) (0.084)
Age -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 0.013
(0.011) (0.017) (0.036) (0.017)
Tasks order 0.088 -0.057 0.345∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.089) (0.152) (0.093) (0.084)
Math A 0.145 -0.789∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.207)
Math B 0.141 -0.363∗∗
(0.100) (0.174)
Risk aversion 0.003 -0.040 -0.036 0.083∗∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034)
Business 0.102 -0.126
(0.093) (0.160)
Hints -0.309∗∗ 0.009
(0.144) (0.049)
Constant 0.211 1.250∗∗∗ 0.973 -1.052∗∗
(0.255) (0.385) (0.783) (0.452)
Obs. 174 174 180 180
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Performance is standardised to mean 0
and standard deviation 1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The effect of the stereotype and affirmative action on beliefs
In this section we analyse whether the stereotype and AA impact participants’
expectations for their rank in their group. In each task, prior to performing
in the tournament, participants were asked to report their guesses for their
rank (between 1 and 6). The regression results presented in Table 3.4.6 show
that there is no impact of the stereotype on participants’ expectations for their
rank. Male participants expect to be ranked higher than female participants,
which is consistent with the common observation that males tend to be more
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confident than females (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Also, participants with
lower mathematical skills expect to be ranked lower (this results is driven by
participants’ expectations for their rank in the mathematical task). Moreover,
Australian participants who perform better in the tournament expect to be
ranked higher.
Table 3.4.6: Expected ranks
Baseline vs Stereotype Stereotype vs AA
Au Ch Au Ch
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Stereotype 0.171 0.206
(0.249) (0.220)
AA 0.236 -0.309
(0.310) (0.232)
Math task 0.229 -0.023 -0.115 -1.170∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.491) (0.228) (0.450)
Stereotype x Math task -0.287 0.022
(0.251) (0.176)
AA x Math task 0.229 0.040
(0.280) (0.177)
Male -0.927∗∗∗ -0.464 -0.622∗∗∗ -0.711∗∗
(0.212) (0.343) (0.217) (0.321)
Age -0.001 -0.072 -0.051∗∗ -0.047
(0.019) (0.061) (0.024) (0.061)
Math A 0.488∗ 0.631∗
(0.265) (0.348)
Math B 0.327 0.383
(0.291) (0.260)
Risk aversion -0.058 -0.014 -0.001 -0.034
(0.047) (0.054) (0.060) (0.058)
Business -0.502∗∗ -0.510∗∗
(0.216) (0.218)
solved -0.093∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.058) (0.031) (0.051)
Constant 4.477∗∗∗ 5.075∗∗∗ 5.088∗∗∗ 4.818∗∗∗
(0.525) (1.374) (0.648) (1.322)
Obs. 186 204 174 180
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Performance is standardised to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we conducted a cross-country laboratory experiment in order to
investigate the incentive effects of affirmative action, in a context with a real
stereotype and differences in competitive capacities between participants. In
accordance with previous findings (see Calsamiglia et al., 2013), our results
suggest that the stereotype does not influence participants’ effort. Despite the
large gap in performance in the mathematical task between Australian and
Chinese participants, we do not find that the former exert different levels of effort
when performing with Chinese participants in a competitive setting, relative to
the alternative scenario where they exclusively compete with other Australians.
We also do not find strong evidence that Australian participants vary their
level of effort when their chances of winning the tournament are enhanced by
an AA rule. In sum, our findings support that in a context with a stereotype
and unequal abilities, AA is neither an effective policy instrument in narrowing
inequality in achievement, nor has a detrimental effect.
The main contribution of our study is to suggest that AA rules, that often
aim to ex-post compensate for inequality of opportunity in education between
disadvantaged groups (for instance, in university admissions or the labour mar-
ket), might not be effective in influencing individuals’ behaviour toward increas-
ing effort. As Heckman (1998) observes, focusing on factors which account for
the disparity in qualifications, such as the quality of compulsory education, the
family environment and peers influence, might be more effective in promoting
educational achievement of disadvantaged groups than positive discrimination
after compulsory education. Yet, we also emphasise the fact that our results
contrast with previous findings from laboratory experiments with real effort
tasks. These suggest that AA decreases the disparity in performance between
participants with different competitive capacities (Calsamiglia et al., 2013) and
reduces the gender gap in tournament entry decisions (Niederle et al., 2013).
Thus, the findings in this study show that we need more evidence on the in-
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centive effects of AA in contexts with different stereotypes or intensity of the
disadvantage.
Our experimental setting offers a good framework to investigate the incentive
effects of an AA rule. First, our experimental design rests on a real stereotype,
that exists prior to the experiment. This element differentiates our study from
the investigation by Calsamiglia et al. (2013) where the stereotype is induced
by the experiment. Moreover, both sub-samples of participants, Australians
and Chinese do not have relevant information which would provide a better
assessment of the abilities of the participants from the other university against
whom they are competing, such as the quality of the undergraduate program
and selection process applied by universities. Hence, expectations with respect
to the ability of the participants of the other university are based on the par-
ticipants’ beliefs with regard to the mathematical skills of a randomly chosen
Australian student (for the Chinese), or a randomly chosen Chinese student (for
the Australians).
We acknowledge several limitations of our study. First, we only analyse the
incentive effects of an AA rule from the labour supply side. We do not estimate
the costs of the policy, as our analysis ignores the efficiency losses which might
result from AA. Moreover, our one-shot experimental design ignores medium or
long-term effects of AA and how participants would react to the dismantling of
an existing AA rule. Additionally, in our setting the level of the disadvantage in
ability between the two groups is, on average, constant between sessions. This
is a weakness given that individuals’ response to AA is likely to be influenced
by the extent of the stereotype. Another weakness in this study is that the level
of difficulty of the mathematical task seemed to be adequate for the Australian
participants, but too low for the Chinese. Further criticism is brought by the
gender imbalance among Chinese participants, with an over-representation of fe-
males, as we cannot rule out the influence of gender stereotypes in mathematical
skills and competitiveness on participants’ decisions.
A more general limitation of this study is the extent to which the results
can predict field behaviour (Harrison and List, 2004). In particular, the effort
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options that participants face in the laboratory are not comparable to the effort
needed to acquire formal training and qualification or in searching for a high
quality position in the job market. Similarly, the incentives that participants
are given in the laboratory are not comparable to those that individuals face
in real life (high payoff at the end of the experimental session versus high life-
time income, personal satisfaction and social recognition). Therefore, laboratory
experiments provide at best suggestive evidence and should ideally be supple-
mented by field experiments. However, in many cases, including testing AA
policies, it may not be possible to implement even small scale field experiments.
Additionally, if the causal effect of AA is influenced by contextual factors, such
as the nature and extent of the stereotype, the prevalence of historical discrim-
ination, and the type and intensity of preferential rules, neither laboratory nor
field experiments will yield the true causal effect of such policies (see Falk and
Heckman, 2009). A major advantage of conducting laboratory experiments is
that it allows for a more flexible manipulation of these potentially relevant fac-
tors than (eventual) field experiments. Thus, laboratory experiments, if not
ideal, constitute a valuable instrument to bring insights on how such policies
influence individuals’ behaviour, and consequently, on their potential medium
and long-run contribution in attenuating social inequalities.
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Abstract1
This chapter introduces an incentive program that attempts to close the gap
in educational attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians,
and provides an evaluation of its effectiveness. The program is of special inter-
est as it uses in-kind incentives conditional on achievement of a specific target
for academic grades, classroom behaviour and attendance, coupled with infor-
mation sessions on the importance of educational achievement. In 2012, all
indigenous students enrolled in 21 high schools in Queensland were invited to
take part in the program. Using a differences-in-differences design, we find that
the program improved behaviour and academic grades and reduced the num-
ber of unexplained absences for female students, but not for male students. In
contrast, the program improved scores on a standardised national assessment
test for male students. Moreover, we find that the program is only effective for
students from intact families.
1This is joint work with Uwe Dulleck and Benno Torgler.
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4.1 Introduction
Underperformance in education of indigenous populations is commonly observed
in developed countries as well as developing countries.2 In Australia, the dis-
advantage in educational achievement of indigenous people begins very early in
life and widens over time (De Schutter, 2008). For instance, only 48 percent of
indigenous children attend pre-school versus 58 percent of non-indigenous chil-
dren. Similarly, only 36 percent of indigenous students complete year 12 against
75 percent of non-indigenous students (Bath and Biddle, 2011; De Schutter,
2008). Besides this disparity in participation, there is also a large gap in cog-
nitive and non-cognitive outcomes: indigenous students perform systematically
worse than non-indigenous students on standardised tests and also tend to have
worse indicators of classroom behaviour.
Several programs aiming to improve educational attainment of children and
adolescents from minorities and disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds have
been discussed and evaluated in the economics literature. These programs typ-
ically use cash or in-kind incentives (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Bettinger, 2011),
information (Avvisati et al., 2014), public recognition (Kremer et al., 2009)
and learning support (Rodriguez-Planas, 2012), some showing significant im-
pact while others being less successful (Fryer, 2011). This chapter provides the
first evaluation of the effectiveness of one such intervention, the FOGS Artie
program, designed to improve educational outcomes of indigenous Australians.
This program is of special interest as it combines strong encouragement, in-
kind incentives and learning support, delivered by volunteers organised by a
charity associated with a sport code popular with the target population. It
was introduced in 21 public high schools in Queensland and specifically tar-
gets the educational achievement - academic grades, classroom behaviour and
attendance - of indigenous students. In 2012, the program offered symbolic
2See, for example, Patrinos (1992) for Canada, Bradley et al. (2007) for Australia, Ladson-
Billings (2006) for the US and Patrinos (2004) for Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and
Peru.
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in-kind rewards to all indigenous students enrolled in the participating schools,
conditional on the achievement of a specific goal defined at the start of each
school term, coupled with information sessions on the importance of education.
Using individual level data, we identify the impact of the program by apply-
ing a differences-in-differences design, that enables comparisons of the pre and
post-treatment outcomes progression for indigenous students in program schools
with that of indigenous students in control schools over the same time period.
Our results indicate that the program improved both behaviour and academic
grades and reduced the number of unexplained absences for female but not male
students. However, the program improved scores on a standardised national as-
sessment test for male indigenous students. These findings are consistent with
the evidence of a tendency for a comparative advantage in teachers’ assess-
ments for girls and in standardised tests for boys (Duckworth and Seligman,
2006). Moreover, we find that the program only benefits students belonging to
intact families.
Of the several factors that may contribute to the gap in educational outcomes
between indigenous and non-indigenous students, the most important is likely
to be family environment (Heckman, 2008); specifically, the tendency for in-
digenous children to belong to more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds
than non-indigenous children. In particular, indigenous parents, who themselves
tend to have low levels of education and financial resources, may be less likely
to encourage their children to perform well at school.3 A second potential ex-
planation for the persistent gap in education is the stereotype that indigenous
children perform worse at school than non-indigenous children, which, especially
when pervasive in the school community, may adversely influence children’s own
beliefs about their abilities and chances of pursuing post-secondary education
(Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Both this lack of confidence in their own abili-
ties and the lack of a supportive family environment may undermine indigenous
students’ motivation to perform well at school. At the same time, because em-
3Doyle et al. (2009) find that children from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds,
who do not benefit from a supportive family environment, have lower educational achievement
already in their first years of formal education.
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ployment opportunities of indigenous people tend to be confined to the public
sector, private firms that rely on government support and organisations whose
industrial relations practices are aimed at encouraging greater ethnic diversity
within the firm, they may consider the economic returns from investment in
education as being low (Paradies et al., 2008; Rowse, 2002). Low educational
achievement not only reduces employment opportunities, it directly influences
individual behaviour, particularly health and consumption choices, ability to
plan fertility (Conti et al., 2010) and parental skills (Kalil et al., 2012).
In light of the above observations, reducing disparities in educational at-
tainment may be one of the most powerful instruments for diminishing overall
inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. Moreover, at the
societal level, early intervention aimed at narrowing the gap in educational at-
tainment is less costly than remedial policies like unemployment benefits, subsi-
dies and increases in health care costs.4 Most importantly, the intergenerational
transmission of skills is likely to lead to a sustained reduction in inequalities,
meaning that there is no equity-efficiency trade-off in early intervention (see,
Doyle et al., 2009). In fact, given the already observable gap in cognitive and
non-cognitive abilities between 5-year-old children from different socio-economic
backgrounds, childhood intervention is likely to be the most effective strat-
egy. Nevertheless, evaluations of programs conducted with adolescent students
strongly suggest that these are effective in improving the educational achieve-
ment of girls. In contrast, they seem to have little effect for boys (Angrist et al.,
2002; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Angrist et al., 2009; Rodriguez-Planas, 2012).
The greater malleability of female high school students’ behaviour relative
to their male counterparts and its amenability to short-term interventions can
be at least partly explained by gender differences in non-cognitive skills. The
economics literature, for example, provides strong evidence for a gender bias in
risk attitudes, time preferences, preferences for competitive environments and
self-confidence (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). A major factor in explaining gender
differences in educational achievement and behavioural responses to remedial
4See, for example, Heckman (2008).
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intervention is the gender gap in patience; in particular, the ability to delay
rewards or self-control (Shoda et al., 1990). Other key predictors of educational
achievement include the ability to set goals for educational performance and
establish and adhere to a work schedule for goal achievement. For instance,
there is evidence that female primary school students are more patient and
more able to delay rewards than male students (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007;
Castillo et al., 2011) and that girls apply self-regulated learning strategies that
involve goal setting and planning more frequently than boys (Zimmerman and
Martinez-Pons, 1990). Education outcomes are also impacted by gender dif-
ferences in classroom behaviour, which are partly associated with differences in
maturity between boys and girls of similar age. Evidence that women react more
strongly to emotions than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) also suggests that
female students might be more averse to negative feedback on their educational
performance and thus exert more effort to avoid negative outcomes. The gender
gap may also be widened by different teacher expectations for the educational
performance of female relative to male students, not only through subjective
grading (Cornwell et al., 2013) but also via the impact on the students’ own
expectations for their achievement potential (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968).
The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
economics literature on incentive programs in education. Section 4.3 describes
the intervention and Section 4.4 describes our empirical strategy and the data.
Section 4.5 presents our main findings and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Evidence on incentives in education
The economics literature on incentive programs aimed at improving educational
achievement tends to focus on two aspects: cash transfers and in-kind rewards
conditional on academic achievement (Angrist et al., 2002; Angrist and Lavy,
2009; Bettinger, 2011; Schultz, 2004; Rodriguez-Planas, 2012), and sanctions
in case of non-compliance with a minimum attendance rate (Dee, 2011; Jones
et al., 2002). Extant research also devotes attention to the effect of providing
128CHAPTER 4. INCENTIVES IN EDUCATION FOR INDIGENOUS STUDENTS
information to students and parents on the importance of education (Avvisati
et al., 2014) and of combining different types of interventions (Angrist et al.,
2009). Methodologically, many of these studies examine the impact of incentive
programs in an experimental context, using random assignment of students to
treatment and comparison groups (Table 4.2.1 lists some of these studies which
are also described below).5 Students assigned to the treatment group are ex-
posed to the intervention at test, while students assigned to the comparison
group are exposed to the same conditions as the treatment group would have
been exposed to in the absence of the treatment (counterfactual). The valid-
ity of the causal inferences made by comparing the post-intervention outcome
means of treatment versus control group relies strongly on the random assign-
ment of the treatment. That is, if individuals are not self-selected into the
treatment group and have similar relevant (i.e., potentially outcome correlated)
pre-treatment observable characteristics as individuals in the comparison group,
the post-treatment differences in the outcome of interest between the treatment
and control group can be validly attributed to the intervention being tested.
In the extant literature, randomised evaluations of cash incentive programs
tend to find heterogeneous program effects across sub-groups. In particular,
they show that incentives are more effective for female than male students,
except among primary school children (Bettinger, 2011). For example, Angrist
et al. (2002), show that Colombia’s PACES program,6 which randomly assigns
vouchers partly covering the cost of private secondary school to children from
poor socio-economic backgrounds, reduces the probability of grade repetition
for female students more than male students, increasing females’ test scores by
0.2 standard deviations from the mean. A similar positive effect for girls was
observed in Angrist and Lavy’s (2009) study of the Israeli Achievement Awards
program that provided cash awards for successful completion of high school
exit exams to low-achieving high school students. The program allocation was
randomised among 40 high schools selected for their low success rates on high
5See Lavecchia et al. (2014) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
6Programa de Ampliacio´n de Cobertura de la Educacio´n Secundaria.
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school exit exams. One specificity of this program is the high value of the cash
incentives: a student who passed all tests received approximately US$2,400. The
authors find that the program led to a 0.1 increase in certification probability
for girls only.
Likewise, based on a randomised evaluation in 11 high schools of the 5-year
US Quantum Opportunity Program, Rodriguez-Planas (2012) provides evidence
of a heterogeneous intention-to-treat effect between male and female students.
This program is closely related to the one evaluated in our study as it com-
bines different aspects: mentoring, educational services and financial rewards
to low-performing high school students. Moreover, as in our study, no adjust-
ment was made for ongoing participant involvement or the extent of program
exposure. The program had large positive effects on educational outcomes for
female students with persistent effects on employment outcomes. It increased
female students’ probability of graduating from high school by 15 percent and of
pursuing post-secondary education by 20 percent. However, the author found
no evidence of a positive effect on male students’ educational outcomes. In
addition, the program design prevented separate identification of each compo-
nent’s impact (mentoring, educational services and rewards) or any assessment
of whether the effects were driven by the combination of different incentives.
The impact of such financial incentives, together with academic support ser-
vices, is also the subject of Angrist et al.’s (2009) investigation on the academic
performance of first-year students at a large Canadian university. All first-year
students, except those in the upper quartile of the grade point average distri-
bution, were randomly assigned to a treatment group (which received financial
incentives, academic support services or both) or a control group. The results
suggest that providing academic support services has a significant positive im-
pact on performance, but only for women. Providing the combined intervention
in the first year produced higher second-year performance for female students
than for their male counterparts.
Bettinger (2011), however, finds no such gender differences among primary
school students, in the low socio-economic area of Coshocton (Ohio), who were
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offered cash incentives for academic performance. In this program, 8 of the 16
eligible grade-school combinations were selected by lottery, with all children in
the treatment grades in each school being eligible for the incentive program.
The results show positive program effects in math scores (an increase of 0.15
standard deviations from the mean), but only for students at the top of the test
score distribution.
In terms of programs exclusively for females, Kremer et al. (2009) show that
scholarships (covering 2 years of school fees and expenses) offered to grade 6
girls in the top 15 percent of achievers in 34 randomly selected Kenyan schools,
coupled with public recognition at an assembly of students, parents, teachers and
school officials, increased test scores. They also identify positive externalities
on low-achieving students unlikely to win the scholarship. Nevertheless, as in
Rodriguez-Planas (2012), the experiment does not allow the scholarship effects
to be disentangled from the impact of public recognition.
One common aspect of the above studies suggesting that incentive programs
improve educational outcomes of female students is that they target students
from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds whose families are more likely
to be cash constrained. These students may be more likely to positively re-
spond to a cash incentive program than more advantaged students. The latter
might already benefit from reward mechanisms conditional on their academic
achievement, meaning that cash incentive programs would have little impact on
their behaviour and academic outcomes. In addition, because students from low
socio-economic backgrounds tend to have poorer educational achievement than
students from higher socio-economic backgrounds, they are more likely to have
ex-ante achievement levels below the threshold fixed by such programs. These
interventions are therefore designed to influence the behaviour of students who
are below threshold levels and, tipically, more socio-economically disadvantaged
than those above the threshold. For example, Henry and Rubenstein (2002)
find evidence that the HOPE scholarship program in Georgia, which provided
merit-based financial aid to high school students independent of family income
level, mostly beneffited students from low socio-economic backgrounds.
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Nevertheless, cash incentives conditional on achievement can also have dis-
couraging effects on low-achieving students, as Leuven et al. (2010) show in
an experiment that rewarded first-year university students conditional on their
completion of all first-year subjects. This experiment, conducted at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, randomly assigned 249 first-year student volunteers to
two treatment groups (a large reward and a small reward) and a control group
(no reward). Whereas high-ability students responded to the large reward by
improving their performance, low-ability students responded by lowering their
performance. The program also had lasting effects: the high-ability students in
the treatment groups performed even better in their second and third years of
study, whereas the low-ability students performed worse.
In contrast, other studies find no effect of cash incentives on academic
achievement. For example, in a randomised controlled experiment conducted in
schools in three different US districts, Fryer (2011) provided varying cash incen-
tives to students conditional on achievement. In Dallas, second grade students
from 21 public schools received monetary incentives to read books. In New
York, students from 63 schools were rewarded for their performance on reading
and math exams. In Chicago, students from 40 schools were given incentives for
their grades in five core courses. The participating schools in these three states
were characterised by a very high share of students from low socio-economic
backgrounds. Overall, the results indicate that the incentives had no impact
on either the outcomes for which students received the incentives or on self-
reported effort. Similar results were reported by Angrist et al. (2014) for the
Opportunity Knocks program, which randomly offered financial rewards and
peer mentoring for first and second-year financial aid applicants at a Canadian
university in Ontario conditional on grades.
In the school context, team incentives may be effective in improving academic
outcomes because of peer effects and peer monitoring. That is, if students see
their peers reaching high performance in school, they are likely to set higher
goals for their own achievement. Moreover, when group members coordinate
to reach a common goal, the group support and monitoring of each member’s
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compliant behaviour provide all members greater incentives to work toward
goal achievement (Ray, 2006). To assess the role of individual versus group
monetary incentives in increasing schooling outcomes, Blimpo (2014) conducts
an experiment in which 100 secondary schools in Benin were randomly assigned
to three treatment groups and one control group. In the first treatment, students
were offered a monetary prize based on their individual performance on the
secondary school certification examination. In the second and third treatments,
they were matched into groups of four and either received a monetary prize based
on the group’s average exam performance or participated in a tournament in
which only the three teams with the highest average performance won a prize.
Each of the three treatments significantly increased test scores by 0.29, 0.27 and
0.34 standard deviations, respectively.
Methodologically, the best practice for ensuring validity of casual inferences
is random assignment of the intervention at test between observational units,
individuals or groups. However, for ethical and/or practical reasons, random
treatment assignment is not always feasible. Moreover, many programs, like the
one analysed in this chapter, have been implemented without a design that al-
lows the definition of a rigorous counterfactual ex-ante. Hence, evaluating these
programs requires the application of quasi-experimental methods that allow ex-
post counterfactual construction, such as differences-in-differences and matching
methods. Jackson (2010), for example, evaluates the Advanced Placement In-
centive Program in Texas, in which participation, rather than being randomly
assigned, was allocated to schools selected by funding donors from among all
interested schools. There was also substantial variation in the date of program
introduction in the different schools driven by donor availability and preferences.
The program provided cash incentives for academic achievement to both high
school students (grades 11 and 12) and teachers. To exploit the phased-in im-
plementation of the project in interested high schools, Jackson (2010) employs
a differences-in-differences strategy, by comparing the difference in aggregate
(school level) outcomes pre and post-program between schools involved in the
program and schools with the same pre-treatment test scores that adopted it at
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a later stage. The results indicate that the intervention increased the probabil-
ity of a student enrolling in college, remaining in college beyond the first year
and the first-year grade point average. The author also identifies a stronger
positive program effect for minority students.
Other randomised evaluations look particularly at the impact of in-kind
rewards conditional on schooling outcomes. For instance, Vermeersch and Kre-
mer’s (2005) assessment of the impact of providing school meals in 25 randomly
selected Kenyan pre-schools shows large positive effects on parents’ compliance
with school enrolment and attendance of their children (a 30 percent increase in
participation in treated schools). Another study by Berry (2009) not only tests
whether monetary and in-kind rewards generate different incentive effects but
also whether the incentive effects vary with reward recipient (child or parents).
This experiment, conducted in 8 primary schools in India, randomly allocated
five different treatments at the student level. In the first and second treatments,
the children were rewarded for reaching a target test score level with either a
toy or money, respectively. In the third treatment, the monetary reward was
given to the parents. In the fourth and fifth treatments, the parents were given
the choice either ex-ante or ex-post, to reward their child with a toy or keep
the money themselves. The results show that although the incentives increased
children’s test scores overall, the treatments resulted in no significant differences.
There is also evidence that establishing sanctions for non-compliance with a
minimum rate of school attendance is effective in increasing attendance rates.
Jones et al. (2002), for instance, find that providing orientation and assistance
programs to secondary school students while imposing sanctions (lost eligibility
for social benefits) for non-compliance with an 80 percent school attendance tar-
get increases the probability that students will meet the target. However, again,
the experimental design allows no disentanglement of the sanction effects versus
the learning and orientation effect. Nevertheless, according to Dee (2011), the
Wisconsin Learnfare program, a six semester fee waiver reform in nine counties
that sanctioned a family’s welfare grant when students from covered families
failed to meet school attendance and completion targets, increased school en-
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rolment by 3.5 percent and school attendance by 4.5 percent.
With only a few exceptions,7 the literature shows cash and in-kind rewards
conditional on educational outcomes to be effective. However, there is a dis-
cussion on whether (monetary) incentives in education crowd out intrinsic mo-
tivation (see, Gneezy et al., 2011). In particular, financial rewards may lead
to a substitution effect between the objectives of learning and of receiving the
prize. Although this is a fair concern, it is not a relevant issue for the pro-
gram evaluated in the present study, as it provides strong encouragement and
low-value in-kind rewards. The extent to which financial incentives crowd out
intrinsic motivation could be assessed by measuring the long-run program ef-
fects (upon removal of the incentives). However, little evidence exists on the
long-term effects of such interventions. In addition, if the most important fac-
tor in explaining inequality in education between children from different socio-
economic backgrounds is family environment (Doyle et al., 2009), it is question-
able whether short-term interventions providing monetary or in-kind incentives
will have persistent effects on students’ educational trajectories.
Information asymmetries experienced by families from different socio-economic
backgrounds regarding the benefits of education are likely to play a major role in
explaining inequality in educational achievement. This is supported by studies
clearly showing that providing information on the benefits of academic achieve-
ment has a positive impact on educational outcomes. Nguyen (2008), for in-
stance, assesses the impact on school achievement of providing the parents of
children in 640 Madagascan primary schools with information on returns to
schooling. Specifically, the parents either received statistical information on
school returns, met with role models who gave information about their own
backgrounds, educational achievement and current employment situation or
were exposed to a combination of both. Although the results show no impact of
the role model intervention on school attendance and test scores, they identify a
positive impact of providing statistical information on both outcome variables.
7See, for example, Blimpo (2014), Fryer (2011) and Leuven et al. (2010).
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Similarly, Avvisati et al. (2014) evaluated the effect of providing information
sessions for interested parents of sixth grade students, in 34 volunteer middle
schools in deprived Paris suburbs, on how to assist and encourage their children
to expend effort in school. Not only did this intervention have a positive effect
on school attendance, it improved behaviour outcomes for the students whose
parents took part in the program. There was, however, no effect on test scores,
although there were positive spill-over effects (of lower magnitude) for the stu-
dents whose parents did not participate in the program but whose classmates’
parents were involved.
The study in this chapter contributes to the literature on incentive programs
in education, by evaluating the impact of a highly cost-effective program, that
combines symbolic rewards conditional on educational outcomes and behaviour
(attendance, behaviour in class), with strong encouragement and role model, in
the context of Australian indigenous adolescent students. From a methodologi-
cal perspective, we estimate the intention-to-treat and, as in Jackson (2010), we
apply a differences-in-differences design in order to account for the non-random
allocation of the treatment.
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4.3 The FOGS Artie program
The Former Origin Greats (FOGS) is a non-profit organisation created in 1997
in the state of Queensland by former elite players from the rugby leagues. One
of its main projects is the FOGS Artie program, funded partly by the Australian
government, which focuses on the educational outcomes of indigenous students.
It began in 2010 as a pilot project in 8 selected public high schools located in
both metropolitan and provincial areas in Queensland. In 2011, the program
added 13 additional high schools for a total of 21 schools, 13 in metropolitan ar-
eas, 6 in regional areas and 2 in areas designated as very remote. Although many
more than 21 schools expressed their interest in participating in the program,
budget restrictions (increased travel and personnel costs) limited the selection
to those which had the largest numbers of indigenous students. In 2010 and
2011, the program’s scope was extremely limited and offered mostly individual
support to indigenous students identified by their teachers as at risk of repeating
grades. The very limited number of available tutors, however, meant that such
help could not be offered to all indigenous students in need of it.
In 2012, FOGS introduced a broader program in these 21 schools that specif-
ically targeted school attendance, grades in math and English and classroom
behaviour of all indigenous students enrolled in grades 8 to 12 in the participat-
ing schools. Specifically, the program provided information on the importance
of school attendance and educational achievement, strong encouragement for
successful academic achievement with a role model, learning support, estab-
lished specific goals and awarded prizes at the end of each term to students who
reached these goals. Thus, we will focus our main results on the analysis of the
program effect in 2012, given that all indigenous were invited to take part in
the program, as opposed to the previous years, when only a small and selected
sample of students identified by the teachers as the weakest were assigned to
the program. This would raise difficulties for the interpretation of the results in
the early years of the program.8
8We discuss in Appendix C.3 the effect of the tutoring program in 2011.
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In 2012, at the start of each term in each participating school, all indigenous
students were invited to a launch during which FOGS staff members and former
elite rugby players held an information session about the benefits of education
and invited students to take part in specific challenges for the upcoming school
term. These challenges took the form of an incentive mechanism involving end-
of-term in-kind rewards conditional on students’ attendance rates, academic
grades and behaviour. The objectives fixed for each term differed across the
participating schools (see Table 4.3.1). In 2012, the program objectives and
prizes offered were identical in 11 out of the 21 participating schools. In term 1,
conditional on having obtained at least a passing score for effort and behaviour
in both math and English classes, students could choose between two tickets
to the cinema or a night out at football. In term 2, conditional on having
obtained at least a passing score in math and English, students were offered
sports clothing. In terms 3 and 4, conditional on having reached an attendance
rate of at least 90 percent, students were again offered sports clothing. In 8
other schools, students defined individual goals at the beginning of each term
and received prizes at the end of the term based on whether they had achieved
their goal. In the 2 remaining schools, the goal for each term was to achieve
an attendance level of at least 90 percent. Although we have no information on
program take-up (i.e., how many students took part in the launches and were
informed about the FOGS Artie program), all indigenous students were invited
to participate, so it is likely that even those who did not attend were aware of
the program through their classmates. We also do not have information on the
students’ level of engagement with the program and whether they were fully
aware of the challenges specified for each term.
140CHAPTER 4. INCENTIVES IN EDUCATION FOR INDIGENOUS STUDENTS
Table 4.3.1: Distribution of goals across schools for 2012, by term
Term
Goal 1 2 3 4
Passing score for effort & behaviour in math and English 11
Passing score in math and English 11
At least 90% of attendance 2 2 13 13
Individuals goals 8 8 8 8
No. of schools 21 21 21 21
4.4 Empirical design and data description
4.4.1 Empirical strategy
Program placement in the participating schools, rather than being random, de-
pended on several factors, not only the number of indigenous students enrolled
in the school but also whether the school principal knew about the program and
was willing to take part in it. This non-random assignment inherently prevents
us from constructing a valid ex-ante counterfactual to estimate causal effects.
In consequence, we build a control group by matching each school involved in
the program with non-participant schools that have a very close probability of
program involvement. We estimate the latter for all Queensland high schools
using a set of aggregate school-level relevant characteristics observed prior to the
2010 start of the intervention: geographic location, total number of students,
total number of indigenous students, socio-economic indicators and attendance
rates.9 This matching method identifies a control group similar in its char-
acteristics to the treatment group and thus more likely to respond in kind to
underlying trends or contemporaneous shocks (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Ap-
9We estimate a probit model for each school’s propensity for treatment group assignment
using aggregate school-level data for all Queensland high schools. We regress an indicator
variable for whether the school was part of the program on a set of observable relevant char-
acteristics and then match each treated school with the two non-treated schools that had
the closest probability of being treated. We choose to match each treated school with the
two non-treated schools that are its best matches (a one-to-two matching) because of sam-
ple size considerations, given that in many cases the different treated schools have the same
non-treated school best match. Details of our matching method are given in Appendix C.1.
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pendix C.1, which presents the results of the corresponding probit regression,
identifies the number of indigenous students enrolled and the school’s geographic
location as the relevant variables for propensity for program involvement, which
is consistent with FOGS’s use of indigenous student enrolment as its main se-
lection criterion.
Matching on observable characteristics, however, does not account for dif-
ferences in unobservable characteristics between control schools and those that
received the intervention. That is, if schools whose administrative staff were
more concerned about indigenous students’ outcomes were more likely to be
part of the program, the estimates would confound the effect of the program and
unobservable school characteristics capable of impacting educational outcomes.
In our sample, the selection on unobservable characteristics is significantly at-
tenuated as 14 of the 24 schools in the control group (that is, 14 out of the
schools that had the closest probability of program involvement) were willing
to be part of the program but ineligible because of insufficient indigenous enrol-
ment or funding restrictions. Hence, we believe it plausible that these schools
may have similar unobservable characteristics to those involved in the program.
To account for observable and unobservable heterogeneity between treatment
and control schools that could influence students’ academic achievement and be-
haviour, we apply a differences-in-differences strategy that enables comparisons
of the pre and post-treatment outcomes progression for indigenous students in
program schools with that of indigenous students in control schools over the
same time period. Because of data limitations, we estimate the intention-to-
treat (ITT) - that is, the impact of offering the program on educational outcomes
- without taking into account whether students were actively participating in
the program (whether they attended the sessions with the FOGS and their level
of engagement). We do so using the following model:
Yift = α+ γf + λt + β(f.t) +X
′
iftδ + ift (4.1)
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where γf is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled in a
program school and 0 if enrolled in a control school, λt is a time dummy equal
to 1 if the outcomes are observed in 2012 and 0 if observed pre-intervention (in
2009), and X represents a vector of individual and school level control variables.
To draw robust inference, we estimate cluster-robust standard errors on the
school level.10 This allows us to correct for the within-cluster error correlation, a
likely occurrence given that students in each school share the same environment.
We estimate equation (1) for the pooled sample of indigenous students and also
separately by gender. The causal impact of the program is given by parameter
β, the coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment and year dummy
variables.
β = [E(yift | f = 1, t = 1)− E(yift | f = 1, t = 0)]−
[E(yift | f = 0, t = 1)− E(yift | f = 0, t = 0)]
Within each sub-sample (treatment and control), the difference in outcomes
post and pre-intervention controls for specific observed and unobserved differ-
ences between treatment and control schools. The difference between treatment
and control schools’ progression in outcomes eliminates common time effects.
It accounts, for instance, for potential changes in national or state level educa-
tion policies, which could impact students’ outcomes and be confounded with
program effects.
The main identification assumption of the differences-in-differences model is
that time trends are common across treatment and control groups (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). That is, in the absence of the treatment, educational outcomes
in the treated schools would have evolved just as in control schools. Whether
this is a reasonable assumption can be tested in two different ways. A common
method is to look at time trends for the population of interest, across control and
treated groups over a large number of pre-intervention periods. In Queensland,
students’ academic results are centrally reported to the department of education
10See Cameron and Miller (2013).
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only since 2009 preventing us from following this approach. Instead, we apply a
similar method to De Silva et al. (2010), by analysing time trends (pre and post
intervention) for non-treated individuals within units assigned to treatment and
control groups. Given that the program was offered exclusively to indigenous
students in the treatment schools, we investigate whether there is a common
time trend to the treatment and control schools, in the progression of educa-
tional outcomes of non-indigenous students. As further discussed in the results
section, our empirical analysis shows no evidence of significant differences be-
tween treatment and control schools in the progression of educational outcomes
of non-indigenous students. Such observation gives support to the fact that any
significant treatment effects in educational outcomes of indigenous children are
due to the intervention.
A limitation of this approach is that non-indigenous students might also be
considered treated if there are externalities from the intervention in their ed-
ucational outcomes. However, given that in most schools indigenous students
represent less than 8 percent of the student population and not all indigenous
students were engaged in the program, we can plausibly assume that any poten-
tial program externalities affecting non-indigenous students will be very small.
4.4.2 Data
We use data from the Queensland Department of Education Training and Em-
ployment (DETE) on all students, indigenous and non-indigenous, enrolled in
schools that took part in the FOGS Artie program and schools selected as con-
trol schools. The data cover the period from 2009 until 2012 for both treatment
and control schools and include individual level data on whether students are
identified as indigenous (determined by parental declarations at the start of the
academic year),11 as well as gender, year level, date of birth, parental education
11The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines an indigenous person as a person of Aboriginal
or Torres Strait Islander descent who self-identifies as an indigenous and is accepted as such
by the community in which he or she lives. No proof of aboriginality is required, however, to
declare a child indigenous in schools, although it might be requested if the family applies for
special financial support or assistance programs reserved for indigenous people.
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and postal code. We base students’ academic outcomes on individual level data
by semester of teachers’ assessments of overall achievement in math, English
and science. We supplement this information with ninth grade students’ scores
in the Naplan test, a nationwide assessment of core literacy and numeracy skills
for students in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 conducted annually for purposes of na-
tional comparison. We also have individual level data on students’ absences
and whether they were explained or unexplained. Finally, we have data on stu-
dents’ scores for classroom behaviour, by subject and semester, derived from the
end-of-semester teachers’ assessment of behaviour and effort in each subject.
Our sample includes a total of 3,059 indigenous and 37,493 non-indigenous
students distributed across 21 treatment and 24 control schools, whose 2009
socio-demographic statistics are given in Table C.2.1 in Appendix C.2. We ob-
serve that the number of indigenous students decreases with the progression in
high school year level. Only 10 percent of the indigenous students in our sample
are enrolled in grade 12 versus 15 percent of non-indigenous students. Addi-
tionally, approximately one third of indigenous students in the sample are from
a single-parent family versus 18 percent of non-indigenous students, and the
parents of the former have lower education levels than non-indigenous parents.
Pre-treatment characteristics of treatment and control schools
Given that the selection of the control schools is based on aggregate school-
level data, we first check for possible differences in 2009 pre-treatment socio-
demographic characteristics and academic outcomes between treatment and
control schools with individual student-level data. Overall, there are no signif-
icant differences in relevant indicators observed prior to the program between
treatment and control schools. We find no statistically significant differences
in socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 4.4.1), behaviour and academic
scores (Tables 4.4.2), Naplan scores (Table 4.4.3), attendance rates and number
of unexplained absences (Table 4.4.4).
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Table 4.4.1: Pre-treatment differences in school characteristics
% of Total Indigenous Male Mother’s Father’s
Indigenous enrolment enrolment education education
Treatment -0.001 76.454 5.223 0.009 0.102 0.077
(0.011) (96.100) (11.518) (0.006) (0.137) (0.134)
Constant 0.076∗∗∗ 1040.647∗∗∗ 73.537∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 2.712∗∗∗ 2.597∗∗∗
(0.009) (68.752) (9.528) (0.003) (0.102) (0.104)
N 40552 40552 40552 40552 40541 32630
Schools 45 45 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.4.2: Pre-treatment differences in academic and behaviour grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
Behaviour
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.022 0.023 0.037 0.034 0.003 0.060
(0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.051) (0.065) (0.057)
N 27617 27244 18352 24231 23997 17595
Panel B: Indigenous
Treatment -0.072 0.026 -0.068 0.061 -0.130 0.040
(0.108) (0.083) (0.095) (0.101) (0.089) (0.105)
N 1616 1585 997 1439 1434 1010
Academic grades
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.011 0.029 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.067
(0.044) (0.048) (0.055) (0.041) (0.066) (0.054)
N 28768 28209 19567 26105 25716 19048
Panel B: Indigenous
Treatment 0.046 0.105 -0.009 0.071 0.018 0.052
(0.073) (0.069) (0.087) (0.072) (0.091) (0.078)
N 1678 1610 1077 1530 1496 1088
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level; grades standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation
1. The control variables include gender, parents’ education, proportion of indigenous students and
dummy variables for year level, plus a dummy for indigenous students in the Panel A specification.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.4.3: Pre-treatment differences in Naplan scores
Naplan scores
Writing Spelling Grammar Numeracy
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.024
(0.051) (0.045) (0.050) (0.049)
N 6945 6945 6945 6940
Panel B: Indigenous
Treatment -0.149 -0.076 -0.028 -0.058
(0.130) (0.123) (0.113) (0.134)
N 476 476 476 478
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level; grades standardised to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Includes all control variables as in Table 4.4.2. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.4.4: Pre-treatment differences in attendance
Attendance
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.169 0.286 0.363 0.381
(0.752) (0.831) (0.870) (0.774)
N 32629 32629 32629 32629
Panel B: Indigenous
Treatment 1.026 0.127 -0.186 0.656
(1.662) (1.340) (1.370) (1.154)
N 2005 2005 2005 2005
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Includes all control variables as in Table 4.4.2. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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4.5 Results
We arrange our discussion of the results for the effect of the program on indige-
nous students’ educational outcomes around three aspects: behaviour grades,
academic grades and attendance. We also present separate results for male and
female students because, like the experimental literature on incentives for educa-
tional achievement,12 we find that incentives are more effective for female than
for male students. In addition, because our results suggest that the program is
only effective for students from intact families, we limit our interpretation of the
results to students in the sample who live with both parents, which accounts
for 66 percent of the total sample of indigenous students and 82 percent of the
total sample of non-indigenous students.13 This is in line with the evidence that
family structure is a crucial variable in explaining educational outcomes. Conti
et al. (2010), for instance, show that the family environment is the strongest
predictor of students’ educational achievement from the earliest years of school,
and that children from single-parent families are systematically disadvantaged
in both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. One reason may be that single par-
ents tend to be single mothers with low levels of education and more financial
constraints than intact families. They may thus be less able to offer a support-
ive environment for their children’s cognitive and socio-emotional development.
When the family environment is highly detrimental to schooling outcomes, any
external intervention during high school years may have very little power to
enhance educational achievement by improving behaviour or changing study
habits.
To check for similar time trends in outcomes between indigenous and non-
indigenous students, we also report the treatment effects for non-indigenous
non-participants in the program. This allows us to investigate the extent to
which it is reasonable to assume that indigenous students in treatment schools
12See, for example, Angrist and Lavy (2009) and Rodriguez-Planas (2012).
13We show in Appendix C.5.3 that none of the results discussed in the following sections
hold when considering the whole sample of students (i.e. including students who belong to
single-parent families).
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would have had the same progression in outcomes as those in control schools,
in the absence of the program. As previously discussed, testing for time trends
in non-indigenous students may be problematic because of possible program ex-
ternalities on non-indigenous students’ outcomes. However, because indigenous
students constitute such a small fraction of the student population (7 percent on
average across schools), finding no significant treatment effect on non-indigenous
students’ outcomes would be evidence that any significant treatment effect for
the sample of indigenous students likely corresponds to the program effect.
It should also be noted that because of reporting errors, the sample size is
not constant across either subjects (math, English and science) or the outcomes
considered (behaviour, academic grades and attendance). As these reporting
errors are likely to be random, they should not bias our estimates. In addition,
the sample size differences across subjects (math, English and science) result pri-
marily from the fact that high school students can choose their own curriculum,
so not all students are enrolled in all three subjects. In particular, many stu-
dents substitute elective subjects for science classes, making students enrolled in
science a specific sample that tends to include high achievers. Hence, although
we report the treatment effects for the three main subjects, any positive impact
on science grades should not be interpreted as an average effect of the program
since students were given no incentives targeting science. Finally, since we have
less than 50 schools in our sample and that we cluster the standard errors at
the school level, these may be downward biased (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
However, applying the cluster bootstrapping method, does not yield different
results than the OLS method with cluster-robust standard errors.14 Hence, in
all tables, we simply report the cluster-robust standard errors.
Next, in section 4.5.4, we describe the robustness checks conducted to assess
the stability of our results, in particular, by including school fixed effects.15
We also discuss the treatment effect estimates obtained after restricting the
comparison group to the sample of 14 schools that expressed their willingness
14The cluster bootstrapping method is appropriate to correct for over-rejection when the
number of clusters is at least equal to 20 (Cameron et al., 2008).
15See Cameron and Miller (2013) for a discussion on cluster-specific fixed effects.
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to take part in the program. Finally, in section 4.6, we discuss potential reasons
for the heterogeneity in treatment effects between male and female students.
4.5.1 Classroom behaviour
In the first term of 2012, indigenous students from 11 out of the 21 treatment
schools were offered a prize at the end of the term conditional on obtaining at
least a passing score for behaviour in both math and English classes. Our data
include students’ grades by semester but not by term. The regression results
for the pooled sample of indigenous students, considering the 11 schools with
behaviour and effort incentives as the treatment group, are given in Table 4.5.1,
panel I.A, and separately by gender in panels I.B and I.C. These results show
mild evidence of a positive program effect on students’ behaviour in math classes
in semester 1 (significant at the 10 percent level), as well as in semester 2 but
of lower magnitude (0.19 and 0.13 standard deviations from the mean, respec-
tively). This positive effect is driven by female students. For male and female
students separately (panels I.B and I.C), we find no significant treatment effects
on behaviour for male students but a significant positive effect for female stu-
dents in both math and science in semester 1 (but not in semester 2). Relative to
the 2009 scores, the program is expected to increase female students’ behaviour
scores in math by 0.28 standard deviations from the mean (significant at the
10 percent level) and result in female students in treatment schools scoring 0.27
standard deviations from the mean higher on behaviour in science classes than
female students in control schools (also significant at the 10 percent level). We
also report in Table 4.5.1 the treatment effects for non-indigenous students,
both for the pooled sample (panel II.A) and separately by gender (panels II.B
and II.C). The results indicate no significant treatment effect on these students’
behaviour scores, which supports that we are measuring the program effect on
the behaviour outcomes of indigenous students.
We report in Appendix C.4 the results obtained when considering as treated
schools all 21 schools that were part of the program, that is, including those
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whose students were not given explicit incentives to improve their grades in
behaviour and effort in math and English classes in semester 1. The results are
consistent with the findings discussed above, but the magnitude of the positive
program effect for semester 1 for behaviour in math classes is smaller (0.22
standard deviations from the mean for the sample of female students).
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Table 4.5.1: OLS estimates of the program effect on behaviour
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.188∗ 0.076 0.225 0.131∗ 0.168 0.192
(0.105) (0.125) (0.146) (0.077) (0.138) (0.120)
N 2592 2561 1734 2280 2287 1690
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.086 0.024 0.178 0.082 0.158 0.217
(0.150) (0.194) (0.213) (0.138) (0.189) (0.169)
N 1283 1275 864 1153 1160 859
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.284∗ 0.141 0.272∗ 0.182 0.176 0.176
(0.149) (0.100) (0.160) (0.165) (0.154) (0.182)
N 1309 1286 870 1127 1127 831
II. Non-indigenous
Panel II.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.014 -0.037 -0.043 0.022 -0.061 -0.016
(0.055) (0.079) (0.068) (0.052) (0.088) (0.068)
N 41171 40901 28639 35695 35431 26992
Panel II.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.009 0.007 -0.044 0.037 -0.031 -0.009
(0.063) (0.084) (0.088) (0.061) (0.084) (0.076)
N 21005 20854 14534 18252 18111 13750
Panel II.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.037 -0.083 -0.039 0.007 -0.094 -0.023
(0.053) (0.079) (0.062) (0.052) (0.098) (0.070)
N 20166 20047 14105 17443 17320 13242
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level; grades standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation
1. The control variables include indicator variables for the academic year, for whether the student
is enrolled in a treated school, parents’ education, the proportion of indigenous students enrolled at
the school and dummy variables for the school grade (9, 10, 11 and 12). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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4.5.2 Academic performance
In the second term, indigenous students were offered a prize conditional on ob-
taining at least a passing grade in both math and English. Table 4.5.2 shows
the regression results for semesters 1 and 2. Although the results in panel I.A
for the pooled sample of indigenous students indicate that the incentive had
no effect on grades for semester 1, they do show a positive effect in semester 2
on both math and English scores. This positive impact on academic grades is
driven by female students. Specifically, the incentive increased female students’
semester 1 grades in English by 0.23 standard deviations from the mean (sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level) and their semester 2 grades in both math and
English by 0.28 and 0.34 standard deviations from the mean, respectively (panel
I.C). As for classroom behaviour, panel II of Table 4.5.2, shows no impact of
the program on academic outcomes of non-indigenous students.
As in the previous section, we report in Appendix C.4 the estimation results
when considering as treatment schools all 21 schools that were part of the pro-
gram, showing that none of the coefficient estimates for the program effect are
statistically significant.
We also analyse whether the program impacts students’ Naplan test scores
in the four core skills of writing, spelling, grammar and numeracy, which is con-
ducted at the schools but externally marked. Although the students in grade
9 who took the test at the end of the first semester were offered no rewards
conditional on their test achievement and their test performance did not impact
their academic grades, it seems plausible to assume that an improvement in be-
haviour and academic grades would also positively influence the ninth graders’
Naplan scores. As Table 4.5.3 shows, male indigenous students enrolled in
schools involved in the program performed significantly better in all three lit-
eracy components of the test (panel I.B), improving their test scores between
0.35 and 0.64 standard deviations from the mean. However, we find no posi-
tive effect on female students’ test performance (panel I.C) and no evidence of
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differences between treatment and control schools in non-indigenous students’
scores progression (panel II).
Table 4.5.2: OLS estimates of the program effect on academic grades
Academic grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.065 0.042 0.149 0.178∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.180
(0.112) (0.113) (0.111) (0.088) (0.112) (0.122)
N 2718 2656 1889 2438 2420 1845
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.030 -0.142 0.075 0.063 0.165 0.220
(0.140) (0.146) (0.131) (0.116) (0.147) (0.146)
N 1337 1309 928 1219 1215 925
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.090 0.231∗∗ 0.220 0.280∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.140
(0.167) (0.113) (0.132) (0.141) (0.123) (0.147)
N 1381 1347 961 1219 1205 920
II. Non-indigenous
Panel II.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.005 -0.022 -0.030 0.008 -0.049 -0.064
(0.064) (0.052) (0.053) (0.062) (0.070) (0.069)
N 43564 43091 31066 38669 38346 29655
Panel II.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.017 -0.016 -0.038 0.035 -0.026 -0.063
(0.067) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.077) (0.072)
N 22201 21933 15762 19709 19526 15070
Panel II.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.007 -0.028 -0.021 -0.020 -0.072 -0.067
(0.073) (0.049) (0.065) (0.065) (0.071) (0.079)
N 21363 21158 15304 18960 18820 14585
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level; grades standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation
1. Includes all control variables as in Table 4.5.1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5.3: OLS estimates of the program effect on Naplan scores
Naplan scores
Writing Spelling Grammar Numeracy
I. Indigenous
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.302∗ 0.113 0.130 0.155
(0.160) (0.137) (0.132) (0.178)
N 972 972 972 974
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.635∗∗∗ 0.419∗ 0.351∗ 0.357
(0.227) (0.219) (0.202) (0.250)
N 527 527 527 528
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.083 -0.241 -0.125 -0.093
(0.184) (0.182) (0.186) (0.247)
N 445 445 445 446
II. Non-indigenous
Panel II.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.020 0.005 0.036 -0.013
(0.066) (0.060) (0.063) (0.067)
N 12367 12367 12367 12360
Panel II.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.000 -0.007 0.021 -0.030
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.073)
N 6496 6496 6496 6491
Panel II.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.042 0.019 0.053 0.006
(0.080) (0.071) (0.076) (0.084)
N 5871 5871 5871 5869
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level; Naplan scores standardised to mean 0
and standard deviation 1. Includes all control variables as in Table 4.5.1. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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4.5.3 Attendance
In the second semester of 2012, indigenous students from 13 out of the 21 schools
involved in the program were given incentives for regular school attendance,
with indigenous students receiving a prize at the end of each term conditional on
reaching an attendance rate of at least 90 percent. As shown in Table 4.5.4, panel
I, the program was most effective for female participants, being expected to
decrease the number of their unexplained absences by 4.25 days during semester
2 (panel I.C). However, we find no effect for male students. The results for the
sample of non-indigenous students (panel II) provide mild evidence (significant
at 10 percent) that in semester 1 only, male non-indigenous students have a lower
number of unexplained absences in treated schools than in control schools.
In Appendix C.4, we show that the results hold when considering as treated
schools all 21 program schools, although the magnitude of the program effect is
smaller.
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Table 4.5.4: OLS estimates of the program effect on attendance
Attendance
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
I. Indigenous
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.662 -2.532 0.308 -2.469
(2.435) (1.950) (2.017) (1.557)
N 3390 3390 3390 3390
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.005 -2.740 -0.017 -0.907
(2.643) (2.267) (2.523) (2.014)
N 1713 1713 1713 1713
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -1.291 -2.344 0.766 -4.250∗∗
(2.790) (1.865) (2.167) (1.627)
N 1677 1677 1677 1677
II. Non-indigenous
Panel II.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.070 -2.209∗ -1.046 -0.736
(1.377) (1.264) (1.361) (1.247)
N 50365 50365 50365 50365
Panel II.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.467 -2.488∗ -0.697 -1.183
(1.357) (1.326) (1.297) (1.173)
N 25684 25684 25684 25684
Panel II.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.345 -1.911 -1.405 -0.260
(1.458) (1.233) (1.492) (1.362)
N 24681 24681 24681 24681
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 37 37 37 37
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Includes all control variables as in Table 4.5.1. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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4.5.4 Robustness analysis
In order to assess the robustness of our main results, we estimate the program
effects using school fixed effects, which controls for schools’ unobserved het-
erogeneity, showing overall that the results reported in the previous sections
remain stable (see Appendix C.5.1). In particular, the positive impact of the
incentives on female students’ behaviour scores in math remains significant for
both semesters, and the magnitude of the effect is larger. In terms of academic
grades, the positive effect on math scores for female students is significant at
the 5 percent level and larger; however, the positive impact on English grades is
smaller and loses its statistical significance. The positive effect of the incentives
in reducing the number of unexplained absences for female students, however,
remains significant at the 5 percent level (although slightly smaller in magni-
tude). With respect to the Naplan scores, we observe a positive significant effect
for male indigenous students in literacy.
We also estimate the program effects restricting the control group to the
14 schools that expressed interest in being part of the program, which are
likely to have similar unobservable characteristics to the treated schools (see
Appendix C.5.2). This similarity might be important in that the teaching and
administrative staff’s motivation to reduce disparities between indigenous and
non-indigenous students’ educational outcomes could lead to improved outcomes
for the former even in the absence of the intervention. The results obtained draw
the same conclusions as those described in the previous sections, although the
magnitude and significance level of the treatment effect estimates on indigenous
students’ outcomes are in some cases larger.
4.5.5 Potential reasons for the heterogeneous effects
The findings previously described highlight heterogeneous program effects for
male and female students; specifically, an improvement in female indigenous
students’ academic grades and behaviour and a reduction in the number of their
unexplained absences. However, they show no positive impact on these students’
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standardised test scores (Naplan). In contrast, although the program seems to
improve male indigenous students’ scores on (objective) standardised tests, it
does not improve their teacher-assessed grades for academic achievement and
behaviour. Nor do we find any significant impact on male students’ attendance
rates or unexplained absences.
Of particular interest is that female students’ response to the program ap-
pears to be driven by the specific incentive or goal; for instance, the inter-
vention has a positive impact on their behaviour grades when the incentive
scheme specifically targets classroom behaviour. Similarly, female students have
fewer unexplained absences when the specific challenge relates to attendance
rate. Although we do not know exactly which mechanisms explain these gender
differences, conclusions from other studies offer several possible explanations.
First, such gender differences may be explained by the nature of the reward:
those offered to students conditional on their achievement of a specific goal
were low-value symbolic rewards, which an experimental study of Swedish sixth
graders suggests motivate girls but not boys (Jalava et al., 2015). Girls also tend
to be more self-disciplined than boys, an advantage more relevant to teacher-
assessed report card grades than to standardised achievement tests (Duckworth
and Seligman, 2006). On the other hand, Jacob (2002) finds that 90 percent of
the gender gap in higher education is due to differences in non-cognitive skills,
such as the difficulty to pay attention in class, seek help from the teachers, or set
and self-commit to goals like studying regularly and doing homework. The fact
that girls are better at self-monitoring and achieving goals than boys (Zimmer-
man and Martinez-Pons, 1990) might at least partly explain the observed gender
differences. Moreover, as we find a positive program impact on girls’ behaviour
scores but not boys’, the positive behaviour progression of female students is
also likely to be reflected in the overall teacher-assessed academic scores. An-
other potential contributing factor for the male-female disparity is that teachers
may have different expectations for female and male students’ reactions to the
program, which might also be reflected in the outcomes. For example, Corn-
well et al. (2013) find that female students benefit from (subjective) teacher
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grading because it is subject to a gender gap that exceeds the predicted gender
differences between male and female students’ test scores. Furthermore, as the
allocation of the weakest students to the tutoring sessions was decided by the
teachers, we cannot exclude a gender bias in favour of female students, for in-
stance, if teachers believed that they would benefit more from the extra learning
support than male students.
A plausible explanation for the different incentive effects for male and female
students on the Naplan test are differences in male and female preferences for
competition, as well as self-confidence (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson
and Gneezy, 2009). The Naplan is competitive, with students receiving feed-
back not only on their absolute performance but also their performance relative
to all other students in the country. Moreover, Gneezy et al. (2003), in an ex-
perimental setting, find that female students are less likely than male students
to choose to perform in a competitive environment and also perform less well
under competition. They also find that the reticence for entering competition is
only partly explainable by the fact that female students are less over-confident
and more risk averse than male students. Instead, a large share of this male-
female difference results from a female disutility for performing in a competitive
setting. The program may thus be less effective in improving female students’
test scores in competitive settings but more effective for male students.
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, we evaluated the impact of the FOGS Artie program, which com-
bines learning support, strong encouragement for educational achievement with
a role model and offers symbolic rewards to indigenous high-school students con-
ditional on the achievement of a specific educational goal. At the start of each
term of 2012, all indigenous students enrolled in the 21 schools involved in the
program were invited to a launch organised by FOGS, during which former elite
rugby players and administrative staff encouraged the students to perform well
at school and announced a specific goal for the upcoming term. We provided
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evidence that the program had a positive impact on a set of indicators of edu-
cational performance - including behaviour, academic grades and attendance -
but that this positive effect was driven mainly by female students. Specifically,
the program improved female indigenous students’ scores in both behaviour and
academic grades and reduced their number of unexplained absences. Our re-
sults further indicate that symbolic rewards and specific challenges matter to
female students because their positive responses to the program are larger for the
indicators defined as semester targets. For the standardised national test (the
Naplan), in contrast, the program improved scores only for male indigenous stu-
dents, which raises the question of what leads to this gender difference between
female and male students. This is consistent with the existing evidence that
male students have an advantage in standardised tests, while female students
have an advantage in teacher-assessed performance (Duckworth and Seligman,
2006). A potential reason for this effect is the gender disparity in classroom
behaviour, which is taken into account in teachers’ assessments of scholastic
performance. Another possible contributing factor is that males outperform
females in competitive settings because of such factors as stronger feelings of
confidence or competence (Gneezy et al., 2003). Because individual Naplan test
scores are evaluated and compared at the national level, the test can be seen
as a competitive setting in which students can see their individual performance
against the national average and the range of achievement for the middle 60
percent of students in Australia.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of
incentives on the schooling outcomes of indigenous students in Australia. Never-
theless, we acknowledge several weaknesses in our study, not least the fact that
participating schools were self-selected into the FOGS program, which raises
concerns about unobserved characteristics that could be crucial for program
success. That is, even in the absence of the program, these schools could have
had better outcomes than schools that were not exposed to any intervention.
This selection effect, however, although a fair concern, is somewhat attenuated
given that the majority of the schools in our control group were willing to partic-
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ipate in the program. In addition, all participating schools were selected based
on an objective criterion, the number of indigenous students enrolled. More-
over, the absence of a treatment effect for non-indigenous students not involved
in the program provides convincing evidence that there would be no differences
in the progression of outcomes between indigenous students in treatment and
control schools in the absence of the intervention. Admittedly, a second major
limitation is the lack of information on whether the indigenous students were
actually treated; that is, whether they were informed about the program and at
what level they engaged in it. As a result, rather than estimating the average
treatment effect of the program, we necessarily test for an intention-to-treat
effect.
One important contribution of our study is showing that symbolic rewards
combined with strong encouragement and support are effective in improving
indigenous students’ educational achievement and attitudes toward education.
Another important contribution of this study is the clear support it provides
for family environment being a determinant variable not only for educational
outcomes but also for the success of remedial programs in the later years of com-
pulsory schooling. We have evidence that the program is effective in improving
the educational outcomes of students from intact families but no indication of
any positive impact on those of students from single-parent families. Hence, the
program does not seem effective for students who are most disadvantaged, possi-
bly because, as Conti et al. (2010) and Heckman (2008) point out, interventions
aimed at improving the educational trajectories of children from disadvantaged
socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to be effective if undertaken early
in life.
At this point we can only estimate the short-term effects of the intervention,
even though it is the long-term effects that are most relevant from a public
policy perspective. In particular, it is crucial to know whether the intervention
has persistent effects on indigenous students’ educational outcomes by chang-
ing their study habits or classroom behaviour, as well as their aspirations and
attitudes toward education. We also cannot identify which of the initiatives - en-
162CHAPTER 4. INCENTIVES IN EDUCATION FOR INDIGENOUS STUDENTS
couragement, incentives and learning support - is the most effective, or whether
it is their combination that is driving the positive outcomes. Therefore, trying
to disentangle the impact of each of these measures is an interesting avenue for
future research. It would also be interesting to investigate whether larger and
more meaningful rewards influence educational outcomes of indigenous students
and in particular, of male students.
Factors that are known to play an important role in educational outcomes in-
clude non-cognitive skills like time preferences, the capacity for self-commitment
to achieve goals and self-confidence (Shoda et al., 1990). Hence, future research
might also examine whether indigenous and non-indigenous children exhibit
different levels of such non-cognitive skills in their first years of formal edu-
cation and whether early intervention programs can successfully address these
differences. Finally, based on the evidence from research on social preferences
demonstrating that individuals have a tendency to reciprocate trust with com-
pliant behaviour (e.g. Fehr and Falk, 2002), investigating whether trust-based
incentive schemes, with rewards conditional on the commitment to achieve a
specific goal, constitute powerful incentives is a very interesting avenue for fu-
ture research.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and contribution
In this thesis, I presented three empirical essays on the economics of education,
applying conceptual and methodological insights from behavioural and experi-
mental economics. Together, the three studies in this dissertation contributed
to the existing knowledge on potential behavioural mechanisms for inequality in
education and solutions to mitigate these effects. As discussed in the introduc-
tory chapter, understanding how to attenuate persistent patterns of inequality
in educational attainment between identifiable groups (for instance, according
to ethnicity, gender, social background or relative age) requires a rigorous in-
vestigation of the effect of specific contextual factors or incentives and other
solutions on individuals’ choices in education. The behavioural economics of
education enriches the standard economic approach, by placing the emphasis
on how these influence a set of non-cognitive skills (behavioural traits and eco-
nomics preferences), that are relevant predictors of educational achievement
(Koch et al., 2014) and which are to a certain extent malleable until adulthood
(Avvisati et al., 2014; Dahl, 2004).
Each of the studies in this thesis contributed to this recent and expanding
literature by investigating how to attenuate specific factors susceptible to influ-
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ence non-cognitive skills and adversely affect educational outcomes. In Chapter
2, I investigated a potential relative age bias in the development of economic
preferences that could explain relative age disparities in educational achieve-
ment. In the next chapter, I examined the effects of positive discrimination
on incentives to exert effort and beliefs of disadvantaged individuals affected
by a negative stereotype. Finally, in Chapter 4, I evaluated the impact of an
incentive program in education for low socio-economic background adolescent
students, designed to increase their intrinsic motivation toward successful aca-
demic achievement and aspirations.
Another element that ties together the three studies in this thesis is that
environmental factors do not influence educational achievement in isolation.
Instead, their effects can be magnified or weakened by their interplay with other
factors. Consequently, attenuating a specific contextual factor that restricts
choices in education, for instance peer influences, stereotypes or poor family
support, may weaken the influence of other determinants of poor educational
outcomes. Furthermore, the interpretation of the findings in each study in the
light of the other studies is relevant for formulating policy recommendations on
how to mitigate systematic disparities in education. In this concluding chapter,
I will highlight the complementing relation between the findings in each study
for public policy.
Finally, the studies in this dissertation are also related by the methodology
followed, which is experimentation in social science. The studies in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 are economic laboratory experiments. The former is a classroom
experiment and the study in Chapter 3 is a classic laboratory experiment, i.e.
with university students as the participant pool. The study in Chapter 4 is a
quasi-experiment, in the sense that I create ex-post conditions that allow to be
as close as possible to a randomised field experiment.
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. In the remainder of this
section, I will briefly summarise each of the studies in this thesis and high-
light the reasons why these are novel efforts. In the following section, I will
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describe the policy implications of each study and the complementarity of the
findings for public policy. In the next section, I will re-emphasise the limitations
of each study and I will conclude this chapter with directions for future research.
In Chapter 2, I investigated whether psychological factors contribute to the
observed disparity in educational trajectories between the youngest and the
oldest individuals from the same cohort (e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Grenet,
2009). Specifically, I tested for relative age differences in economic preferences
(competition, self-confidence, risk and ambiguity attitudes) and professional
aspirations, with a sample of 661 high school students, aged between 13 and
14 years old, and born within a two-month window of the school entry cut-
off date. Overall, I found little evidence that relative age differences in these
preferences are at least partly responsible for the persistent relative age gap
in educational trajectories. This study was motivated by the existing evidence
that peer comparisons based on maturity differences during childhood, when
small age differences correspond to important relative differences in physical
and mental development, may influence individuals’ non-cognitive skills (e.g.,
Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008; Thompson et al., 2004; Goodman et al., 2003). This
study makes several important contributions to the existing empirical research
on the RAE. As far as I am aware, it is the first experimental investigation
of the RAE and also the first study that focuses on the RAE on economic
preferences. It also suggests that further attention should be directed toward the
investigation of relative age differences in non-cognitive skills which are known
to be relevant predictors of educational attainment, such as time preferences,
goal setting capacities and intrinsic motivation.
In Chapter 3, I conducted a cross-country laboratory experiment in order to
examine the impact of AA on the incentives to exert effort and beliefs of dis-
advantaged individuals. Previous laboratory experiments have investigated the
incentive effects of AA rules in an abstract setting (e.g., Schotter and Weigelt,
1992), or based on gender stereotypes (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
Closely related to the study in this thesis, Calsamiglia et al. (2013) created
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differences in competitive capacities between participants, by pairing subjects
experienced at a real effort experimental task with non-experienced participants,
who performed in a competitive setting. These studies tend to find that AA
reduces disparities in outcomes between groups with different competitive ca-
pacities and/or in the presence of stereotypes. The experimental studies on AA
are highly context-dependent and the results may be influenced by the nature
or extent of the stereotype in each study. This stresses the need for more ev-
idence on AA in different contexts, that would allow for a general assessment
of the incentive effects of such policies. The study in this thesis contributes to
the experimental evidence on the incentive effects of AA and is distinct from
the existing literature, by combining a real stereotype and differences in com-
petitive capacities between participants. The experimental design was based
on the asymmetry in mathematical skills between Australian and Chinese stu-
dents (Dandy and Nettelbeck, 2002). Another specificity of this study is that
I conducted the experiment simultaneously in two experimental laboratories,
in Australia and in China. In this setting, participants performed real effort
tasks, a mathematical exercise and a control task, under three different treat-
ments: baseline, stereotype and AA. The main result of the study was that,
despite the large competitive disadvantage of Australian participants, neither
the stereotype nor AA impacted their effort in the tournament.
In Chapter 4, I provided evidence on the impact of a program targeting
educational outcomes of indigenous adolescent students. The program was de-
livered by a charity in 21 high schools and combined learning support, in-kind
incentives and strong encouragement toward successful educational achievement
to all indigenous students. Using a differences-in-differences design, I found that
the program improved behavioural and academic grades and reduced the num-
ber of unexplained absences for female students only. However, the program
improved test scores in national standardised assessments in literacy for male
students (but not female students). It is a recurrent finding in the program
evaluation literature that financial incentives are more effective for females than
male students (e.g., Angrist et al., 2002; Rodriguez-Planas, 2012). Moreover,
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the findings are consistent with the evidence that females are advantaged in
teachers’ assessments, potentially due to their compliant behaviour in the class-
room, whereas male students tend to be advantaged in standardised tests, which
have a strong competitive aspect (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006). Moreover,
I found that the program is only effective in improving academic outcomes for
students from intact families, suggesting that it did not benefit the most disad-
vantaged students. An important contribution of this study was showing that
soft incentives are effective in improving academic outcomes and behaviour for
female indigenous students. Additionally, to the best of my knowledge, this
study constitutes the first rigorous evidence on the effect of a program in educa-
tion targeting indigenous Australian students. This is a very important aspect of
this investigation given the national commitment to equity in education, in the
pursuit of the broader objective of enhancing living standards of the indigenous
population.
5.2 Policy implications
In this section, I will discuss the contribution of the findings in each study and
their interrelation for the educational policy. Inasmuch as the study in Chapter 2
and recent evidence (Crawford et al., 2014) suggested that maturity differences
may be the main explanatory factor for the small but persistent relative age
gap in academic achievement, I will briefly discuss the educational policies that
could be considered in order to attenuate this effect (see Musch and Grondin,
2001, for a more detailed discussion). The most evident solution is delaying
the school starting age. For instance, in Queensland the school starting age
was delayed by six months in 2007. Similarly, in the US, 26 states have delayed
school entry since the 60s, which led to an an increase in educational attainment
and wages (Bedard and Dhuey, 2007). However, these are average effects across
the entire cohort, which may hide heterogeneous effects across the age distri-
bution (in particular, between the oldest and the youngest individuals). More-
over, delaying the school starting age could increase the disparity in educational
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achievement between children from different socio-economic backgrounds. For
instance, children from resourceful families would spend additional time in high
quality pre-school institutions, while those from poor families would spend more
time in environments susceptible to impair their cognitive and socio-emotional
development. Another potential solution is to sort children into different class-
rooms according to their level of maturity. The main concern that such measure
entails is that it would penalise those in the middle on the age distribution, who
would be allocated to a class with younger children, although they would be able
to follow a higher level of instruction. In addition, children’s relative maturity
within the classroom is not stable, but susceptible to evolve over time. Hence,
an appropriate approach to prevent the persistent relative age gap in academic
performance may simply be providing extra learning support to the youngest
children.
Besides questioning which interventions are the most effective in attenuating
disparities in academic achievement, another major consideration is when they
should be introduced. The observation that the relative age gap in academic
performance emerges in kindergarten (e.g., Datar, 2006), along with the evi-
dence that incentive programs in education should be undertaken early in life
(Heckman, 2007), strongly suggest that the support for the youngest children
should be provided in the first years of schooling. The findings in Chapter 4
also indicate that interventions undertaken in the later stages of the educational
trajectory may not be effective in shaping adolescents’ behaviour toward better
academic outcomes. In particular, in this study I show that incentive programs
implemented during adolescence to attenuate disparities in educational achieve-
ment may not be effective for the most disadvantaged children. Nevertheless,
the encouraging finding is that incentives schemes with in-kind symbolic re-
wards conditional on achievement are effective in motivating adolescent female
students to increase their school grades and attendance. However, these are the
immediate effects of the program, which may be transitory, whereas the persis-
tent effects on academic outcomes, attitudes toward education, social behaviour
and employment are more relevant for public policy, whose ultimate goal is to
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achieve a sustained alleviation of inequality.
Most incentive programs in education targeting disadvantaged students (as
the one introduced in Chapter 4), offer in-kind or financial rewards conditional
on successful achievement of a short-term goal. The rationale for implementing
such incentive programs is that many students fail to make decisions compatible
with successful academic achievement, that is to establish a working schedule
and to stick to it (Gneezy et al., 2011). Moreover, this incapacity may be more
prevalent among students belonging to poor socio-economic backgrounds, who
often lack encouragement and support toward high educational achievement.
Other types of programs intend to provide long-term incentives for disadvan-
taged individuals to invest in education. An important underlying motive for
enacting affirmative action policies in university admissions, is that such rules
will raise incentives for disadvantaged individuals to invest in education. In
Chapter 3, I found that such positive discriminatory policies may not be effec-
tive in influencing behaviour toward increasing effort. Yet, this finding has to
be interpreted carefully, as it contrasts with previous results in the experimental
literature (Calsamiglia et al., 2013; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Moreover,
although I found clear evidence of differences in competitive capacities between
participant, as in Calsamiglia et al. (2013), I did not find evidence that the
stereotype impacts participants’ effort in the task. The findings in this study
suggested that we need more evidence on the incentive effects of AA, in contexts
with different stereotypes, in order to inform public policy on its effectiveness
in counteracting the effect of pre-labour market factors (such as stereotypes,
family background, school quality and peers) on educational outcomes.
5.3 Shortcomings
In this section, I will emphasise the main shortcomings of each study, which
have been discussed in the corresponding chapters. With respect to Chapter 2,
an important limitation is that I did not test for a RAE on time preferences.
It is well-established that the ability to delay rewards, to define goals and work
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toward their achievement is an important predictor of educational outcomes
(Castillo et al., 2011). Moreover, it has been shown that more mature children
are more patient (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007). Not testing for relative age
differences on time preferences was motivated by practical difficulties. First, it
would extend the experimental session, which would require our participants
missing more than one class. Moreover, we would need to request extra effort
from the schools in organising the deferred payments.
Another potential limitation in this study is that a very large fraction of our
participants who were born just before the cut-off date had their school entry
delayed. This may be an issue when relating our findings to other studies on the
RAE using data from countries in which the proportion of students whose school
entry was delayed is virtually zero (Crawford et al., 2014) or very small (Bedard
and Dhuey, 2006; Grenet, 2009; Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008). In particular, we
may underestimate the RAE if the students whose school entry was delayed are
negatively selected, that is, if they were the least mature and potentially the
ones negatively affected by peer comparisons in the classroom based on relative
age.
Finally, the choice of students in grades 8 and 9 as the participant pool,
which are the two first years of high school in Queensland, may be subject
to criticism. There is evidence that the transition from primary to secondary
school is often accompanied with negative emotional consequences, in particular
for adolescents with low coping skills (Qualter et al., 2007). This effect could
bias the estimates of the RAE for the sample of grade 8 students, if the youngest
and oldest students are differently affected by the transition from primary to
secondary school. However, the results obtained when restricting the sample
to students in year 9 were not significantly different than when considering the
pooled sample of participants, supporting the validity of the results obtained
with the pooled sample.
The study in Chapter 3 provided an original design to investigate the incen-
tive effects of AA in a laboratory experimental setting, but shared the weak-
nesses of similar studies. An important limitation was related to external va-
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lidity, that is, the extent to which participants’ choices in the laboratory can
be extrapolated to real life decisions. In the specific context of AA studies, the
question is to which extent participants’ effort in the experiment can be related
to investment choices in education and effort in order to gain high qualifications.
Individuals may behave very differently in the context of a laboratory experi-
ment compared to real life situations with incomparably large stakes. In order
to attenuate the external validity issue, especially given the difficulty to con-
duct field experiments with exogenous policy implementations, some laboratory
experimental studies (including the one in this thesis) base the experimental de-
sign on a real stereotype or asymmetry in competitive capacities. However, this
approach is not free from criticism because, as in potential field experiments,
the results of each study may become very context-dependent. Additionally,
the extent of the stereotype in each experimental study is fixed. As previously
mentioned, we need more evidence on AA in contexts with different stereotypes
and intensity of preferential rules for a valid assessment of its incentive effects.
The main caveat of the study in Chapter 4 was the non-random allocation of
the intervention. This raised the important issue that selected schools may have
specific characteristics, such that a simple comparison of post-program outcomes
between treated schools and other similar (on pre-program characteristics) but
non-treated schools, would confound the effect of the program and other factors.
Although I acknowledge that this is a major concern, all participating schools
were selected based on an objective criterion: the large number of indigenous
students enrolled. Moreover, none of the invited schools declined the invitation
to take part in the program.
In order to circumvent the potential selection problem, I considered as con-
trol schools non-treated schools that had the closest probability of being part of
the program, based on their observable characteristics, and I estimated the im-
pact of the program using the differences-in-differences strategy, which controls
for potential differences in unobservable characteristics. In addition, the results
were stable when considering as control schools only those that had the closest
probability of taking part in the program and requested to be part of the pro-
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gram, but were not eligible due to their slightly smaller number of indigenous
students and/or funding restrictions. Furthermore, the stability of outcomes
pre and post-treatment for non-indigenous students (who were not part of the
program), supported the fact that the observed positive effect on indigenous
students’ outcomes was driven by the program.
Another important limitation in this study was that I could not disentangle
the impact of the different interventions: learning support, in-kind incentives
and encouragement. A related issue is that I cannot rule out a gender bias in
favour of female students in teachers’ assignment decisions of students to the
tutoring sessions in the early years of the program. Such bias could partly ex-
plain the heterogeneous treatment effects between male and female students.
Nevertheless, I found that females adjusted their behaviour to the in-kind in-
centives or specific goals defined for each term. Also, I could only estimate the
intention-to-treat, without taking into account whether the students were aware
of the program and their level of engagement. Finally, I only provided evidence
for the short-term effects of the intervention.
5.4 Directions for future research
The investigation of how environmental factors are associated with regularities
in behaviour that are relevant for individuals’ outcomes in a plurality of domains,
is a very promising and important avenue for research in behavioural economics.
First, such investigation will provide significant insights to the understanding of
the mechanisms for systematic asymmetries in several spheres, such as academic
outcomes, career choices, health status and life-cycle saving, between individuals
exposed to dissimilar environments (e.g. socio-economic backgrounds, peers,
institutions). In turn, these findings will constitute the basis for the design
of public interventions aiming to influence individuals’ choices toward more
desirable outcomes. In particular, in the field of economics of education, we
need to further the understanding of the regularities in behaviour that have a
causal impact on educational outcomes.
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In this direction, part of the discussion below will be oriented toward a
further development of the questions analysed in this thesis and new questions
that would allow us to improve our understanding of how to encourage better
decisions in education. I will also discuss how future research could address
some of the limitations in this thesis.
An evident extension to the study in Chapter 2 is the investigation of how
to attenuate the small but persistent relative age penalty on academic outcomes
and on the choice of professional career for the youngest individuals in a cohort.
Testing the effect of some of the potential solutions previously discussed would
allow us to provide evidence-based advice on effective measures to counteract
the RAE (which is beyond the scope of this thesis). Another interesting question
is whether we observe a RAE on economic preferences in a context with strict
school entry cut-off dates, such as in England where, unlike in Australia, grade
retention and delayed school entry are very seldom. As previously mentioned,
testing for the RAE on economic preferences in the context of a strict school
entry cut-off date would provide an estimate of the RAE corresponding to the
population average effect, instead of a local average effect on the sub-population
of students whose relative age is affected by the school entry rules. In addition,
it would be interesting to test for relative age differences in time preferences and
self-control, as these are relevant predictors of educational achievement (Shoda
et al., 1990). As observed by Bandura (1993), the ability to make commitments
or establish goals in education and stick to them, can plausibly be influenced
by individuals’ perception of their abilities relative to their peers.
Over the last few years, there has been a growing investigation of the im-
pact of different types of incentives in education and throughout all stages of
the educational trajectory, typically targeting economically disadvantaged stu-
dents. Besides measuring the effects of short-term incentives on performance
indicators, we need an improved understanding of the channels for these effects.
Accordingly, further questions arise from the study presented in Chapter 4. The
first question is with respect to disentangling what is driving the observed ef-
fect (symbolic rewards, learning support, encouragement, or the combination
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of several incentives). In particular, identifying the effect of a role model or
strong encouragement by an indigenous person with a similar cultural and so-
cial background as the target population, could bring important insights for
the educational policy. For instance, if the role model is effective in motivat-
ing students to adopt study habits and behaviour compatible with successful
academic achievement, that would suggest that it may be very valuable to in-
vestigate the effect of indigenous teachers in schools in educational outcomes
of indigenous students. Another interesting question is the extent to which a
trust-based incentive scheme in education is effective in improving academic
outcomes of disadvantaged students (for instance, conditioning rewards on the
promise to comply with regular school attendance or to establish and follow a
study plan compatible with successful academic achievement). The rationale
for such investigation is the well-established finding in the social preferences
literature that individuals have a tendency to reciprocate trust with compliant
behaviour (Fehr and Falk, 2002). Furthermore, it would be interesting to test
what sort of incentives are effective for male indigenous students, as our results
suggest that female students benefit more from incentive programs than male
students (see also, Angrist et al., 2002; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Rodriguez-
Planas, 2012). Likewise, it is important to test what type of incentives are
effective in improving educational outcomes of children and adolescents belong-
ing to the most disadvantaged family environments. In particular, as young
children’s educational outcomes are strongly determined by parental behaviour,
we need to understand which solutions directed to parents can help young chil-
dren from particularly disadvantaged socio-economic contexts.
The investigation of which elements of the program are effective in improving
academic outcomes of indigenous, or more generally, low socio-economic back-
ground students, has to be combined with the analysis of its effect on students’
behaviour. In particular, we can test (by means of a randomised controlled
trial) whether the intervention influences intrinsic motivation, or other charac-
teristics which are important predictors of academic achievement, such as study
habits, behaviour in the classroom, aspirations; and naturally, whether it has
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persistent effects on academic outcomes. The long-run effects (upon removal
of the incentives), whose measurement requires following people over time, are
the most relevant outcomes when assessing the cost-effectiveness of incentives
in education.
Future research should also be directed toward the investigation of the under-
lying mechanisms of other environmental factors known to impact academic per-
formance. In particular, it would be interesting to test for potential mechanisms
through which peers impact children’s educational outcomes. Observational
studies demonstrate that peers influence academic performance (e.g., Zimmer,
2003; Zimmerman, 2003) and social behaviour (e.g., Gaviria and Raphael, 2001).
Likewise, laboratory experimental studies show that peers influence productiv-
ity (Falk and Ichino, 2006) and decisions with respect to risk taking (Gardner
and Steinberg, 2005; Viscusi et al., 2011; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015). One
possible way to test for latent peer effects on students’ academic performance
would be to investigate, in the context of the classroom, whether and under
which circumstances peers have a causal influence on young individuals’ goal
setting and capacity of self-regulation in order to reach the defined goals. Since
peer effects that occur in the classroom are malleable, this investigation could
provide relevant insights for public policy on how to attenuate potential adverse
or foster positive peer effects in education.
I conclude this thesis with reemphasising that each contextual factor that
influences educational outcomes encompasses multiple aspects susceptible to
explain its causal effects. Thus, we need a further understanding of the be-
havioural processes through which specific conditions affect individuals’ choices
in education. The expanding field of behavioural and experimental economics,
with a more realistic conceptualisation of human behaviour, substantiated by
factual observation by means of controlled experiments, creates exciting oppor-
tunities to identify these latent mechanisms and their causal implications. This
exploration will allow us to make predictions on the effectiveness of prospec-
tive solutions in influencing individuals’ toward better educational choices and
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ultimately, in mitigating inequality in education. My ambition for the work de-
veloped in this thesis was twofold: to broaden the existing knowledge on how to
counteract behavioural mechanisms that adversely impact individuals’ choices
in education and inspire further research in the evolving field of the behavioural
economics of education.
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A.1 Empirical strategy
In this section, we discuss the general case, that is when the impact of absolute
age and grade cannot be assumed equal to zero. We consider the following model
for the relationship between performance (yi) and chronological age, schooling
and relative age:
yi = β0 + β1agei + β2gradei + β3rai + β4states + Xiβ5 + Xjβ6 + i (A.1)
We estimate jointly β1+β3 and β1+β2 by estimating the following equation:
yi = γ0 + γ1gradei + γ2rai + γ3states + Xiγ4 + Xjγ5 + νi (A.2)
By estimating equation (2) we obtain estimates of the following parameters:
γ1 = β1 + β2 (A.3a)
γ2 = β1 + β3 (A.3b)
In the specific case where there is no effect on outcomes (yi) of a one year
difference in chronological age or in schooling, γ1 will be equal to zero, and
therefore β1 + β2 will also be equal to zero (or β1 = β2 = 0 under the maturity
assumption). Consequently, the relative age effect (β3) is identified and given
by γ2 in equation (2). This scenario is represented graphically in Figure A.1.1b.
Alternatively, if the combined effect of the chronological age and schooling
is significantly different from zero (γ1 6= 0 in Equation (2)), then γ2 is the upper
bound of the relative age effect (β3), averaged across school cohorts.
If β1 + β3 = 0 (or γ2 = 0) and β1 + β2 6= 0 (or γ1 6= 0), only grade has an
impact on outcomes. This case corresponds to Figure A.1.1c.
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Finally, if β1 + β3 = 0 (or γ2 = 0) and β1 + β2 = 0 (or γ1 = 0), none of the
variables considered (age, grade and relative age) affects the outcome variable
yi. This situation is represented in Figure A.1.1d.
birthdate
y
Jan 1999Jan 2000Jan 2001
ByB
DyD
AyA
CyC
Year 9 Year 8
γ1
Slope γ2
(a) β1 + β2 > 0, β1 + β3 > 0
y
yB = yD
yA = yC
(b) β1 = β2 = 0, β3 > 0
y
yA = yB
yC = yD
(c) β1 = β3 = 0, β2 > 0
y
Jan 1999Jan 2000Jan 2001
yA = yB =
yC = yD
(d) β1 = β2 = β3 = 0
Figure A.1.1: Identification strategy
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A.2 Illustration of the experimental tasks
Task 1: Preferences for competitive environments
Figure A.2.1: Illustration of task 1
8 16 10 12 7
Task 2: Ordered choices lists
Figure A.2.2: Risk elicitation
1. draw from bag A  or  $0.35 for sure
2. draw from bag A  or  $0.70 for sure
3. draw from bag A  or  $1.05 for sure
4. draw from bag A  or  $1.35 for sure
5. draw from bag A  or  $1.70 for sure
etc. . .
16. draw from bag A  or  $5.60 for sure
17. draw from bag A  or  $5.95 for sure
18. draw from bag A  or  $6.30 for sure
19. draw from bag A  or  $6.65 for sure
20. draw from bag A  or  $7.00 for sure
As in Sutter et al. (2013), we denote r the risk attitude, which is obtained as
follows:
r = 1− CEr/pi
where CE, certainty equivalence, is given by the midpoint between the two sure
payoffs where the participant switches from the risky option to the sure payoff
(6.125 dollars in the examples above), and pi denotes the prize in the risky option
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(7 dollars in our task). If r > 0.5, the participant is considered risk averse. If
r < 0.5, the participant is considered risk loving, and risk-neutral if r = 0.5.
We denote a the ambiguity attitude, which is obtained as follows:
a = (CEr − CEa)/(CEr + CEa)
where CEa is the certainty equivalent in the ambiguous prospect, with a ∈
[−1, 1]. If a → −1, the participant has extreme ambiguity loving. If a → 0,
the participant is ambiguity neutral, and if a→ 1, the participant has extreme
ambiguity aversion.
Task 3: Balloon Analogue Risk Task
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Task 4: Aspiration levels
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A.3 Regression results on academic scores
Table A.3.1: IV regression on academic scores
All Male Female
math English math English math English
Relative age 0.039 -0.066 -0.085 -0.136 0.158 -0.048
(0.164) (0.209) (0.259) (0.322) (0.208) (0.215)
Year 9 -0.113 -0.124 -0.232 -0.027 0.017 -0.244
(0.128) (0.123) (0.148) (0.152) (0.179) (0.152)
QLD -0.022 -0.035 -0.261 -0.006 0.272 -0.067
(0.179) (0.131) (0.176) (0.154) (0.183) (0.219)
Constant 0.958 1.174 2.489∗ 0.213 -0.759 2.396∗
(1.183) (1.119) (1.331) (1.285) (1.620) (1.418)
Observations 466 468 247 247 219 221
Standard errors clustered by school. Academic scores are standardised to mean 1
and standard deviation 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.4 First stage of the IV regression
Table A.4.1: First stage of the IV re-
gression
Relative age
(1a) (1b)
Predicted ra 0.498∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.041)
QLD -0.079∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.037) (0.041)
Year 9 -0.058
(0.045)
Male 0.092∗∗
(0.038)
Math score -0.014
(0.018)
English score -0.003
(0.016)
Public -0.084∗∗
(0.038)
Regional 0.073
(0.060)
Constant 0.646∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.399)
Observations 537 466
Standard errors clustered by school. Pre-
dicted ra takes value 1 if the participant
is born just after the cut-off date and 0
if he or she is born just before the cut-
off date. Relative age takes value 1 if
the participant is relatively old, and 0 if
he is relatively young in his cohort. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.5 OLS regression results
Table A.5.1: OLS regressions on performance
Piece-rate Tournament Difference
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age -0.394 -0.548 -0.611 -0.762∗∗ 0.207 0.196
(0.347) (0.352) (0.428) (0.345) (0.244) (0.262)
QLD -0.946 -0.658 -1.212∗ -1.000∗∗ 0.284 0.351
(0.634) (0.487) (0.693) (0.470) (0.181) (0.264)
Year 9 0.654∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ -0.213
(0.302) (0.290) (0.222)
Male 0.356 0.152 0.186
(0.273) (0.337) (0.241)
Math score 1.094∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ -0.135
(0.155) (0.192) (0.143)
English score 0.233 0.252 -0.052
(0.189) (0.206) (0.115)
Public -1.062∗ -1.085 0.034
(0.578) (0.656) (0.332)
Regional -0.468 -0.652 0.135
(0.501) (0.414) (0.310)
Constant 6.999∗∗∗ 1.957 8.348∗∗∗ 2.092 -1.358∗∗∗ 0.135
(1.211) (2.982) (1.308) (3.084) (0.352) (1.919)
N 534 463 532 461 529 458
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5.6: OLS regressions on risk aversion
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 0.035 0.047∗∗ 0.028 0.049 0.060∗ 0.046
(0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039)
QLD 0.021 0.016 -0.001 -0.011 0.044 0.040
(0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.044)
Year 9 -0.034 -0.038 -0.033
(0.032) (0.032) (0.045)
Male -0.076∗∗∗
(0.025)
Math score -0.026 -0.045 -0.010
(0.017) (0.028) (0.020)
English score -0.003 -0.008 0.004
(0.016) (0.023) (0.024)
Public 0.015 -0.001 0.042
(0.028) (0.040) (0.035)
Regional -0.039 -0.069 -0.013
(0.043) (0.063) (0.061)
Constant 0.502∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.740∗
(0.043) (0.268) (0.061) (0.284) (0.064) (0.387)
N 505 438 255 232 250 206
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5.7: OLS regressions on ambiguity aversion
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age -0.001 0.003 0.058 0.055 -0.043 -0.039
(0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.037)
QLD -0.003 0.001 -0.022 -0.015 0.008 0.002
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.052) (0.043) (0.044)
Year 9 -0.008 -0.020 -0.007
(0.018) (0.032) (0.026)
Male -0.019
(0.027)
Math score 0.004 -0.022 0.028∗
(0.015) (0.026) (0.017)
English score 0.001 -0.007 0.008
(0.017) (0.025) (0.027)
Public -0.037 -0.016 -0.059∗
(0.043) (0.058) (0.033)
Regional -0.018 -0.050 0.004
(0.036) (0.056) (0.045)
Constant 0.106 0.213 0.083 0.274 0.126 0.241
(0.077) (0.195) (0.083) (0.330) (0.088) (0.273)
N 486 424 247 225 239 199
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table A.5.8: OLS regressions on the BART
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 10.234 8.560 -4.393 2.481 16.077 11.456
(9.587) (10.170) (19.259) (17.580) (13.057) (13.573)
QLD -0.371 -6.230 11.333 5.975 -11.001 -18.946
(13.804) (17.565) (12.397) (18.263) (21.652) (23.639)
Year 9 0.944 0.643 3.741
(7.370) (9.184) (11.024)
Male 8.922
(9.691)
Math score 3.798 2.790 6.235
(3.708) (4.826) (5.623)
English score -2.133 -1.032 -4.714
(5.603) (8.487) (5.784)
Public -21.856 -23.273 -12.961
(15.452) (18.783) (24.483)
Regional -3.347 -17.554 10.957
(13.844) (22.233) (13.315)
Constant 163.539∗∗∗ 180.495∗∗ 161.292∗∗∗ 179.307∗ 171.425∗∗∗ 167.279∗
(27.444) (68.620) (20.979) (92.956) (44.284) (91.997)
N 488 450 251 240 237 210
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5.9: OLS regressions on professional aspirations
Average rank for the 4 occupations
All Male Female
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Relative age 0.524 0.128 0.438 -0.542 0.935 0.779
(1.616) (1.755) (3.040) (2.921) (1.957) (2.457)
QLD -2.810∗ -2.108 -3.217∗∗ -2.778∗ -2.383 -1.359
(1.407) (1.348) (1.398) (1.489) (3.119) (2.804)
Year 9 2.454 2.786 2.405
(1.480) (2.435) (1.897)
Male -0.170
(1.318)
Math score 0.326 0.223 0.500
(0.725) (0.978) (1.131)
English score 1.302 0.011 2.747∗∗
(1.005) (1.450) (1.226)
Public 3.298∗ 1.502 6.214∗∗
(1.721) (1.876) (2.818)
Regional 0.612 0.408 0.518
(1.595) (1.784) (2.875)
Constant 60.248∗∗∗ 35.896∗∗∗ 60.471∗∗∗ 35.796 59.760∗∗∗ 31.815∗
(2.712) (13.007) (2.667) (21.714) (5.955) (16.131)
N 524 461 262 243 262 218
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.6 Robustness analysis
Table A.6.1: IV probit on the choice of compensation scheme, for grade 8
participants
Stage 3 Stage 4
Sample All Male Female All Male Female
Relative age 0.179∗ 0.306∗ 0.091 0.218∗∗ 0.254∗ 0.185
(0.103) (0.165) (0.141) (0.107) (0.152) (0.148)
N 247 134 113 251 136 115
Average marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. In-
cludes all covariates as in specification (2c) in Table 2.5.4. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Table A.6.2: IV regression for ambiguity
aversion, for grade 8 participants
Ambiguity aversion
Sample All Male Female
Relative age 0.037 0.188∗∗ -0.113
(0.057) (0.094) (0.103)
N 226 123 103
Standard errors clustered by school. Includes all
covariates as in specification (2b) in Table 2.5.8.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6.3: IV regression for risk aversion,
for the total sample of grade 9 participants
Risk aversion
Sample All Male Female
Relative age 0.099 0.222∗ 0.018
(0.065) (0.121) (0.067)
N 249 132 117
Includes those who were enrolled in other states
or countries with different cut-off dates. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by school. Includes all
covariates as in specification (2b) in Table 2.5.6.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.7 Instructions script
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Today you will be engaged in
few task. It is fun and you can earn some real money. You will get the money
at the end of the session. The decisions you will make in the experiment will
determine how much you get at the end. The experiment consists of four tasks.
In task 1,2 and 3 you have the possibility to make money. One of these tasks
will be randomly selected for payment at the end of the session.
I invite you to listen carefully to the instructions for you to understand the
tasks. Please raise your hand at any time if you have a question. Please do not
talk to your neighbours during the session.
Task 1
This task will have 5 parts (write 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 on the board).
(Underline 1) In the first part, you will be invite to quickly compute sums
of five numbers. Each time you propose an answer (right or wrong) another set
of five numbers will appear for you to sum. You will have 3 minutes to solve as
many additions as you can. You are not allowed to use a calculator/phone. If
this part is selected for payment, you will receive $0.20 per correct answer.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
OK, then please click on the button I understand.
(Underline 2) Let’s consider the part 2. In this part the task is exactly the
same as in the part 1: you will have 3 minutes to solve as many additions as you
can. However, the payment will be different. Now it will depend on whether you
are one of the students in this room/school, having the highest number of right
answers. If you are in the top third students in terms of number of answers you
will receive $0.60 per correct answer. If you are not in the top third of students
with the highest number of right answers, you will not get anything. You can
see an example of a classroom with 12 participants in the room. In this example
only the students ranked 4 or above receive $0.60 per addition correctly solved.
Those ranked below 4, do not get anything. In this classroom/school, you are
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X students, so only those ranked within the top X/3 students will receive $0.60
per correct answer. The others will not receive anything.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
(Underline 3) Let’s consider the part 3. In this part the task is once again
exactly the same as in the part 1: you will have 3 minutes to solve as many
additions as you can. However, you will now have the opportunity to choose
how to be paid for it. You can chose either to be paid like in part 1 ($0.20 for
each correct answer) or like in part 2 ($0.60 per correct answer only if you are
one of the top X/3 students in part 2). You will be asked to choose between
these two possible payment methods before starting to solve the additions.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
(Underline 4) Let’s now consider the part 4 of the task. This part is a bit
different. In this part you will not have to solve any addition. You will only
have to choose a payment method. This payment method will be applied to
one of your previous results, the number of right answers that you gave in part
1. This is how it will work: First, you will be informed about how many right
answers you gave in part 1. Second, you will have the possibility to choose how
to be rewarded for these right answers. You may want to be paid like in part
1, in that case you will receive $0.20 for each correct answer. Alternatively,
you will have the opportunity to choose a payment method as in part 2. If
you do so, you will receive $0.60 per correct answer if you are one of the top
X/3 students in part 1, and nothing otherwise. Importantly this choice has no
influence on your payment in part 1 itself ( point on the 1 on the board). It will
only determine you payment in part 4. Let’s consider an example. Imagine you
got 5 answers right in part 1, you select competition. Suppose you were not in
the top X/3, how much do you get in part 4, if selected? In part 1, if selected?
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
(Underline 5) Let’s consider the final part of the task. This task is relatively
simple. There are no addition to solve or payment method to chose. In this part,
you will be asked to guess how well you did relatively to the other participants
in the room/school in Part 1 and Part 2. In this classroom/school you are X.
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This number will be displayed on the screen. You will then be asked to enter a
guess about your rank in Parts 1 and 2. You can put any number between 1 (if
you think you are the one who has the highest number of correct answers) to X
(if you think you are the one with the smallest number of correct answers).
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
Ok, then please click on the button I understand.
Task 2
The second task consists in two parts (write 1,2 on the board)
(Underline 1) Let’s consider part 1. You will have to choose whether you
prefer safe amounts of money or drawing a ball from Bag A, with a chance of
winning $7. Here is the bag. I will now fill the bag with white and orange
balls. As you can see there are 6 white balls and 6 orange balls. So you have
50% chance to draw a white ball. (You show conspicuously the balls and place
them in the bag). When you decide to draw a ball from Bag A, you draw a
ball blindly. If the drawn ball is white, you receive $7. If the drawn ball is
orange, you get nothing. You will be presented with a list of sure amounts of
money ranging from $0.35 to $7. For each sure amount you will have to indicate
whether you prefer the sure amount, or whether you prefer to draw a ball from
the bag. You will have on your screen a decision table which looks exactly like
the one you see now on the explanation screen. You will then have to make a
decision for each row between drawing a ball from Bag A and a sure amount of
money. For example: In the first row, you decide whether you prefer to draw a
ball from Bag A and thereby maybe winning $7, or if you prefer taking $0.35
home for sure. In the second row you decide again between drawing a ball from
Bag A and a sure amount of money. Now you are offered $0.70 to take home
for sure. (show a printed version of the table and point the different elements
when talking) There is no right or wrong answer. You just have to indicate your
preferences. Assume that you very much dislike drawing a ball from Bag A. In
this case you might choose the sure amount of money all the time. Assume that
you like drawing a ball from bag A very much, then you might check the boxes
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on the left hand side most of the time. However, even if you like to draw from
the bag you may consider not choosing the bag in the bottom row. Do you have
an idea why? The easiest way to proceed is for you to make a choice for each
row in the table going from the top row to the bottom row. The webpage will
help you fill the boxes. Whenever you indicate that you prefer a sure amount
to drawing the bag, it will tick all the sure amounts which are higher. If you
prefer $2.45 to draw from the bag, you should also prefer $2.8, $3.15 and so on.
So the webpage will tick these boxes (point to them on the print out). At the
end of the experiment, if this part is selected for payment, only 1 out of the 20
decisions will be used to determine your earnings.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like you would like me to
explain better? If you do not have any questions, please click on the button I
understand.
(Underline 2) Now we explain the second part of the task. The second part
is very similar to the first part. The only difference is that Bag A is replaced by
Bag B. Now you have to choose between drawing a ball from Bag B and thereby
maybe winning $7 or taking a sure amount of money home. Drawing from Bag
B works as follows: This bag contains 12 balls. The balls are either white or
orange as before, but this time we do not tell you the exact number of white
and orange balls. When you decide to draw a ball from Bag B, you draw a ball
blindly. If the drawn ball is white you get $7, if t is orange, you get nothing.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
If you do not have any questions, please click on the button I understand.
Task 3
In this task imagine you are blowing up a balloon, just like the one you have
on your screen. You have a button labeled ‘Press” on your screen. Each time you
will click on this button, the balloon will increase in size. The bigger the balloon,
the larger the reward will be. Each click on the pump raises your earnings by 5
cents. At each point you can chose to collect the money or to continue pumping.
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It is your choice to decide how much to pump up the balloon, but be aware that
at some point, the balloon will explode. If the balloon explodes before you
click on the button Collect $$$, all the money that you accumulated in this
balloon will be lost. The balloon can explode at any pump, even at the first
one. Also, be aware that all the balloons will not explode at the same time.
After you collected the money on a balloon, or after the explosion of a balloon,
you will be presented with another balloon. There are 5 balloons in total. The
amount accumulated in each balloon will not affect the amount accumulated
in the other balloons. If this task is selected for payment, you will receive the
earnings accumulated in one randomly chosen balloon.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
Task 4
The last task is different from the precedent ones. Here we will ask you to
think about what you would like to do in the future as a professional career.
You will see different professions and you will be asked to say how happy you
would be to have a given profession relative to two other professions in a com-
parable area of activity. In the example on your screen, the three professions
are Engineer, Factory worker and Technician. Engineer is ranked higher than
Factory worker in the classification of occupations and is also associated with
a higher social status. The profession of Technician is ranked between the pro-
fession of Engineer and the profession of Factory worker in the classification of
occupations and is associated with a higher social status. In this task we ask you
to think about how happy you would be to have the middle ranked profession
(here the profession of Technician), relative to the other two professions. If you
think you would be very happy to have this profession you should place it higher
on the scale, otherwise, you should place it lower on the scale. In this example,
if you would be as happy being a Technician as you would be being a Factory
worker, then you should position the Technician close to the Factory worker in
the scale. This would indicate that you clearly prefer to be an Engineer over
both other professions. If you would be as happy being a Technician as you
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would be being an Engineer, then you should position the Technician close to
the Engineer in the scale. This would indicate that you are indifferent or only
weakly prefer the profession of Engineer to the profession of Technician. You
will be asked to do this exercise for four different groups of professions.
Is it clear?. . . Is there something which you would like me to explain better?
If you do not have any questions, please click on the button I understand.
You will now start to perform each of the tasks. If you have any question
while performing the tasks, please raise your hand and one of us will come
to answer your question privately. In each task, you will be given a short
explanation on the screen about the task you are about to perform. Please feel
free to take the time during the experiment to re-read the instruction of each
task before starting it.
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B.1 Instructions
Instructions for the baseline treatment
WELCOME
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of decision mak-
ing. You can earn real money through your participation in this experiment.
Please follow the instructions carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand
if you have any question. Please do not ask your question out loud; wait
until an experiment administrator comes to you and answers your
question privately. During this session, please do not discuss with
the other participants.
Your decisions are strictly anonymous. You are identified solely by your
participant number. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to come to
the side room, where you will receive your earnings in a sealed envelope with
your participant number.
In the experiment, you will be randomly allocated to a group with 5 other
participants. Each group will have 6 participants in total. Although
you are matched with other participants, you will perform the tasks
individually. In the first part of the experiment, you will be asked to perform
sequentially two rounds of two different tasks. The first round of each task will
consist in a qualifying round to the second round of the same task. According
to your performance in the first round, relative to the performance of the other
members of your group, you will either be allocated to a more complex or
alternatively, to a simpler version of the same task that you performed in the first
round. The allocation to the more complex or simpler version of the
task in the second round, will be decided according to the following
rule: the 2 participants with the highest scores in the first round
will be allocated to the more complex version, and the remaining 4
participants will be allocated to the simpler version of the same task.
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If you qualify for the complex version of the task, you will earn $3
per correct answer, while you will earn $0.50 per correct answer if
you qualify for the simpler version of the task. Before performing the
first round of each task, you will have the option to buy hints, which
are likely to improve your performance.
In the second part of the experiment, you will be invited to make decisions
between lotteries, to answer a short questionnaire and to perform the implicit
association test.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your gains in each
task, plus your earnings from the lotteries and a $10 show up fee.
Thank you for your participation.
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Instructions for the stereotype treatment
WELCOME
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of decision mak-
ing. You can earn real money through your participation in this experiment.
Please follow the instructions carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand
if you have any question. Please do not ask your question out loud; wait
until an experiment administrator comes to you and answers your
question privately. During this session, please do not discuss with
the other participants.
Your decisions are strictly anonymous. You are identified solely by your
participant number. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to come to
the side room, where you will receive your earnings in a sealed envelope with
your participant number.
In the experiment, you will be randomly allocated to a group with 5 other
participants. Each group will have 3 Australian students from Queens-
land University of Technology in Australia and 3 Chinese students
from the Southeast University in China. You are matched with 2
other participants in your room and 3 other Chinese participants
who will perform the experiment in China, as you can see on the
video screen. The 6 members of each group will perform each task
simultaneously. Although you are matched with other participants,
you will perform the tasks individually. In the first part of the experiment,
you will be asked to perform sequentially two rounds of two different tasks. The
first round of each task will consist in a qualifying round to the second round of
the same task. According to your performance in the first round, relative to the
performance of the other 5 members of your group, you will either be allocated
to a more complex or alternatively, to a simpler version of the same task that
you performed in the first round. The allocation to the more complex
or simpler version of the task in the second round, will be decided
according to the following rule: the 2 participants with the highest
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scores in the first round will be allocated to the more complex ver-
sion, and the remaining 4 participants will be allocated to the simpler
version of the same task. If you qualify for the complex version of the
task, you will earn $3 per correct answer, while you will earn $0.5 per
correct answer if you qualify for the simpler version of the task. Be-
fore performing the first round of each task, you will have the option
to buy hints, which are likely to improve your performance.
In the second part of the experiment, you will be invited to make decisions
between lotteries, to answer a short questionnaire and to perform the implicit
association test.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your gains in each
task, plus your earnings from the lotteries and a $10 show up fee.
Thank you for your participation.
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Instructions for the AA treatment
WELCOME
You are about to participate in an experiment in economics of decision mak-
ing. You can earn real money through your participation in this experiment.
Please follow the instructions carefully and do not hesitate to raise your hand
if you have any question. Please do not ask your question out loud; wait
until an experiment administrator comes to you and answers your
question privately. During this session, please do not discuss with
the other participants.
Your decisions are strictly anonymous. You are identified solely by your
participant number. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to come to
the side room, where you will receive your earnings in a sealed envelope with
your participant number.
In the experiment, you will be randomly allocated to a group with 5 other
participants. Each group will have 3 Australian students from Queens-
land University of Technology in Australia and 3 Chinese students
from the Southeast University in China. You are matched with 2
other participants in your room and 3 other Chinese participants
who will perform the experiment in China, as you can see on the
video screen. The 6 members of each group will perform each task
simultaneously. Although you are matched with other participants,
you will perform the tasks individually. In the first part of the experiment,
you will be asked to perform sequentially two rounds of two different tasks. The
first round of each task will consist in a qualifying round to the second round of
the same task. According to your performance in the first round, relative to the
performance of the other 5 members of your group, you will either be allocated
to a more complex or alternatively, to a simpler version of the same task that
you performed in the first round. The allocation to the more complex
or simpler version of the task in the second round, will be decided
according to the following rule:
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The Australian participant in your group with the highest score
compared to the scores of the other two Australian participants will
be allocated to the more complex version of the task. Among the
remaining 5 other participants, the one with the highest score (either
Chinese or Australian), will also be allocated to the more complex
version of the task. The other 4 members of the group will be allo-
cated to the simpler version of the task. According to this rule, at
least 1 Australian participant within your group will figure among the
two participants allocated to the more complex version of the task.
If you qualify for the complex version of the task, you will earn
$3 per correct answer, while you will earn $0.5 per correct answer if
you qualify for the simpler version of the task. Before performing the
first round of each task, you will have the option to buy hints, which
are likely to improve your performance.
In the second part of the experiment, you will be invited to make decisions
between lotteries, to answer a short questionnaire and to perform the implicit
association test.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your gains in each
task, plus your earnings from the lotteries and a $10 show up fee.
Thank you for your participation.
Instructions for the mastermind task
In the mastermind game you have to guess a code made by 4 coloured pegs in
a maximum of 10 attempts. The sequence of 4 pegs is formed from a set of 6
colours, repetitions allowed. In response to each of your guesses, you will be
given information regarding how many pegs are of the correct colour and in
the correct hole (the red response) and how many pegs are of the correct
colour but in the incorrect hole (the white response). For example, if
the secret code is (• • ••) and the guess is (• • • •), then you will receive 2 red
responses and 1 white response. The game ends when either you guess the right
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code or 10 guesses have occurred. At the end of each game, you will be given a
new code to guess. You will be given 10 minutes to correctly guess the
maximum number of codes.
At the end of the first round, you will obtain a score, based on the number of
codes that you correctly guessed, which will be compared with the score of the
5 other participants from your group. If you get the first or second best score in
your group, you will be allocated to a more complex version of the game in the
second round (a variant of the mastermind game with 5 holes), otherwise you
will be allocated to a simpler version of the game in the second round (a variant
of the mastermind game with 4 holes but 5 possible different colours instead of
6). Only your performance at the second round of the task will be
considered for your final payoff. Your score in the first round will not be
considered to determine your final payoff.
If you are allocated to the more complex version of the mastermind
game, you earn $3 for each code guessed. Alternatively, if you are
allocated to the simpler version, you earn $0.50 per code guessed.
Before performing the test you will have the option to buy 1 or
2 hints, which will provide you indications about strategies to guess
the correct code with a smaller number of attempts, which therefore
are likely to improve your performance in the test.
Please raise your hand if you have any question and wait for the instructor
who will privately answer your question.
Instructions for the mathematical task
The mathematical task consists in multiple choice questions (with 4 options of
response) relative to addition and subtraction of fractions. As in the mastermind
task, at the end of the first round, you will obtain a score, which will be compared
with the score of the 5 other participants from your group. If you get the first
or second best scores in your group, you will be allocated to a more complex
version of the same task in the second round. Alternatively, you will be allocated
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to a less complex version of the same task. Only your performance at the
second round will be considered for your final payoff. Your score in the
first round will not be considered to determine your final payoff. You will be
given 6 minutes to perform the test.
If you are allocated to the more complex version of the task, you
will earn $3 for each correct answer. Alternatively, if your are allo-
cated to the simpler version, you will earn $0.50 per correct answer.
Before performing the task, you will have the possibility to buy 1
or 2 hints, which will provide you some explanations on how to solve
the questions, which therefore are likely to improve your performance
in the test. You will have to decide whether you don’t want to buy any hint,
or if you want to buy 1 or 2 hints.
Please raise your hand if you have any question and wait for the instructor
who will privately answer your question.
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Hint 2 for the mathematical task
Read carefully the following explanations. You are allowed to take notes,
but you are not allowed to share your notes or talk with the other
participants.
How to find the common denominator?
Factor each of the numbers into primes. Then for each different prime num-
ber follow the steps hereafter:
1. Count the numbers of times each prime number appears in each of the
factorizations
2. For each prime number, take the largest of these counts
3. Multiply each factor the greatest number of times it occurs in either num-
ber
Examples
Find the least common multiple of these sets of numbers:
3, 9, 21
3 = 3
9 = 3× 3
21 = 3× 7
3× 3× 7 = 63 is the least common multiple
12, 80
12 = 2× 2× 3
80 = 2× 2× 2× 2× 5
24 × 3× 5 = 240 is the least common multiple
How to factor the numbers into prime numbers?
For instance, for 80, we start dividing it by the smallest prime number, 2,
which yields 40. Then we divide again 40 by 2, which yields 20, and successively
10 and 5. We can only divide 5 by itself. Thus we get the sequence 2× 2× 2×
2× 5 = 24 × 5.
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Hint 1 for the mastermind task
Read carefully the following explanations. You are allowed to take notes,
but you are not allowed to share your notes or talk with the other
participants.
In playing mastermind, one tries to make the most of previous information
and to use the information to narrow the possibilities in order to solve the code
in as few steps as possible. One way to do this is to always put guesses on
the board that would make answers to previous guesses valid; e.g. if a guess
receives no red or white pegs, we know that the code does not have any of the
colours in the guess and therefore, using these colours in future guesses would
be ineffective.
STRATEGY
1. For the first guess, randomly chose a code and submit it to be evaluated.
2. While the code is not broken (number of reds received equals the number
of positions),
2a. pick a random combination
2b. consider this combination as the actual code and test all previous
guesses against it; test if the same results come up.
2c. if 2b returned true, submit this combination or else, go back to step
2a.
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Instructions for the Holt and Laury (2009) risk task
Now you are given a list of ten decisions situations. Each decision situation is a
paired choice between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some
decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and
make them in any order. You will record your choices by clicking on the box
of your preferred option, but only one of them will be chosen randomly in the
end to determine your earnings. In the first decision situation, in Option
A you have 10% chances of winning $2 and 90% chances of winning
$1.60; whilst in option B, you have 10% chances of winning $3.85 and
90% chances of winning $0.10. The other decisions are similar, except
that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for
each option increase. In fact, for decision 10 in the bottom row, you
get $2 for sure in Option A and $3.85 for sure in Option B. Please
do not talk with anyone while we are doing your choices; raise your hand if you
have a question.
Option A Option B
10% of $2; 90% of $1.60  or  10% of $3.85; 90% of $0.10
20% of $2; 80% of $1.60  or  20% of $3.85; 80% of $0.10
30% of $2; 70% of $1.60  or  30% of $3.85; 70% of $0.10
40% of $2; 60% of $1.60  or  40% of $3.85; 60% of $0.10
50% of $2; 50% of $1.60  or  50% of $3.85; 50% of $0.10
60% of $2; 40% of $1.60  or  60% of $3.85; 40% of $0.10
70% of $2; 30% of $1.60  or  70% of $3.85; 30% of $0.10
80% of $2; 20% of $1.60  or  80% of $3.85; 20% of $0.10
90% of $2; 10% of $1.60  or  90% of $3.85; 10% of $0.10
100% of $2; 0% of $1.60  or  100% of $3.85; 0% of $0.10
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Instructions for the IAT
Put your index fingers on the E and I keys of your keyboard. Words or images
representing the categories at the top will appear one-by-one in the middle of
the screen. When the item belongs to a category on the left press the E Key.
When the item belongs to a category on the right, press the I key. If you make
an error, an X will appear. Fix the problem by pressing the other key.
The following is a list of category labels and the items that belong to each
of those categories:
• Chinese: Sketches of Chinese faces
• Australian: Sketches of Australian faces
• Math-intensive occupations: Statistician, Mathematician, Physicist, En-
gineer, Astronomer, Geodesist
• Non math-intensive occupations: Lawyer, Journalist, Diplomat, Philoso-
pher, Military Officer, Teacher
This is a time sorting task. Go as fast as you can, while making as few
mistakes as possible. The task will take about 5 minutes to complete. Enter
machine number and click the ok button to begin.
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B.3 Sample stimuli for the IAT
Sample stimuli for the target concept discrimination
Figure B.3.1: Sketches of Australians
Figure B.3.2: Sketches of Chinese
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C.1 Propensity score matching
We estimate a probit model for the propensity of each school in Queensland to
be part of the treatment group. We regress an indicator variable on whether
the school was part of the FOGS program on a set of school level characteristics
observed in 2009 (pre intervention), which might affect the likelihood of being
part of the program. We then match (with replacement) each treatment school
with the schools which had a very close conditional probability of being part of
the program, i.e. the ones with the smallest absolute difference in the propen-
sity score, given the pre-intervention characteristics. Our sample includes all
secondary or combined (primary and secondary) schools in Queensland, exclud-
ing those located in two regions, Darling Downs South West and Far North
Queensland, as none of the schools located in these two regions took part in the
FOGS Artie program.
We estimate the following probit model:
Pr(fs = 1|X) = Φ(X ′β)
where X is a vector of school level observable characteristics: school cate-
gory (secondary or combined school), region (Central Queensland, Metropoli-
tan, North Coast, North Queensland, South Sast), zone (metropolitan, provin-
cial, rural, remote), icsea (index of community socio-educational advantage),
total number of non-indigenous students enrolled at the school, total number
of indigenous students enrolled at the school, average attendance rate of non-
indigenous students and average attendance rate of indigenous students.
The probit regression results below show that schools with a larger number
of indigenous students have a higher probability to be part of the program. This
is consistent with the fact that the main selection criteria applied by the FOGS
was the number of indigenous students enrolled at the schools.
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Table C.1.1: Probit regression for program participa-
tion
Pr(fs = 1|X)
Combined -0.846
(0.605)
Icsea -0.005
(0.005)
No. of Indigenous students 0.027∗∗∗
(0.008)
No. of non Indigenous students -0.000
(0.001)
Attendance rate of Indigenous 6.514
(4.998)
Attendance rate of non Indigenous -7.837
(9.023)
Region (ref.= Central QLD)
Metropolitan region -1.440∗
(0.821)
North Coast region -0.026
(0.609)
North QLD region -7.568∗∗
(3.538)
South East region -0.729
(0.723)
EQ zone (ref.= Metropolitan)
Provincial -1.932∗∗
(0.851)
Remote -0.573
(0.544)
Rural 0.486
(0.868)
Schools 189
Prob > χ2 0.000
LR χ2 (13) 46.91
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
244 APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.2 Descriptive statistics
Table C.2.1: Socio-demographic characteristics for 2009
Indigenous Non-indigenous
Control Treatment Control Treatment
No. Col
%
No. Col
%
No. Col
%
No. Col
%
Year Level
8 399 25 377 26 3974 21 3948 22
9 390 25 358 24 4190 22 3870 21
10 337 21 334 23 4347 23 4017 22
11 295 19 251 17 3746 19 3666 20
12 161 10 157 11 3008 16 2727 15
Total 1582 100 1477 100 19265 100 18228 100
Female 813 51 735 50 9559 50 8886 49
Male 769 49 742 50 9706 50 9342 51
Total 1582 100 1477 100 19265 100 18228 100
Biparental family 1067 67 938 64 15907 83 14718 81
Monoparental family 515 33 539 36 3358 17 3510 19
Total 1582 100 1477 100 19265 100 18228 100
Mother’s education
Not stated/unknown 549 35 519 35 7504 39 6194 34
Year 9 or below 151 10 176 12 977 5 1072 6
Year 10 429 27 409 28 4711 24 4949 27
Year 11 190 12 145 10 1631 8 1610 9
Year 12 263 17 227 15 4440 23 4395 24
Total 1582 100 1476 100 19263 100 18220 100
Father’s education
Not stated/unknown 413 39 366 39 6708 42 5467 37
Year 9 or below 105 10 104 11 853 5 1036 7
Year 10 292 27 268 29 3855 24 3996 27
Year 11 57 5 72 8 1078 7 1057 7
Year 12 200 19 128 14 3413 21 3162 21
Total 1067 100 938 100 15907 100 14718 100
Schools 24 21 24 21
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C.3 Tutoring program in 2011
In this section, we report “program effects” for 2011. In 2010 and 2011 the scope
of the program was very limited. In 2010 in particular, only a very small number
of students identified by their teachers as being at risk of repeating grades would
benefit from extra learning support provided by the FOGS. In 2011, this scheme
was extended to 13 additional schools. Given that not all indigenous students
were part of the tutoring program and that those who benefited from it were
subjectively selected by the teachers, the estimates reported below cannot be
interpreted as the program effect. As in the results section, the estimates are
relative to the baseline year 2009. Although not reported here, there are no
significant effects for non-indigenous students. There are also no significant
effects in Naplan test scores and attendance for both sub-samples of indigenous
and non-indigenous students.
Table C.3.1: OLS estimates for the tutoring program for indigenous students
Semester 1 Semester 2
Academic grades
Math English Science Math English Science
FOGS x Year 2011 0.074 0.055 0.113 0.107 0.188∗∗ 0.104
(0.096) (0.101) (0.108) (0.086) (0.086) (0.079)
N 3059 2969 2017 3125 3055 2210
Behaviour
FOGS x Year 2011 0.157∗ 0.063 0.138 0.108 0.330∗∗∗ 0.089
(0.087) (0.095) (0.101) (0.099) (0.071) (0.099)
N 3407 3357 2170 2960 2950 2082
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 39 39 39 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level; grades standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. The control variables include indicator variables for the academic year, for
whether the student is enrolled in a treated school, parents’ education, the proportion of
indigenous students enrolled at the school and dummy variables for the school grade (9, 10,
11 and 12). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.4 Regression results with all schools that were
part of the program
Table C.4.1: OLS estimates of the program effect on behaviour, considering as treatment
schools the 21 schools part of the program
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
FOGS x Year 2012 0.176∗ 0.099 0.274∗∗ 0.060 0.197∗ 0.171
(0.088) (0.100) (0.114) (0.077) (0.109) (0.113)
N 3541 3500 2370 3074 3075 2300
Panel B: Male
FOGS x Year 2012 0.135 0.153 0.383∗∗ 0.029 0.195 0.230
(0.128) (0.144) (0.152) (0.106) (0.136) (0.156)
N 1755 1739 1170 1541 1542 1148
Panel C: Female
FOGS x Year 2012 0.215∗∗ 0.055 0.165 0.095 0.200 0.120
(0.101) (0.104) (0.135) (0.123) (0.122) (0.147)
N 1786 1761 1200 1533 1533 1152
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
FOGS x Year 2012 0.050 0.032 0.057 0.054 0.051 0.048
(0.057) (0.068) (0.077) (0.050) (0.073) (0.079)
N 52386 52069 36608 44958 44720 34192
Panel B: Male
FOGS x Year 2012 0.094 0.082 0.088 0.075 0.089 0.067
(0.067) (0.078) (0.097) (0.059) (0.075) (0.089)
N 26734 26550 18569 23044 22903 17430
Panel C: Female
FOGS x Year 2012 0.003 -0.022 0.025 0.032 0.011 0.027
(0.052) (0.065) (0.066) (0.047) (0.078) (0.075)
N 25652 25519 18039 21914 21817 16762
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4.2: OLS estimates of effects on academic grades, considering as treatment
schools the 21 schools part of the program
Academic grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
FOGS x Year 2012 0.000 0.041 0.081 0.042 0.122 0.103
(0.105) (0.108) (0.099) (0.099) (0.096) (0.094)
N 3658 3562 2515 3239 3194 2437
Panel B: Male
FOGS x Year 2012 0.017 -0.046 0.027 0.007 0.073 0.158
(0.132) (0.146) (0.124) (0.135) (0.118) (0.115)
N 1804 1757 1227 1614 1595 1209
Panel C: Female
FOGS x Year 2012 -0.018 0.131 0.129 0.076 0.171 0.052
(0.125) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.123) (0.117)
N 1854 1805 1288 1625 1599 1228
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
FOGS x Year 2012 0.018 0.025 0.034 0.036 -0.001 -0.024
(0.062) (0.052) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.074)
N 54670 54100 38954 48301 47894 36896
Panel B: Male
FOGS x Year 2012 0.026 0.033 0.026 0.055 0.018 -0.028
(0.063) (0.058) (0.066) (0.060) (0.066) (0.077)
N 27871 27547 19741 24658 24427 18771
Panel C: Female
FOGS x Year 2012 0.008 0.015 0.042 0.017 -0.020 -0.020
(0.068) (0.050) (0.076) (0.067) (0.064) (0.081)
N 26799 26553 19213 23643 23467 18125
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4.3: OLS estimates of effects on attendance, considering as treatment schools
the 21 schools part of the program
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
FOGS x Year 2012 -0.606 -1.618 -0.321 -1.276
(2.091) (1.563) (1.733) (1.297)
N 4211 4211 4211 4211
Panel B: Male
FOGS x Year 2012 -0.629 -1.150 -1.601 0.523
(2.357) (1.828) (2.241) (1.711)
N 2105 2105 2105 2105
Panel C: Female
FOGS x Year 2012 -0.418 -2.122 1.075 -3.108∗∗
(2.279) (1.552) (1.862) (1.267)
N 2106 2106 2106 2106
II. Non-indigenous
FOGS x Year 2012 0.213 -1.499 -0.792 -0.454
(1.301) (1.082) (1.255) (1.050)
N 59771 59771 59771 59771
FOGS x Year 2012 0.522 -1.652 -0.455 -0.818
(1.280) (1.150) (1.204) (1.030)
N 30520 30520 30520 30520
FOGS x Year 2012 -0.124 -1.332 -1.154 -0.068
(1.368) (1.038) (1.351) (1.105)
N 29251 29251 29251 29251
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.5 Robustness analysis
C.5.1 Regression results with school FE
In this section, we present the differences-in-differences estimation results for
a model that includes school-specific fixed effects (controlling for each school’s
unobserved characteristics). We estimate the following equation:
Yift = α+ βtreatift + timet + schools +X
′
iftδ + ift (C.1)
where treatift is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled
in a program school in 2012 and 0 otherwise, timet is a year fixed effect, X
represents a vector of individual and time varying school-level control variables.
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Table C.5.1: OLS estimates of the program effect on behaviour, with school FE
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.113 0.009 0.132 0.152∗ 0.153 0.146
(0.111) (0.132) (0.158) (0.084) (0.143) (0.147)
N 2592 2561 1734 2280 2287 1690
Panel B: Male
Treatment -0.069 -0.052 0.039 -0.033 0.127 0.157
(0.157) (0.200) (0.216) (0.140) (0.196) (0.188)
N 1283 1275 864 1153 1160 859
Panel B: Female
Treatment 0.303∗∗ 0.086 0.241 0.316∗ 0.187 0.136
(0.148) (0.122) (0.174) (0.164) (0.164) (0.223)
N 1309 1286 870 1127 1127 831
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.005 -0.038 -0.020 0.074 -0.039 0.002
(0.062) (0.078) (0.075) (0.060) (0.088) (0.067)
N 41171 40901 28639 35695 35431 26992
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.022 0.008 -0.025 0.100 -0.012 0.019
(0.071) (0.082) (0.096) (0.071) (0.090) (0.074)
N 21005 20854 14534 18252 18111 13750
Panel B: Female
Treatment -0.030 -0.084 -0.009 0.048 -0.063 -0.013
(0.059) (0.078) (0.068) (0.059) (0.092) (0.071)
N 20166 20047 14105 17443 17320 13242
Schools fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.2: OLS estimates of the program effect on academic grades, with school FE
Academic grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.061 -0.015 0.064 0.219∗∗ 0.164 0.121
(0.116) (0.129) (0.106) (0.094) (0.126) (0.125)
N 2718 2656 1889 2438 2420 1845
Panel B: Male
Treatment -0.014 -0.186 -0.056 0.055 0.069 0.150
(0.152) (0.162) (0.143) (0.128) (0.141) (0.142)
N 1337 1309 928 1219 1215 925
Panel B: Female
Treatment 0.136 0.162 0.183 0.368∗∗ 0.244 0.112
(0.173) (0.136) (0.121) (0.150) (0.169) (0.182)
N 1381 1347 961 1219 1205 920
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.002 -0.038 -0.042 0.028 -0.069 -0.052
(0.086) (0.061) (0.054) (0.075) (0.084) (0.082)
N 43564 43091 31066 38669 38346 29655
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.018 -0.029 -0.051 0.055 -0.052 -0.045
(0.090) (0.075) (0.068) (0.082) (0.094) (0.087)
N 22201 21933 15762 19709 19526 15070
Panel B: Female
Treatment -0.023 -0.045 -0.036 -0.001 -0.083 -0.066
(0.092) (0.053) (0.063) (0.076) (0.079) (0.089)
N 21363 21158 15304 18960 18820 14585
Schools fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.3: OLS estimates of the program effect on Naplan scores, with
school FE
Naplan scores
Writing Spelling Grammar Numeracy
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.305∗ 0.133 0.153 0.222
(0.179) (0.150) (0.145) (0.185)
N 972 972 972 974
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.562∗∗ 0.362 0.316 0.413
(0.240) (0.226) (0.205) (0.261)
N 527 527 527 528
Panel C: Female
Treatment -0.092 -0.220 -0.117 -0.065
(0.245) (0.236) (0.244) (0.299)
N 445 445 445 446
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment 0.020 0.017 0.047 0.002
(0.065) (0.060) (0.062) (0.067)
N 12367 12367 12367 12360
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.010 0.013 0.043 0.013
(0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.069)
N 6496 6496 6496 6491
Panel C: Female
Treatment 0.029 0.018 0.048 -0.008
(0.080) (0.073) (0.077) (0.085)
N 5871 5871 5871 5869
Schools fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0
and standard deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.4: OLS estimates of the program effect on attendance, with school FE
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.993 -2.120 0.424 -2.240
(2.349) (1.826) (2.093) (1.492)
N 3390 3390 3390 3390
Panel B: Male
Treatment -0.218 -2.336 0.095 -0.654
(2.637) (2.123) (2.613) (1.891)
N 1713 1713 1713 1713
Panel C: Female
Treatment -1.898 -1.727 0.896 -3.973∗∗
(2.547) (1.798) (2.275) (1.713)
N 1677 1677 1677 1677
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment -0.134 -1.968 -0.953 -0.738
(1.428) (1.234) (1.400) (1.217)
N 50365 50365 50365 50365
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.142 -2.268∗ -0.671 -1.247
(1.416) (1.300) (1.349) (1.136)
N 25684 25684 25684 25684
Panel C: Female
Treatment -0.422 -1.647 -1.225 -0.203
(1.503) (1.204) (1.511) (1.339)
N 24681 24681 24681 24681
Schools fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 37 37 37 37
Standard errors clustered at the school level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.5.2 Regression results with 14 control schools
Table C.5.5: OLS estimates of program effect on behaviour restricting the control group
to the 14 non-treated schools willing to take part in the program
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.203∗ 0.204 0.237 0.186∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.204
(0.116) (0.132) (0.160) (0.083) (0.142) (0.140)
N 1913 1895 1325 1722 1735 1302
Panel B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.075 0.144 0.197 0.114 0.274 0.205
(0.170) (0.196) (0.220) (0.158) (0.199) (0.176)
N 967 963 673 886 891 668
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.318∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.251 0.273 0.333∗∗ 0.205
(0.156) (0.113) (0.161) (0.191) (0.153) (0.193)
N 946 932 652 836 844 634
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.028 0.002 0.018 0.061 -0.010 0.027
(0.063) (0.086) (0.078) (0.055) (0.092) (0.084)
N 32874 32748 23168 28957 28821 22032
Panel B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.066 0.072 0.041 0.094 0.027 0.042
(0.072) (0.088) (0.097) (0.063) (0.088) (0.091)
N 16895 16843 11833 14866 14813 11278
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.010 -0.071 -0.002 0.029 -0.048 0.011
(0.058) (0.087) (0.076) (0.057) (0.103) (0.088)
N 15979 15905 11335 14091 14008 10754
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 25 25 25 25 25 25
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.6: OLS estimates of the program effect on academic grades restricting the
control group to the 14 non-treated schools willing to take part in the program
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
I. Indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.186 0.232∗∗ 0.156 0.261∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.205
(0.109) (0.108) (0.129) (0.100) (0.115) (0.131)
N 1892 1863 1324 1738 1732 1318
Panel B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.175 0.065 0.141 0.170 0.183 0.152
(0.155) (0.143) (0.174) (0.131) (0.157) (0.161)
N 955 936 664 887 885 675
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.174 0.384∗∗∗ 0.168 0.329∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.263∗
(0.162) (0.115) (0.140) (0.162) (0.115) (0.154)
N 937 927 660 851 847 643
II. Non-indigenous
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.060 0.016 -0.002 0.073 -0.007 -0.032
(0.079) (0.055) (0.063) (0.069) (0.073) (0.083)
N 33302 33041 23570 30013 29844 22767
Panel B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.076 0.040 0.005 0.119 0.012 -0.015
(0.082) (0.067) (0.075) (0.073) (0.082) (0.082)
N 17118 16979 12047 15377 15285 11644
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.041 -0.009 -0.007 0.024 -0.025 -0.051
(0.087) (0.052) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.096)
N 16184 16062 11523 14636 14559 11123
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 25 25 25 25 25 25
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.7: OLS estimates of the program effect on Naplan scores restrict-
ing the control group to the 14 non-treated schools willing to take part in
the program
Naplan scores
Writing Spelling Grammar Numeracy
I.Indigenous students
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.325∗ 0.194 0.185 0.155
(0.185) (0.151) (0.150) (0.205)
N 766 766 766 767
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.560∗∗ 0.490∗ 0.386∗ 0.442
(0.261) (0.247) (0.222) (0.299)
N 417 417 417 418
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.046 -0.156 -0.055 -0.199
(0.221) (0.208) (0.212) (0.295)
N 349 349 349 349
II. Non-indigenous students
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.078 0.069 0.101 0.057
(0.069) (0.059) (0.060) (0.063)
N 10064 10064 10064 10060
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.035 0.040 0.073 0.031
(0.070) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068)
N 5329 5329 5329 5326
Panel I.C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.126 0.103 0.132∗ 0.087
(0.081) (0.071) (0.073) (0.083)
N 4735 4735 4735 4734
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0
and standard deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.8: OLS estimates of the program effect on attendance restricting the control
group to the 14 non-treated schools willing to take part of the program
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
I. Indigenous students
Panel I.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 1.567 1.567 3.063 3.063
(2.176) (2.176) (1.988) (1.988)
N 2482 2482 2482 2482
Panel I.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 2.044 -4.294 2.465 -3.066
(2.621) (2.630) (2.843) (2.443)
N 1286 1286 1286 1286
Panel I.C: Female
Prgram x Year 2012 1.341 -3.899 3.998∗ -6.269∗∗∗
(2.552) (2.315) (2.250) (1.756)
N 1196 1196 1196 1196
II. Non-indigenous students
Panel II.A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 1.322 -3.079∗∗ 0.329 -1.803
(1.265) (1.402) (1.583) (1.462)
N 39349 39349 39349 39349
Panel II.B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 1.609 -3.307∗∗ 0.541 -2.218
(1.305) (1.478) (1.511) (1.400)
N 20203 20203 20203 20203
Panel II.C: Female
Prgram x Year 2012 1.025 -2.834∗∗ 0.121 -1.358
(1.322) (1.361) (1.720) (1.559)
N 19146 19146 19146 19146
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 27 27 27 27
Standard errors clustered at the school level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.5.3 Regression results for the total sample
Table C.5.9: OLS estimates of the program effect on behaviour for the total sample of indigenous
students from intact and single-parent families
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
Treatment -0.161∗ -0.044 -0.060 -0.136 -0.173∗ -0.095
(0.092) (0.099) (0.119) (0.096) (0.087) (0.101)
Year 2012 -0.069 -0.091 -0.109 0.095∗∗ -0.027 0.018
(0.064) (0.076) (0.068) (0.046) (0.079) (0.070)
Treatment x Year 2012 0.080 0.001 0.038 0.073 0.042 0.157
(0.090) (0.124) (0.141) (0.075) (0.141) (0.093)
Male -0.485∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.037) (0.045) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047)
Mother educ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Single-parent -0.169∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.049) (0.053) (0.041) (0.047) (0.041)
% Indigenous -3.357∗∗∗ -2.824∗∗∗ -3.038∗∗∗ -3.866∗∗∗ -4.342∗∗∗ -3.492∗∗∗
(0.674) (0.661) (0.676) (0.701) (0.593) (0.787)
Year 9 -0.220∗∗∗ -0.091∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.074 -0.052 -0.112∗
(0.059) (0.052) (0.064) (0.068) (0.060) (0.064)
Year 10 -0.140∗∗ -0.045 -0.142∗∗ 0.023 0.031 -0.082
(0.057) (0.046) (0.061) (0.054) (0.045) (0.064)
Year 11 0.109∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.055) (0.091) (0.071) (0.069) (0.111)
Year 12 0.444∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.069) (0.126) (0.106) (0.056) (0.214)
Constant 0.248∗ 0.123 0.190 0.042 0.222∗∗ 0.019
(0.128) (0.085) (0.140) (0.124) (0.089) (0.134)
N 3811 3768 2565 3327 3331 2486
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.10: OLS estimates of the program effect on behaviour for the total sample
of indigenous students from intact and single-parent families, by gender
Behaviour
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
Panel A: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.045 -0.035 0.110 0.120 0.027 0.257∗
(0.132) (0.177) (0.189) (0.122) (0.188) (0.139)
N 1879 1867 1281 1671 1675 1255
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 0.110 0.047 -0.019 0.029 0.057 0.067
(0.139) (0.120) (0.164) (0.153) (0.150) (0.147)
N 1932 1901 1284 1656 1656 1231
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.11: OLS estimates of the program effect on academic grades for the total sample of
indigenous students from intact and single-parent families
Academic grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
Treatment -0.072 0.002 -0.043 -0.127 -0.105 -0.069
(0.080) (0.093) (0.091) (0.076) (0.106) (0.081)
Year 2012 -0.044 -0.052 -0.013 0.056 0.013 0.087
(0.086) (0.079) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.059)
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.013 -0.034 0.038 0.115 0.108 0.087
(0.103) (0.102) (0.110) (0.080) (0.096) (0.124)
Male -0.190∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.024) (0.035) (0.029) (0.037)
Mother educ 0.016 0.023∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Single-parent -0.139∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.030) (0.040) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043)
% Indigenous -1.897∗∗ -1.206 -2.528∗∗∗ -2.081∗∗∗ -2.337∗∗ -2.178∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.728) (0.555) (0.701) (0.862) (0.484)
Year 9 -0.281∗∗∗ -0.082∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.097
(0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.057) (0.064)
Year 10 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.110∗ -0.133∗∗
(0.062) (0.042) (0.047) (0.057) (0.062) (0.058)
Year 11 -0.031 0.143∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.153∗∗ -0.169∗
(0.062) (0.070) (0.077) (0.066) (0.062) (0.085)
Year 12 0.309∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.133 0.498∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.099
(0.064) (0.054) (0.097) (0.085) (0.090) (0.131)
Constant -0.023 -0.072 0.024 -0.089 0.002 -0.235∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.094) (0.076) (0.097) (0.114) (0.076)
N 3982 3898 2783 3552 3513 2701
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.12: OLS estimates of the program effect on academic grades for the total
sample of indigenous students from intact and single-parent families, by gender
Academic grades
Semester 1 Semester 2
Math English Science Math English Science
Panel A: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.042 -0.131 -0.002 0.155 0.114 0.202
(0.131) (0.118) (0.113) (0.104) (0.133) (0.135)
N 1949 1911 1366 1755 1743 1336
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.070 0.068 0.076 0.074 0.113 -0.016
(0.143) (0.118) (0.140) (0.137) (0.103) (0.145)
N 2033 1987 1417 1797 1770 1365
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 35 35 35 35 35 35
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.13: OLS estimates of the program effect on Naplan scores for the
total sample of indigenous students from intact and single-parent families,
by gender
Naplan scores
Writing Spelling Grammar Numeracy
Panel A: Pooled sample
Treatment x Year 2012 0.043 -0.101 -0.070 -0.045
(0.152) (0.128) (0.126) (0.142)
N 1465 1465 1465 1467
Panel B: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 0.187 0.067 0.042 0.074
(0.213) (0.198) (0.195) (0.207)
N 776 776 776 777
Panel C: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -0.115 -0.282∗ -0.186 -0.164
(0.154) (0.154) (0.143) (0.184)
N 689 689 689 690
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 45 45 45 45
Standard errors clustered at the school level. Grades are standardised to mean 0
and standard deviation 1; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.14: OLS estimates of the program effect on attendance for the total sample
of indigenous students from intact and single-parent families
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
Treatment -0.543 1.416 -1.515 2.829∗∗
(1.848) (1.436) (1.306) (1.112)
Year 2012 0.852 -1.809 -5.818∗∗∗ 3.287∗∗∗
(2.245) (1.333) (1.594) (1.086)
Treatment x Year 2012 -3.341 -0.677 -1.749 -1.166
(2.649) (2.208) (1.943) (1.776)
Male 0.616 -0.219 1.725∗∗∗ -1.157∗∗∗
(0.498) (0.357) (0.436) (0.363)
Mother educ 0.630∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.147) (0.252) (0.191)
Single-parent -4.426∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ -4.920∗∗∗ 3.729∗∗∗
(0.663) (0.491) (0.726) (0.586)
% Indigenous -56.422∗∗∗ 45.127∗∗∗ -44.786∗∗∗ 28.486∗
(13.357) (15.117) (9.350) (15.860)
Year 9 -4.514∗∗∗ 3.180∗∗∗ -3.617∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗
(0.811) (0.501) (0.950) (0.762)
Year 10 -7.740∗∗∗ 5.187∗∗∗ -3.041∗∗∗ 3.008∗∗∗
(0.983) (0.701) (0.876) (0.669)
Year 11 -5.408∗∗∗ 4.162∗∗∗ -0.771 1.806∗∗∗
(0.859) (0.791) (0.720) (0.617)
Year 12 -2.937∗∗∗ 1.084 3.447∗∗∗ -2.463∗∗
(1.015) (0.792) (1.142) (0.990)
Constant 87.358∗∗∗ 4.485∗∗∗ 86.284∗∗∗ 6.671∗∗∗
(1.405) (1.572) (1.341) (1.689)
N 5158 5158 5158 5158
Schools 37 37 37 37
Standard errors clustered at the school level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5.15: OLS estimates of the program effect on attendance for the total sample
of indigenous students from intact and single-parent families, by gender
Semester 1 Semester 2
Attendance Unexplained Attendance Unexplained
rate absences rate absences
Panel A: Male
Treatment x Year 2012 -3.793 -0.735 -1.981 -0.171
(2.792) (2.390) (2.467) (2.073)
N 2571 2571 2571 2571
Panel B: Female
Treatment x Year 2012 -2.731 -0.611 -1.403 -2.205
(2.928) (2.276) (2.031) (1.874)
N 2587 2587 2587 2587
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schools 37 37 37 37
Standard errors clustered at the school level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
